Status
Available
Collection
Publication
Penguin Group USA (2014), Edition: Reprint, 632 pages
Description
Presents a minute-by-minute account of an H-bomb accident that nearly caused a nuclear disaster, examining other near misses and America's growing susceptibility to a catastrophic event.
User reviews
LibraryThing member arubabookwoman
This is a sobering look at U.S. nuclear policy from immediately after WW II until the end of the Cold War. Inserted among this history is a minute by minute account of an accident in a nuclear missile silo in Damascus Arkansas in the 1980's.
After the end of WW II, there was no cohesive plan for
There has also been an ongoing conflict between policies of safety and reliability, with the scientists arguing for more safety controls to prevent accidental detonation, and the military pushing for bombs that would go off every time. Needless to say, the military has won, and each time defense spending is authorized the funds are used to make bigger and better bombs, rather than to alter the bombs we already have to make sure they don't accidently go off.
Throughout this history, Schlosser details the thousands (yes I said thousands) of nuclear accidents that have occurred, many minor, but an unsettling number major, including crashes of planes carrying nuclear weapons and the accidental dropping of nuclear bombs. I personally remember the incident in which a plane crashed near Spain in the mid-60's and weeks were spent looking for a lost nuclear bomb. (The other two bombs the plane was carrying were immediately found). And a lot of us of a certain age remember the Cuban missile crisis, and many think that this incident was the closest we've come to nuclear war. Not true--behind the scenes we apparently came even closer during the Berlin Wall crisis.
My criticism of this book is that it basically ends with the fall of the Berlin Wall, the so-called end of the Cold War. I don't think anyone can assume that because the US and the USSR are no longer facing each other down the barrel of a nuclear bomb we are safe, or even safer. There is obviously the problem of the possibility of regional nuclear wars (Indian/Pakistan; Israel/Arab country). Many experts believe, however, that if there is a nuclear holocaust it will most likely be because of a mistake or accident. One of the scariest events the book describes took place during the early 60's when the early warning radar screens at NORAD showed dozens of Soviet missiles headed for the US. The officer in charge had mere minutes to decide whether to launch in retaliation. Fortunately the officer remembered that Khruschev was at the UN in NYC that week, and reasoned that the Soviets wouldn't start a nuclear war while their leader was in the US. It was later determined that the "missiles" that showed up on the radar screen was the moon rising over Norway.
After the end of WW II, there was no cohesive plan for
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how to handle nuclear weapons, and in fact no one was even sure that the bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki could be replicated. A rivalry between the military and civilians for control of nuclear weapons immediately began, with control swinging toward the military each year until there was no longer even the pretense of civilian control. Each successive president was pressured by the military to to delegate the authority to "push the button," to the military, as well as to allow foreign governments, i.e. NATO) to possess and control some of the bombs. There has also been an ongoing conflict between policies of safety and reliability, with the scientists arguing for more safety controls to prevent accidental detonation, and the military pushing for bombs that would go off every time. Needless to say, the military has won, and each time defense spending is authorized the funds are used to make bigger and better bombs, rather than to alter the bombs we already have to make sure they don't accidently go off.
Throughout this history, Schlosser details the thousands (yes I said thousands) of nuclear accidents that have occurred, many minor, but an unsettling number major, including crashes of planes carrying nuclear weapons and the accidental dropping of nuclear bombs. I personally remember the incident in which a plane crashed near Spain in the mid-60's and weeks were spent looking for a lost nuclear bomb. (The other two bombs the plane was carrying were immediately found). And a lot of us of a certain age remember the Cuban missile crisis, and many think that this incident was the closest we've come to nuclear war. Not true--behind the scenes we apparently came even closer during the Berlin Wall crisis.
My criticism of this book is that it basically ends with the fall of the Berlin Wall, the so-called end of the Cold War. I don't think anyone can assume that because the US and the USSR are no longer facing each other down the barrel of a nuclear bomb we are safe, or even safer. There is obviously the problem of the possibility of regional nuclear wars (Indian/Pakistan; Israel/Arab country). Many experts believe, however, that if there is a nuclear holocaust it will most likely be because of a mistake or accident. One of the scariest events the book describes took place during the early 60's when the early warning radar screens at NORAD showed dozens of Soviet missiles headed for the US. The officer in charge had mere minutes to decide whether to launch in retaliation. Fortunately the officer remembered that Khruschev was at the UN in NYC that week, and reasoned that the Soviets wouldn't start a nuclear war while their leader was in the US. It was later determined that the "missiles" that showed up on the radar screen was the moon rising over Norway.
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LibraryThing member zmagic69
This is an outstanding book, about the nuclear weapons systems of the United States,and the many problems regarding the storage and use of them. It was really quite scary. The author does a fantastic job of reporting the facts, not being political( both republican and democrat presidents come off
One thing the reader will see is that as the bureaucracy that dealt with these weapons got bigger and bigger the less control and supervision that was applied. The complete lack of any strategy for using these weapons other than launching all of them and wiping out everything.
The book focuses on two main things, all of the nuclear weapons that the USA has developed, and a major disaster at a Titan II missile silo. If you like fiction such as Tom Clancy and old Clive Cussler, you will be blown away by this book and the fact that dumb luck played a Hugh roll in avoiding disaster.
An excellent companion book to this is Full Body Burden by Kristen Iverson, which details the same incompetence such as building it where they did and the lack of safety measures employed in the making of plutonium triggers at the Rocky Flats site outside Boulder Colorado. If you are looking for more information regarding the history and making of the first atomic bomb you can't do better than The Making Of The Atomic Bomb by Richard Rhodes.
The reader needs to keep in mind that what is in this book is only was has been declassified, or otherwise released, god knows, what else has happened that we don't know.
After reading this book I know that our government is too big to do anything efficiently, effectively, cost consciously, and provide the required resources and safety measures needed to prevent a disaster.
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honest and believable regarding the use of such weapons) and the military whether being run by liberals or conservatives were u realistic 90 percent of the time, refusing to listen to and correct safety issues, and have cohesive plans for usi g these weapons. The scary part is the complete lack of concern regarding making these weapons safer, so that they can't accidentally detonate, or be launched accidentally. That people with very little technical training were allowed to handle and miss handle the weapons was astonishing. The fact that we did not have any major catastrophes is a miracle.One thing the reader will see is that as the bureaucracy that dealt with these weapons got bigger and bigger the less control and supervision that was applied. The complete lack of any strategy for using these weapons other than launching all of them and wiping out everything.
The book focuses on two main things, all of the nuclear weapons that the USA has developed, and a major disaster at a Titan II missile silo. If you like fiction such as Tom Clancy and old Clive Cussler, you will be blown away by this book and the fact that dumb luck played a Hugh roll in avoiding disaster.
An excellent companion book to this is Full Body Burden by Kristen Iverson, which details the same incompetence such as building it where they did and the lack of safety measures employed in the making of plutonium triggers at the Rocky Flats site outside Boulder Colorado. If you are looking for more information regarding the history and making of the first atomic bomb you can't do better than The Making Of The Atomic Bomb by Richard Rhodes.
The reader needs to keep in mind that what is in this book is only was has been declassified, or otherwise released, god knows, what else has happened that we don't know.
After reading this book I know that our government is too big to do anything efficiently, effectively, cost consciously, and provide the required resources and safety measures needed to prevent a disaster.
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LibraryThing member Maurice_Frontz
The book, by the author of 'Fast Food Nation,' intersperses the seventy-year history of nuclear weapons with a blow-by-blow account of a deadly accident at a Titan II missile site in Arkansas in 1980. A fascinating read in which anyone, even someone who has read a lot about the Cold War, will learn
New to me was the inter-service rivalry for control of nuclear weapons, the tremendous waste of resources involved, and the overkill of the Strategic Integrated Operations Plan (SIOP) which targeted Moscow with hundreds of warheads to ensure its destruction.
In addition to recounting the history, the author has a purpose: human error or system error can never be eliminated from possibility and indeed are likely. Many accidents in the twentieth-century avoided a nuclear detonation by sheer good fortune or 'divine intervention.' The question is: how much longer will our luck hold?
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something new.New to me was the inter-service rivalry for control of nuclear weapons, the tremendous waste of resources involved, and the overkill of the Strategic Integrated Operations Plan (SIOP) which targeted Moscow with hundreds of warheads to ensure its destruction.
In addition to recounting the history, the author has a purpose: human error or system error can never be eliminated from possibility and indeed are likely. Many accidents in the twentieth-century avoided a nuclear detonation by sheer good fortune or 'divine intervention.' The question is: how much longer will our luck hold?
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LibraryThing member pierthinker
Schlosser charts the history of nuclear weapons in the USA focusing on the way these weapons were controlled and the way they were mishandled and mistreated. He describes incident after incident where stupidity, incompetence and plain bad luck took America to the edge of a nuclear accident on home
Schlosser writes with an easy rhythm and explains the technicalities well. He avoids hysteria and hyperbole, letting the facts speak for themselves. Unnervingly, there is nothing in this analysis that suggests the control of nuclear weapons today is any better than it was during the events he describes here.
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soil time and time again. That such an accident never occurred is not so much due to the integrity and inherent safety of the weapons themselves or the protocols surrounding their control and handling,but due to dumb luck and the failure, in many cases, of the ignition technologies in place (raising questions about whether these weapons would have worked in a real war situation…).Schlosser writes with an easy rhythm and explains the technicalities well. He avoids hysteria and hyperbole, letting the facts speak for themselves. Unnervingly, there is nothing in this analysis that suggests the control of nuclear weapons today is any better than it was during the events he describes here.
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LibraryThing member HenryKrinkle
In September 1980, an airman working basic maintenance on a Tiatan II nuckear missile dropped a wrench socket which pierced the rocket. Oxidizer and jet fuel leaked, and after a desperate 24 hour attempt to contain the leak, the silo exploded, resulting in one death and multiple injuries. Eric
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Schlosser uses this acccident to loook at the history of the Strategic Air Command and the development of nuclear missile safety. There have been hundreds of mishaps involvingg warheads that should have exploded but didn't because of design flaws. A valuable and interesting book, if a little dry when Schlosser's looking at the policy end of things. Show Less
LibraryThing member drmaf
This is a seriously scary book. If you slept comfortably at night thinking that America's nuclear arsenal was safely protected by layer upon layer of foolproof safeguards, you will abandon that delusion after reading this book. A sorry chronicle of America's progress through the nuclear age,
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backgrounded against the development of a potentially horrific incident in a Titan II silo in Arkansas, where a fuel leak caused by a dropped spanner escalated into a terrible explosion that killed one and injured many others. Had the warhead detonated, a large part of rural Arkansas would have been obliterated. Many other incidents are recounted in less detail, building up a picture of a broken system where bureaucrats and the military fight for control of the weapons, where its not even certain that anyone in command will be alive to launch the missiies in the event of a Russian nuclear strike, and where America's nuclear policy has swung wildly between mutual obliteration and postulating a limited, survivable nuclear exchange. This is not an entertaining book, but it is enthralling and is backed up with meticulously researched facts. Highly recommended. Show Less
LibraryThing member elizabeth.b.bevins
This one will scare you! Fascinating look at our Nuclear program. We are not as safe as you might think.
LibraryThing member laurieindra
Wow. Scary and fascinating. Educated me in many disturbing ways.
LibraryThing member Jacobflaws
Excellent synopsis of Cold War nuclear weapons control. I couldn't put this book down--it just kept sucking me in to keep reading. Scary how close we came many times to nuclear disaster.
LibraryThing member joefreedom
A long read, but an eye-opening and, at times, mind-boggling account of individual heroism, human foibles and just how fortunate we've been that there hasn't been an accidental detonation of a nuclear weapon in the US since the invention of same. We've also been fortunate that nuclear war hasn't
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taken place, but the threat of nuclear weapons remains, and concerns over weapons going missing or being stolen and used by terrorists are now rising. Show Less
LibraryThing member encephalical
Engrossing. Up there with Rhode's The Making of the Atomic Bomb and Dark Sun.
LibraryThing member stevesmits
This book reads like a techno-thriller, more compelling than fiction because its depiction of near nuclear catastrophe is true. Schlosser combines the riveting and frightening story of an accident in a missile silo in Arkansas with the history of other accidents involving nuclear bombs. He delves
The book also relates the evolution of command and control strategies employed by civilian and military leadership since the advent of the nuclear age. The control over nuclear weapons shifted over time from tight civilian oversight to a frighteningly loose control by the military. The ability of low-level commanders to engage nuclear weapons via such processes of "pre-delegation" and "launch on warning" meant that the chances of use of weapons leading to full-scale nuclear holocaust were not small. Moreover, the security of weapons from seizure by lunatics or rogue players was exceptionally weak. One feature of our nuclear arms inventory that I didn't know is the variety and number of low-yield tactical weapons intended for battlefield and anti-aircraft use. Some of these weapons were to be operated by individual soldiers and while not intended for strategic use could have been the trigger for escalation to the use of the weapons meant for mass destruction.
Schlosser writes about the shifting conceptions of political-military nuclear strategy in the Cold War milieu. There is a perverse logic in possessing an arsenal of weapons of mass destruction to deter aggression. On the pretext that their use would result in inconceivably horrific consequences the logic of limiting them creates more rather than less danger, i.e. fewer or smaller would lower the threshold of inhibition. Targeting mass civilian populations, on its face a morally reprehensible strategy, prompts each side to be exceedingly cautious about bringing nuclear weapons into play. By the same odd logic, deploying anti-nuke weapons (e.g. so-called counterforce systems like SDI - "Star Wars") would be destabilizing since one side may use its weapons without suffering (as much) consequence of the other's retaliation. Notwithstanding, throughout the 1980's and beyond, the US vacillated between the so-called Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) strategy and the use of tactical weapons to stop the Soviets on the battlefields of Western Europe and the development of anti-nuke defense weapons systems. Schlosser note that the Europeans were very much opposed to the idea of limited use of nuclear weapons since they believed their protection from Russian aggression was the US strategic nuclear arsenal and that a limited exchange of nuclear strikes would target them first. He also describes the military's plan for nuclear war (the so-called SIOP) which successive civilian administrations found horrifying, but could not materially alter.
Another amazing revelation is the lack, for many years, of effective communication channels between the super powers essential to quickly de-escalating tense situations. He relates that during the Cuban missile crisis messages from Soviet leaders to the Kennedy administration took hours for our embassy to encode and were then given to a Western Union messenger to take on his bicycle to the transmitting office. As one participant noted with dark humor, the fate of the world depended on the messenger not stopping along with way to chat with a girl.
The fallibility of detection and warning systems is also highlighted. The Russians came close to pulling the trigger when a radar warned of incoming US missiles. This turned out to be a Norwegian weather satellite whose launching was pre-announced to the Soviets, but not shared with the right authorities. On the US side, the NORAD computers more than once picked up a massive Soviet missile attack which turned out to be false (but, remember, the decision time to launch a counter strike was minutes). Because the decisional reaction time to a strike by the other side was so short, our nuclear gun was cocked at all times. So many fingers were on hair triggers that there was real danger that, through machine or human error (or depraved intention ala Dr. Strangelove scenarios), the weapons could have been used.
It is fallacious to think that because accidental or inadvertent nuclear exchange never happened it never could have or never will. Schlosser in his thorough history makes the point strongly that behind the incredible technology of the weapons and their control systems are error-prone humans.
Are we beyond the risk of nuclear weapons use in the post-Cold War world of the 21st century? Likely not. While the tensions between east and west have lessened, there are still massive numbers of nuclear weapons held by the super powers. One could imagine that, with the de-emphasis of nuclear weapons as a first-line defense, the attention to safety and control could fade further from attention and resources. Nukes are now held by a few small states of questionable stability and malevolent intent toward others. There are fanatical terrorist groups who are probably seeking to gain control of a nuclear weapon and one is not comforted to learn that even at the height of the nuclear age the security and control of the weapons was not great.
This book compellingly points out that our attention to the presence of nuclear weapons in the world must not wane.
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deeply into design safety weaknesses that could have brought about unintended detonation of nuclear bombs. In one incident, an aircraft accident over North Carolina resulted in the release of a hydrogen bomb whose arming required four electro-mechanical steps. Three of the four steps were completed and the fourth depended on a simple electric switch that fortunately, in a disintegrating, burning plane, did not trip. In light of the many accidents he recounts, that there never was a detonation is probably a matter of good luck. Several accidents caused fissile material, including plutonium, to be exposed to people and the environment.The book also relates the evolution of command and control strategies employed by civilian and military leadership since the advent of the nuclear age. The control over nuclear weapons shifted over time from tight civilian oversight to a frighteningly loose control by the military. The ability of low-level commanders to engage nuclear weapons via such processes of "pre-delegation" and "launch on warning" meant that the chances of use of weapons leading to full-scale nuclear holocaust were not small. Moreover, the security of weapons from seizure by lunatics or rogue players was exceptionally weak. One feature of our nuclear arms inventory that I didn't know is the variety and number of low-yield tactical weapons intended for battlefield and anti-aircraft use. Some of these weapons were to be operated by individual soldiers and while not intended for strategic use could have been the trigger for escalation to the use of the weapons meant for mass destruction.
Schlosser writes about the shifting conceptions of political-military nuclear strategy in the Cold War milieu. There is a perverse logic in possessing an arsenal of weapons of mass destruction to deter aggression. On the pretext that their use would result in inconceivably horrific consequences the logic of limiting them creates more rather than less danger, i.e. fewer or smaller would lower the threshold of inhibition. Targeting mass civilian populations, on its face a morally reprehensible strategy, prompts each side to be exceedingly cautious about bringing nuclear weapons into play. By the same odd logic, deploying anti-nuke weapons (e.g. so-called counterforce systems like SDI - "Star Wars") would be destabilizing since one side may use its weapons without suffering (as much) consequence of the other's retaliation. Notwithstanding, throughout the 1980's and beyond, the US vacillated between the so-called Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) strategy and the use of tactical weapons to stop the Soviets on the battlefields of Western Europe and the development of anti-nuke defense weapons systems. Schlosser note that the Europeans were very much opposed to the idea of limited use of nuclear weapons since they believed their protection from Russian aggression was the US strategic nuclear arsenal and that a limited exchange of nuclear strikes would target them first. He also describes the military's plan for nuclear war (the so-called SIOP) which successive civilian administrations found horrifying, but could not materially alter.
Another amazing revelation is the lack, for many years, of effective communication channels between the super powers essential to quickly de-escalating tense situations. He relates that during the Cuban missile crisis messages from Soviet leaders to the Kennedy administration took hours for our embassy to encode and were then given to a Western Union messenger to take on his bicycle to the transmitting office. As one participant noted with dark humor, the fate of the world depended on the messenger not stopping along with way to chat with a girl.
The fallibility of detection and warning systems is also highlighted. The Russians came close to pulling the trigger when a radar warned of incoming US missiles. This turned out to be a Norwegian weather satellite whose launching was pre-announced to the Soviets, but not shared with the right authorities. On the US side, the NORAD computers more than once picked up a massive Soviet missile attack which turned out to be false (but, remember, the decision time to launch a counter strike was minutes). Because the decisional reaction time to a strike by the other side was so short, our nuclear gun was cocked at all times. So many fingers were on hair triggers that there was real danger that, through machine or human error (or depraved intention ala Dr. Strangelove scenarios), the weapons could have been used.
It is fallacious to think that because accidental or inadvertent nuclear exchange never happened it never could have or never will. Schlosser in his thorough history makes the point strongly that behind the incredible technology of the weapons and their control systems are error-prone humans.
Are we beyond the risk of nuclear weapons use in the post-Cold War world of the 21st century? Likely not. While the tensions between east and west have lessened, there are still massive numbers of nuclear weapons held by the super powers. One could imagine that, with the de-emphasis of nuclear weapons as a first-line defense, the attention to safety and control could fade further from attention and resources. Nukes are now held by a few small states of questionable stability and malevolent intent toward others. There are fanatical terrorist groups who are probably seeking to gain control of a nuclear weapon and one is not comforted to learn that even at the height of the nuclear age the security and control of the weapons was not great.
This book compellingly points out that our attention to the presence of nuclear weapons in the world must not wane.
Show Less
LibraryThing member Opinionated
In the 1980s the fear of nuclear war caused by accident was one of the main reasons the nuclear clock was kept at one minute to midnight. Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union the fear of nuclear war for most has receded well into the background. Eric Schlosser's massive survey of the systems
The narrative focuses on the the chaos and mismanagement that followed the damage to a Titan II missile in Arkansas caused by the most human of human errors - the dropping of a wrench onto the missile. The story of the response to the crisis, tales of bravery and incompetence, is woven around a history of American nuclear weapons in general. Both tales are equally frightening but perhaps most frightening of all is how nuclear weapons have slipped down the priority list. Even when nuclear weapons were top priority and well maintained accidents nearly happened - now that they are low priority, badly maintained, without the best people working on then, the propensity for accident is probably greater than it has been for many years. And once again - thats only taking the US into account
This is an exhaustive, and at times an exhausting, book. For me, there was just a little too much emphasis on technical detail which went over my head and I think probably the head of most non engineers. And I have deducted half a star for Schlosser, who has done so much primary research, repeating the discredited idea that "up to half a million US ground troops would have died in Japan" if it wasn't for the attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki - a massively inflated figure for which there is no evidence at all. As Schlosser himself points out the point of the nuclear attacks was to show the bomb to the Soviets
But a very thorough and very sobering book
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controlling and commanding the US nuclear arsenal (still very large, still very much in working order) shows how foolish we are to forget these weapons. Even at the peak of the Cold War, Schlosser demonstrates, command and control systems had plenty of scope for error - and he produces an exhaustive list of accidents, near accidents and breakdowns in control any of which could have led to nuclear accidents or nuclear war. And goodness knows what was happening in Russia, China, India or Pakistan. The narrative focuses on the the chaos and mismanagement that followed the damage to a Titan II missile in Arkansas caused by the most human of human errors - the dropping of a wrench onto the missile. The story of the response to the crisis, tales of bravery and incompetence, is woven around a history of American nuclear weapons in general. Both tales are equally frightening but perhaps most frightening of all is how nuclear weapons have slipped down the priority list. Even when nuclear weapons were top priority and well maintained accidents nearly happened - now that they are low priority, badly maintained, without the best people working on then, the propensity for accident is probably greater than it has been for many years. And once again - thats only taking the US into account
This is an exhaustive, and at times an exhausting, book. For me, there was just a little too much emphasis on technical detail which went over my head and I think probably the head of most non engineers. And I have deducted half a star for Schlosser, who has done so much primary research, repeating the discredited idea that "up to half a million US ground troops would have died in Japan" if it wasn't for the attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki - a massively inflated figure for which there is no evidence at all. As Schlosser himself points out the point of the nuclear attacks was to show the bomb to the Soviets
But a very thorough and very sobering book
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LibraryThing member marshapetry
Not quite finished with this one but I can say right up front: I think this is a better "read" book than a listening book. For the first several chapters the book jumps back and forth from modern nuclear incidents to historic incidents and it's really hard to follow. In part because there weren't
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any chapter demarcations. Seems like once those incidents were covered then the book followed a relatively straightforward history. Good book overall but not the best "listening" book (though the narrator is excellent). Show Less
LibraryThing member Muir_Alex
For someone who does not enjoy reading history textbooks, I truly enjoyed this book. It does a phenomenal job of mixing narrative writing style with historical information. The history of the development of the atomic bomb (and the hydrogen bomb, for that matter) are interwoven with a
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minute-by-minute narrative of the Damascus accident. This writing style did a great job at keeping the pages turning. That said, there are times when Schlosser goes into almost too much detail during his narrative. Especially at the end, he balances a cast of over 20 characters, and they become hard to keep track of after a while. This being the sole exception, he does a very good job at typing together multiple sources in order to build an accurate historical picture in the other parts of the novel that describe the Cold War. His methods keep the reader on the edge of their seat - you can feel the tension as he writes. In all, the book is definitely worth the read, not only for its historical background, but also for its scientific background as well. Show Less
LibraryThing member buffalogr
This is a book about the many times that the USA has had "bad" nuclear accidents...combined with a historical discussion and wrapped around one incident during 1980. I thought that the book was really boring and did not reveal much new that I didn't already know...maybe, because I lived lots of it.
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The book is well and thoroughly researched but, mostly, the level of that research is superficial. Alternatively, the detailed coverage of the 1980 Damascus, AR incident is mind numbing, though. I skipped large historical sections, just to see what happened to the boys in Arkansas. Show Less
LibraryThing member buffalogr
This is a book about the many times that the USA has had "bad" nuclear accidents...combined with a historical discussion and wrapped around one incident during 1980. I thought that the book was really boring and did not reveal much new that I didn't already know...maybe, because I lived lots of it.
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The book is well and thoroughly researched but, mostly, the level of that research is superficial. Alternatively, the detailed coverage of the 1980 Damascus, AR incident is mind numbing, though. I skipped large historical sections, just to see what happened to the boys in Arkansas. Show Less
LibraryThing member gregorybrown
Having read a fair number of books about the Cold War and its arms race, I was pleasantly surprised to see how much new information was in Schlosser's COMMAND AND CONTROL, and how well it was all woven into some excellent storytelling. Intentional use of nuclear weapons was a constant fear in the
Woven throughout is a look at the Damascus incident, an accident in the 1980s that foregrounds a lot of Schlosser's general concerns but also drags the narrative down. Schlosser will tell a bit of the story, jump to the history for a few chapters, and then skip back to Damascus. But each time, he has to reiterate and recap what's happened so far, drawing out the story even more. He also interviewed everyone he could find who was there, and is sure to let you know it by jumping to every POV. It is a crutch to make the abstract dangers of nuclear Armageddon more relatable, but Schlosser succeeds enough in the broad historical sweep that this incident ends up being the weakest part of the book by far—and annoying too, by the end.
Yet the book itself is excellent and important enough that this misstep doesn't mar the overall project. Highly recommended, especially if you follow it up with THE DEAD HAND, a look by David E. Hoffman at de-escalating the arms race in the '80s and '90s, and disposing of the dangerous materials accumulated in the process.
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'50s-'80s, but in many ways scarier was the possibility for unintentional or mistaken use. Schlosser does a great job covering all the angles, from the monolithic SIOP that would nuke the world under any provocation, to nuclear weapon designs that risked criticality in fires or high-speed crashes.Woven throughout is a look at the Damascus incident, an accident in the 1980s that foregrounds a lot of Schlosser's general concerns but also drags the narrative down. Schlosser will tell a bit of the story, jump to the history for a few chapters, and then skip back to Damascus. But each time, he has to reiterate and recap what's happened so far, drawing out the story even more. He also interviewed everyone he could find who was there, and is sure to let you know it by jumping to every POV. It is a crutch to make the abstract dangers of nuclear Armageddon more relatable, but Schlosser succeeds enough in the broad historical sweep that this incident ends up being the weakest part of the book by far—and annoying too, by the end.
Yet the book itself is excellent and important enough that this misstep doesn't mar the overall project. Highly recommended, especially if you follow it up with THE DEAD HAND, a look by David E. Hoffman at de-escalating the arms race in the '80s and '90s, and disposing of the dangerous materials accumulated in the process.
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LibraryThing member gmicksmith
The author wrote a very good volume on food and here is something about nuclear weapons, the Damascus accident, and the illusion of safety.
LibraryThing member nyxnekhbet
In many ways this book reads like a work of fiction, and honestly you're wanting it to be fiction. Realizing that this is reality is mind bogglingly terrifying. The in-fighting between our Armed Forces, bureaucracy, secrecy, lack of communication, lack of even the most basic safety measures,
I will add that while it took me a while to get through this book because the material is technical and at times a bit dry it really is not a difficult read.
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maintenance, and controls is utterly unbelievable. The interactions between global heads of state and the crazy spy stuff was like something out of a James Bond movie! Thankfully, the safety measures and communications that are in place now are much better than in the past and our arsenal is reduced, but big picture, knowing what I know now about our nuclear arsenal does nothing to help me sleep at night. Call it fate or God or whatever but make no mistake that it has been mainly due to luck that we have not had a major catastrophe on our own land due to a weapons accident. The author points out that the control system should be given credit where due, they did work, though just barely. This is an incredibly educational and I think humbling story. I would promote having this book be required reading in our high schools. I absolutely recommend this to anybody who wants a real view in to how our government and the powers that be are managing our safety, more to the point how they are grossly mis-managing it. I don't know if nonfiction books can have spoilers, but I think you will be surprised by some of the decisions that were made at the highest levels and who made them, I know I was. I will add that while it took me a while to get through this book because the material is technical and at times a bit dry it really is not a difficult read.
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LibraryThing member Stbalbach
The thesis is that nuclear weapons are inherently unsafe because evidently there have been 100s of accidents already - Schlosser provides excruciating details. Schlosser used FOI (Freedom of Information) to obtain and report for the first time many of the accidents. He does so while retelling the
As for the book I found it very long. I already knew the general outline of the Cold War and this is a superficial version. Nor does it leave you feeling good in the end, by design entirely focused on the negative. But it does the job of shattering any notion that nuclear weapons are safe (in storage), which ultimately may help the political process by focusing renewed attention on this most loathsome device. He ends with one proposal that seems smart: if we are to keep nuclear weapons for deterrence purposes, they should be isolated on submarines where any accidental detonation would (hopefully) be far away from land.
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history of the Cold War and development of nuclear weapons over about 490 pages. The center-piece drama is a detailed account of the 1980 Titan II Damascus accident in Arkansas. As for the book I found it very long. I already knew the general outline of the Cold War and this is a superficial version. Nor does it leave you feeling good in the end, by design entirely focused on the negative. But it does the job of shattering any notion that nuclear weapons are safe (in storage), which ultimately may help the political process by focusing renewed attention on this most loathsome device. He ends with one proposal that seems smart: if we are to keep nuclear weapons for deterrence purposes, they should be isolated on submarines where any accidental detonation would (hopefully) be far away from land.
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LibraryThing member breic
The history of nuclear weapons control was fascinating, worth five stars. But Schlosser recounts the 1980 Damascus accident with overwhelming, tedious detail.
> The call came at a bad time. Arnold and his wife had just moved into a new apartment in Shreveport, and they'd stayed up late moving
Chapters and chapters like this, for characters whom we'll never see again.
> The call came at a bad time. Arnold and his wife had just moved into a new apartment in Shreveport, and they'd stayed up late moving
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boxes. He'd gotten only a few hours of sleep. The place was full of boxes that still needed to be unpacked, and he didn't feel like going to work at three in the morning.Chapters and chapters like this, for characters whom we'll never see again.
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LibraryThing member ms_rowse
I started this book in February, and had to set it aside once the school musical hit full-speed and the end of the school year consumed me. It gets a bit slow in the middle, but once it hits the Cuban missile crisis, it was hard to put down.
After reading the first 80 pages, I sent an email to
Never getting rid of this book--it will become an artifact of our family history (much like Fiddler on the Roof is for my mom's side of the family). Anyone with a fleeting interest in nuclear weaponry or the Cold War (a war that doesn't get nearly the respect or recognition it deserves) has to read this book. Totally worth the time, even if it takes five months to finish it.
After reading the first 80 pages, I sent an email to
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Schlosser's publisher, thanking him for writing the book. My dad was a missilier in the Air Force, and I never had a clue what he did. I've always been proud of my dad's Air Force career, but this book exponentially increased that pride. I had no clue the danger he endured every time he pulled an alert or stepped on a plane. In fact, I remember when the 1st Gulf War began, how comforted I felt that my dad was commanding a missile squadron and couldn't be deployed, as if he was somehow completely protected from danger at the missile silos.Never getting rid of this book--it will become an artifact of our family history (much like Fiddler on the Roof is for my mom's side of the family). Anyone with a fleeting interest in nuclear weaponry or the Cold War (a war that doesn't get nearly the respect or recognition it deserves) has to read this book. Totally worth the time, even if it takes five months to finish it.
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LibraryThing member Sullywriter
Despite a few surprisingly sloppy factual errors, this is a remarkable chronicle of nuclear weapons mishaps from the 1940s to the present with emphasis on one of the worst and more recent ones in Arkansas. These are terrifying stories of naiveté, hubris, and sometimes downright incompetence.
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Schlosser convincingly shows that "command and control" of thermonuclear weapons is, at best, a fantasy, a most sobering thought considering the United States continues to maintain a stockpile of thousands of such weapons. Show Less
LibraryThing member markm2315
A riveting history of the nuclear weapon that is mostly about how dangerous they are, both to whomever is bombed with them, and to the user when they accidently fall out of airplanes (again and again). The story is gripping, but there is very little analysis. There are comments in the Epilogue
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pointing out that in an incredibly complex and dangerous system like our nuclear weapons and their command and control, an error rate of .000001% would still be unacceptable since the detonation of a 5 megaton device in Greensboro would be unthinkably horrible. Studies of mistakes in Medicine are similar, since mistakes occur no matter what you do, and they are usually completely unacceptable. I think one could also discuss the old conundrum, that the type of brave arrogant fast-acting no-nonsense guy who rises to the top in a complex organization like a branch of the military, might not be the best person to agree to have the safety of his weapons reviewed. Show Less
Awards
Pulitzer Prize (Finalist — History — 2014)
Commonwealth Club of California Book Awards (Finalist — Nonfiction — 2013)
The Economist Best Books (2013.14)
Andrew Carnegie Medals for Excellence in Fiction and Nonfiction (Longlist — Nonfiction — 2014)
Duke of Wellington Medal for Military History (Shortlist — 2014)
Lionel Gelber Prize (Shortlist — 2014)
Sally Hacker Prize (2014)
Kirkus Reviews Best Book of the Year (Nonfiction — 2013)
Notable Books List (2014)
Time Magazine's Best Books of the Year (Nonfiction — 2013)
Language
Original publication date
2013-09-17
Physical description
8.38 inches
ISBN
9780143125785