Status
Available
Call number
Call number
973.922 sch
Genres
Collection
Publication
Mariner Books (2002), Edition: 1, 1120 pages
Description
As special assistant to the president, Arthur Schlesinger witnessed firsthand the politics and personalities that influenced the now legendary Kennedy administration. Schlesinger's close relationship with JFK, as a politician and as a friend, has resulted in this authoritative yet intimate account in which the president "walks through the pages, from first to last, alert, alive, amused and amusing" (John Kenneth Galbraith). A THOUSAND DAYS is "at once a masterly literary achievement and a work of major historical significance" (New York Times).
Subjects
Original publication date
1965
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User reviews
LibraryThing member keylawk
Schlesinger was Special Assistant in the Kennedy Administration -- really a personal friend "with portfolio" -- for example he was an official part of the election campaign, and after Kennedy took office, was assigned to prepare Kennedy's trip to South America. He was part of the Kennedy Cabinet,
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one of the most intelligent and educated Cabinets before or since. Show Less
LibraryThing member Angelic55blonde
This is an amazing book by Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. Now, given his close relationship to President Kennedy it is clear that there will be some bias. But Schlesinger deals with that right away by acknowledging that in the beginning of his book. Also, even though there is somewhat of a bias which
It is a very long book so it does get dry from time to time but Schlesinger, Jr. gives so much detail the reader really feels like they lived during that time period or were in the room with Kennedy.
This book will definitely take you a long time to read it but it is so worth it. I highly recommend this book.
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makes Schlesinger not hit as hard as he could on some of Kennedy's white house days, this is still a great book that is a great addition to the historiography on President Kennedy.It is a very long book so it does get dry from time to time but Schlesinger, Jr. gives so much detail the reader really feels like they lived during that time period or were in the room with Kennedy.
This book will definitely take you a long time to read it but it is so worth it. I highly recommend this book.
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LibraryThing member mdobe
Arthur M. Schlessinger, Jr.'s book on the Kennedy Presidency is of interest to the historian of foreign policy and diplomacy if for no other reason than the fact that he was close enough to the internal workings of the American presidency that he could write a book of personal reminiscences which
The U.S.-Soviet Cold War dominates much of Schlessinger's account. Schlessinger shared (as well as shaped) the American Cold War consensus ideology during the years covered in this account. Within the context of this consensus he characterizes Kennedy as a consummate statesman, able to find the correct balance between diplomacy and the recourse to military force and - perhaps most importantly - able to learn from his mistakes. This "memoir" of the Kennedy Presidency, full of first hand accounts of diplomacy at the highest levels of government, also represents an attempt to draw "lessons" from American history. This book bears testimony to Schlessinger's important assumption about the Cold War, which - simply put - is that the Munich analogy applies to U.S.-Soviet relations.
Though it would be unfair to characterize the book as Kennedy-worship pure and simple, there is a great deal to James MacGregor Burns' claim that Kennedy was astute enough to choose his own biographer. The Bay of Pigs, for instance, was Kennedy's "ordeal by fire" in which he learned the lessons vlhich allowed him to emerge successful from the Cuban missile crisis. Even from the jaws of defeat, Schlessinger allows his "hero" to snatch victory (and perhaps vindicate his own performance as author of the famous white paper on Cuba?). the prototypical statesman is the account of the Berlin Crisis of 1961. During the crisis Kennedy sought the advice of subordinates, yet maintained control over policy formulation at all times (in contrast to Eisenhower, who Schlessinger implies gave a free reign to John Foster Dulles). As tensions over Berlin mounted in the aftermath of the Kennedy-Khrushchev meeting in Vienna, Dean Acheson recommended sending an Army division along the corridor to West Berlin to demonstrate American resolve. Schlessinger and Kissinger stressed the need for more extensive attempts at diplomacy. Kennedy took a middle course, calling up the reserves but threatening no military action when the East Germans erected the wall. JFK also eschcalated hastily beginning negotiations with the Soviets. In the section entitled "Coda," with which Schlessinger concludes the chapter "Trial in Berlin," Schlessinger stresses the continuing process of education which Kennedy underwent in his attempt to combine high ideals with a "realistic" assessment of geopolitics.
"The Berlin crisis of 1961 represented a further step beyond Laos in the education of the President in the controlled employment of force in the use of peace. One never knows, of course, what would have happened if Kennedy had ordered full mobilization, or if he had rushed straight into negotiation; but either extreme might well have invited Soviet miscalculation and ended in war. Instead he applied power and diplomacy in a combination and sequence which enabled him to guard the vital interests of the west and hold off the holocaust." (p. 404)
According to Schlessinger, Kennedy struck just the right balance in his relationship with the Soviets over Berlin.
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would qualify as a history. As one of a general outpouring of reminiscences in the aftermath of the Kennedy assassination it has surprisingly retained its utility.1 Looking back in retrospect nearly 30 years after its publication, The Thousand Days still affords a valuable insider's account. Obviously written for the general educated public, the book has the additional advantage of historical writing has lost in the last several decades.The U.S.-Soviet Cold War dominates much of Schlessinger's account. Schlessinger shared (as well as shaped) the American Cold War consensus ideology during the years covered in this account. Within the context of this consensus he characterizes Kennedy as a consummate statesman, able to find the correct balance between diplomacy and the recourse to military force and - perhaps most importantly - able to learn from his mistakes. This "memoir" of the Kennedy Presidency, full of first hand accounts of diplomacy at the highest levels of government, also represents an attempt to draw "lessons" from American history. This book bears testimony to Schlessinger's important assumption about the Cold War, which - simply put - is that the Munich analogy applies to U.S.-Soviet relations.
Though it would be unfair to characterize the book as Kennedy-worship pure and simple, there is a great deal to James MacGregor Burns' claim that Kennedy was astute enough to choose his own biographer. The Bay of Pigs, for instance, was Kennedy's "ordeal by fire" in which he learned the lessons vlhich allowed him to emerge successful from the Cuban missile crisis. Even from the jaws of defeat, Schlessinger allows his "hero" to snatch victory (and perhaps vindicate his own performance as author of the famous white paper on Cuba?). the prototypical statesman is the account of the Berlin Crisis of 1961. During the crisis Kennedy sought the advice of subordinates, yet maintained control over policy formulation at all times (in contrast to Eisenhower, who Schlessinger implies gave a free reign to John Foster Dulles). As tensions over Berlin mounted in the aftermath of the Kennedy-Khrushchev meeting in Vienna, Dean Acheson recommended sending an Army division along the corridor to West Berlin to demonstrate American resolve. Schlessinger and Kissinger stressed the need for more extensive attempts at diplomacy. Kennedy took a middle course, calling up the reserves but threatening no military action when the East Germans erected the wall. JFK also eschcalated hastily beginning negotiations with the Soviets. In the section entitled "Coda," with which Schlessinger concludes the chapter "Trial in Berlin," Schlessinger stresses the continuing process of education which Kennedy underwent in his attempt to combine high ideals with a "realistic" assessment of geopolitics.
"The Berlin crisis of 1961 represented a further step beyond Laos in the education of the President in the controlled employment of force in the use of peace. One never knows, of course, what would have happened if Kennedy had ordered full mobilization, or if he had rushed straight into negotiation; but either extreme might well have invited Soviet miscalculation and ended in war. Instead he applied power and diplomacy in a combination and sequence which enabled him to guard the vital interests of the west and hold off the holocaust." (p. 404)
According to Schlessinger, Kennedy struck just the right balance in his relationship with the Soviets over Berlin.
Show Less