Status
Available
Call number
Call number
940.54219218 Cla
Collection
Publication
Atlantic Monthly Press (2008), 416 pages
Description
A British military historian offers an in-depth account of two critical offensives led by Allied troops against the Nazi power base on the Rhine, examining the strategies, military leaders, and campaign of the two airborne assaults, the events leading up to combat, the power struggle among Allied leadership, and the results of the battles on the war's outcome.
User reviews
LibraryThing member stevesmits
My interest in this book stems from my father's participation in Operation Market Garden as a soldier in the 504th Parachute Regiment of the 82nd Airborne Division. Dad spoke about the famous crossing of the Waal River in small boats to secure the bridge at Nijmegen; a very harrowing tale. This
Market Garden was the brainchild of Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery who believed that a dagger-like move through eastern Holland could achieve a breakout into the Ruhr region and, ultimately, a move on Berlin. Montgomery persuaded a reluctant Eisenhower who needed to placate the vainglorious Brit who had been creating difficult political tensions among the allies. A secondary factor behind the decision was to attempt a large-scale airborne action, something that the military leadership had been hoping to try. Montgomery is portrayed here, as in other histories, as an abrasive demanding egotist who was aggressively seeking to keep himself in the limelight over the American generals in the European theater.
The plan had serious flaws which doomed it to failure. It called for dropping parachutists and glider-borne infantry at three bridgeheads: at Eindhoven (the 101st division), at Nijmegen (the 82nd) and Arnhem (the 1st British) to secure the bridges while an armored column raced up a narrow causeway to pass over the bridges and finally across the Rhine into Germany. The flaws were principally two: a failure to recognize the intelligence reports that two Panzer division were in the region, and the difficulty in the face of opposition of the armored corps to proceed up the causeway. The road was bounded by marshy terrain that required the vehicles to stick to the road; any blocking action by opposing forces would stall the column (and did).
The two American divisions succeeded in achieving their objectives, although with significant casualties. The Brits landed too far from their planned drop zone and quickly encountered fierce opposition from German forces in the region. There was a belief among the allies that the Germans were fairly weak and dispirited and would quickly fold under allied pressure. This turned out not to be the case.
After more than a week of trying to break through to relieve the besieged paratroopers at Arnhem the allies had to withdraw. Some of the Brits at Arnhem managed to escape, but many were captured.
The result of Market Garden was to extend a stalemate in the northern sector of the front, not broken until 1945. The author notes that the decision to proceed with an operation before the Port at Antwerp was secured was another deficit as supplies could only reach the armies with difficulty.
Another use of airborne forces, one that is less well-known, occurred in March 1945. Again planned by Montgomery, this effort featured crossing the Rhine at Wesel with a large force, supported by a major airborne drop to secure the flanks of the infantry. In this instance, the utilization of the 17th airborne division, augmented by a regiment from the 101st, was much more modest in intent. Unlike Market Garden it did succeed, although by this point the German opposition was extremely weak.
This book tells of both campaigns in great depth. Like many close recountings of military actions, it is hard to follow the details as the reader is unfamiliar with the terrain and the chronology cannot be told in a linear fashion. Notwithstanding, the book excels in laying out the strategy and the personal/political dynamics of the leading generals. It also features many anecdotes from soldiers who experienced the action on the ground. These give the history a vividness of human perspective that makes it fascinating.
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book tells the story of Market Garden in great detail and also of Operation Varsity and Plunder -- the crossing of the Rhine in March 1945, which featured another airborne assault.Market Garden was the brainchild of Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery who believed that a dagger-like move through eastern Holland could achieve a breakout into the Ruhr region and, ultimately, a move on Berlin. Montgomery persuaded a reluctant Eisenhower who needed to placate the vainglorious Brit who had been creating difficult political tensions among the allies. A secondary factor behind the decision was to attempt a large-scale airborne action, something that the military leadership had been hoping to try. Montgomery is portrayed here, as in other histories, as an abrasive demanding egotist who was aggressively seeking to keep himself in the limelight over the American generals in the European theater.
The plan had serious flaws which doomed it to failure. It called for dropping parachutists and glider-borne infantry at three bridgeheads: at Eindhoven (the 101st division), at Nijmegen (the 82nd) and Arnhem (the 1st British) to secure the bridges while an armored column raced up a narrow causeway to pass over the bridges and finally across the Rhine into Germany. The flaws were principally two: a failure to recognize the intelligence reports that two Panzer division were in the region, and the difficulty in the face of opposition of the armored corps to proceed up the causeway. The road was bounded by marshy terrain that required the vehicles to stick to the road; any blocking action by opposing forces would stall the column (and did).
The two American divisions succeeded in achieving their objectives, although with significant casualties. The Brits landed too far from their planned drop zone and quickly encountered fierce opposition from German forces in the region. There was a belief among the allies that the Germans were fairly weak and dispirited and would quickly fold under allied pressure. This turned out not to be the case.
After more than a week of trying to break through to relieve the besieged paratroopers at Arnhem the allies had to withdraw. Some of the Brits at Arnhem managed to escape, but many were captured.
The result of Market Garden was to extend a stalemate in the northern sector of the front, not broken until 1945. The author notes that the decision to proceed with an operation before the Port at Antwerp was secured was another deficit as supplies could only reach the armies with difficulty.
Another use of airborne forces, one that is less well-known, occurred in March 1945. Again planned by Montgomery, this effort featured crossing the Rhine at Wesel with a large force, supported by a major airborne drop to secure the flanks of the infantry. In this instance, the utilization of the 17th airborne division, augmented by a regiment from the 101st, was much more modest in intent. Unlike Market Garden it did succeed, although by this point the German opposition was extremely weak.
This book tells of both campaigns in great depth. Like many close recountings of military actions, it is hard to follow the details as the reader is unfamiliar with the terrain and the chronology cannot be told in a linear fashion. Notwithstanding, the book excels in laying out the strategy and the personal/political dynamics of the leading generals. It also features many anecdotes from soldiers who experienced the action on the ground. These give the history a vividness of human perspective that makes it fascinating.
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LibraryThing member bobbre
One would think that by its title, the book would deal with the Allied operations to cross the Rhine in 1945. While it does so in a cursory way, the bulk of the tome concerns itself with Airborne unit training topics and primarily deals with Operation Market Garden, which, as is known to many, did
The text is readable and quite well-written, although at times it feels like it is just some filler strung between excerpts from other sources.
On the positive side, it does provide a very good introduction to the airborne operations in Holland and Germany. Although not an exhaustive exposition of the campaigns, it does serve to give satisfactory explanations as to why they occurred and gives ample credit to the courageous soldiers who fought there.
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not succeed in a Rhine crossing. The subsequent operation, Plunder Varsity is covered in a general sense but for only the last third of the work. If one is looking for a more informative treatise on the crossing this book will not suffice.The text is readable and quite well-written, although at times it feels like it is just some filler strung between excerpts from other sources.
On the positive side, it does provide a very good introduction to the airborne operations in Holland and Germany. Although not an exhaustive exposition of the campaigns, it does serve to give satisfactory explanations as to why they occurred and gives ample credit to the courageous soldiers who fought there.
Show Less
Pages
416