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What is the guiding principle of the world's most powerful nation as it searches for enemies at home and abroad? Who is actually running U.S. foreign policy? The story begins on September 12, 2001, as America began to gather itself for a response to the unimaginable. Journalist Suskind tells us what actually occurred over the next three years, from the inside out, by tracing the steps of the key actors who oversee the "war on terror" and report progress to an anxious nation; and the invisibles, the men and women just below the line of sight, left to improvise plans to defeat a new kind of enemy in an hour-by-hour race against disaster. The internal battles between these two teams--one, the Bush administration, under the hot lights; the other, actually fighting the fight--reveal everything about what America faces, and what it has done, in this age of terror.--From publisher description.… (more)
User reviews
From the opening pages it was clear that Suskind was going to take no prisoners. He tells us that Bush was never much of a reader (despite the efforts to project an image that he was), and that he based his decisions on gut reactions based on face to face meetings.
The genius of Suskind is that he writes in a way that shows he is not just twisting a knife in the dying corpse of a discredited administration. In fact he makes a good case for Bush's strengths in his use of gut feeling - something that served him well over the years. Yes, the author is fairly clear that Cheney was really pulling the strings in the US administration (with the help of Rumsfeld et al.), but we see Bush fighting to assert his own authority, and his strengths and weaknesses laid bare.
The result is, of course, a fairly damning indictment on men who followed an obsession against the evidence, leading America into what we can all now see to be the biggest American foreign policy disaster ever. Nevertheless it is written in a way that is not anti American. It is well informed, compassionate and articulately written.
My biggest problem with the book though was the slight;y piecemeal way it is laid out. The timeline jumps forward and back a little. As this is essentially a narrative history based on primary sources, I would have liked it to be laid out in a slightly more logical and chronological order. But that is not a reason not to read this book. In fact this book or something like it should be used in all future courses on American history!
Suskind details some of the early successes of intelligence gathering before the bad guys caught on to the fact that we could hear their telephone conversations and read their e-mail. Western Union was very helpful in tracing monetary transfers. Since the jihadis discovered our technological expertise, they have used more primitive means to communicate. It may take them longer to plan, but that hasn't diminished their determination.
The combination of nuclear threats and fanatical Muslims makes Cheney's doctrine seem to me to be a sensible approach. Suskind's book, however, shows the dark side of the doctrine. He shows how, over time, the doctrine allowed the U.S. to stop verifying leads and react even where there was little or no reason to suspect a threat was real. It also lead to manufacturing evidence [Iraqi purchase of yellow cake uranium from Niger] to justify the goal of further action--the invasion of Iraq.
Suskind tells a good story of bureaucratic in-fighting as the C.I.A., N.S.A., and F.B.I. battled each other as rivals. The author feels that some of the best men in the intelligence agencies have left because of the administration's use of intelligence to justify pre-ordained plans rather than as a guide for setting policy. That may in part because most of his sources seem to be disgruntled former intelligence professionals.
Suskind concludes that the Doctrine has damaged morale and is contrary to America's national ideals. He fails to give Cheney credit where credit was due in two respects: (1) recognizing the enormity of the threat and changing a mind set from criminal law enforcement to aggressive war fighting and (2) compelling rival agencies to co-operate.
Whatever the validity of Suskind's conclusions, this is an important book in providing hair-raising details of the resourcefulness and viciousness of America's enemies, including some in the current administration.
(JAB)
According to Suskind, as Vice President to the 43rd U.S. President, Cheney was master designer and chief enforcer of what became known from the White House inner circles as the Cheney Doctrine. In its simplest form the tenet launched preventive acts that were based on suspicion. The “One Percent” notion lay in his edict that even if there was a one-percent chance of the unimaginable happening, the country needed to act as if the event was a certainty. America didn’t need to have 99% surety or accuracy of information before trouncing any source.
Suskind paints George W. Bush as a global diplomacy neophyte, a visceral fighter prone to bullying, and a faith-based fear monger who leans on Cheney as a funnel that allowed Bush Presidential deniability if any project went sour. With the President’s ear, Cheney and his minions unleashed CIA operations into 80 countries; prompted the impetus for the creation of Homeland Security and the enactment of the U.S. Patriot Act; made Geneva Conventions obsolete for imprisoned enemy combatants in the “War on Terror”; and basically enlarged the Administration’s powers beyond those constitutionally recognized.
Cheney’s credo lay in response, not analysis. Without substantial evidence or any measure of probable cause, the Administration’s agencies were permitted to pursue, prosecute—if not persecute—those suspected of potential harm. The Cheney Doctrine tried to salve the horrors of 9/11 when the defenses of the United States were weakest. Through White House agency directives much of al Qaeda, Taliban, or other conceived terrorist units were wrecked if not destroyed. Nevertheless and after five years, the Bush quick-step stanching of worldwide terrorism through electronic targeting and armed forces deployments merely had driven the fanatic networks underground while providing those extremists ample recruitment material, such as pictures of Abu Ghraib, videos of wounded civilians, and the remains of destroyed institutions.
This book continues to be a harrowing glimpse of Presidential endorsement in the unaccustomed and unfettered use of global power.
The "one percent doctrine" was crafted by Dick Cheney. Essentially, if there's a 1% chance that something will happen then the White House treats it as an absolute certainty. This has led the U.S. on many wild goose chases, and a 1% chance that maybe someone in Iraq met with someone in Al Qaeda helped lead us into our Iraq war.
This book is definitely to be watched with The Dark Side. That show gives you names and faces of the CIA operatives in this book who have since left the agency disgruntled. It also shows you how Cheney and others really beat the drum of Iraq long before 9/11. I also recommend reading it with Bush at War by Bob Woodward. Suskind leaves out much of the details of war in Afghanistan since Woodward had already covered them so well.