The War That Ended Peace: The Road to 1914

I have read and enjoyed two other books by this author I wasn't disappointed this time. The book is a history of Europe from 1900 to 1914. I was glad to see that Eastern Europe and Turkey received the same level of attention as Germany and Britain. Barbara Tuchman in The Proud Tower and Guns of

Show More

August concentrated on Russia and Western Europe. Newer books on this topic,The Sleepwalkers: How Europe Went to War in 1914 and Catastrophe 1914: Europe Goes to War seem to show that a more inclusive approach is the coming trend.
The first part of the book is a discussion of the state of Europe in 1900. The personalities and events seemed to conspire to keep Germany on center stage a large portion of the time. They were an expanding power whose ambition was fueled by the ego of Whilhelm II. He exercised a great deal of power in foreign affairs and military relations where his behavior ranged from embarrassing to dangerous. The author describes him going through the diplomatic correspondence writing comments followed by multiple exclamation points. This is one example of the level of detail maintained by the author throughout the book.
The dreadnought program and problems with Ireland dominated events in Great Britain. Germany's construction of a navy to compete with Great Britain caused constant friction between the two countries. Another example of Whilhelm's desire for Germany's "place in the sun" that led to the country's increasing isolation.
Austria-Hungary was Germany's faithful ally but there was a question as to her value in a crisis. As described by the author Austria-Hungary was barely a step up from the Ottoman Empire as a military power. A polyglot collection of various peoples and cultures their military was seriously handicapped by the fact that their officers and enlisted men often did not speak the same language. Her military had not been tested since it's defeat by Prussia in 1866.
Opposing Germany and Austria-Hungary were France and Russia. Italy is allied with Germany and Austria-Hungary. The alliance of France and Russia was based upon a mutual fear of Germany. Russia was recovering from war and revolution in 1905. France was building an overseas empire and aspired to the glory of the past. At the same time she worried about her low birth rate and lack of soldiers compared to Germany.
In 1908 a series of crisis begin with Austria's annexation of Bosnia-Herzogovina.
Between the annexation and the beginning of WWI there are two wars in the Balkans, France and Germany face off twice in Morocco and finally the Archduke Franz Ferdinand is assassinated. The author's penchant for detail provides the reader with a blow-by-blow account of the assassination complete with the Archduke's last words to Sophie.
Franz Joseph, the Emperor of Austria, is not really that sad to hear that the Archduke was murdered. The Archduke caused a scandal when he married beneath his class and none of his children are eligible for the throne. The Austrian's do see a great opportunity to assert themselves and punish Serbia. There was evidence that the murder weapons were provided by Serbian military personnel acting as members of a secret society. Austria-Hungary gets a promise of support from Germany so when the Russians decide to back Serbia the lights begin to go out all over Europe.
The book is a well written narrative and the author maintains a consistently high level of scholarship. The book is accessible to the general reader and I recommend it as an excellent survey history on this topic.

Show Less

With the centennial of the outbreak of Wortd War I upon us, a torrent of books on the topic has been unleashed. When I clicked on "The War That Ended Peace" in Amazon, two other major histories on the prelude to the War popped up at the bottom of the page (Clark's "Sleepwalkers" and Harris'

Show More

"Catastrophe 1914", and Amazon shows 16 PAGES of books on the War due for publication next year. That list will surely grow.

So why read this one? Because it is as good as all the glowing reviews suggest, for three reasons. The history is excellent. The writing is excellent. And it makes the reader think. To begin with the history, Ms. MacMillan is a noted historian who has no need to prove her mastery of this period. She studied history at Oxford, focussing on the late 19th and early 20th centuries, has taught on the period and on international relations in particular, and is widely published. But for me, what stood out about the history in this book wasn't the qualifications of the writer, but the vividness with which she used sources from the period, and her thoroughness in trying to make clear each point of view in each crisis. Her analysis demonstrates the extent to which individuals had an impact on Europe's progress from peace to war, and she brings this out in vivid sketches of the key men of the time (only a few women, mostly wives, but that's the way it was). As to the writing, she is very clear about very complex events. More than that, her writing is a pleasure to read: it pulls one along despite all the names and places and military rumblings.

Finally, as to her ideas, Ms. MacMillan makes it clear that she does not believe that the FIrst World War was inevitable. That is a bitterly argued point in historiography, with many arguing that nothing could have been done to stop it. If that's right, the War does not have many lessons for the current day: we, presumably, have our own inevitabilities, which will continue peace (for some, at least) or move us into war. But if World War ! was not inevitable, one can study the choices and decisions that helped bring it about, in the hope of learning from past mistakes. Ms. MacMillan clearly thinks that this is appropriate, noting that there are some similiarities between the world of 1914, and the world of today.

I can't compare this book to the other two "big" entrants in the how-Wortd-War-I began stakes, or indeed to Barbara Tuchman's "Guns of August", which I read too long ago to remember in any detail. But I do intend to reread Tuchman, and to read "Sleepwalkers" and "Catastrophe 1914". After doing so, I may revise my review of "The War the Ended Peace". I shall be very surprised, however, if I revise my very positive opinion of it.

Show Less

Anyone under the illusion that the outbreak of World War I was the result only or even mainly of the assassination of an Austrian Archduke in Serbia will be disabused of that conception after reading this thorough account by Oxford University scholar Margaret Macmillan. In fact, after reading this

Show More

book, one can only wonder how in the world war was averted until 1914.

Macmillan provides a detailed introduction to all the major players in European international affairs at the turn of the 20th century. She also reviews the alliances, competitions, hostilities, jealousies, and the sociological currents feeding the inchoate war machine: in particular, inflated senses of honor, nationalism, imperialism, and what one might call a racist interpretation of Darwinism.

At this time, the major European powers (Britain, France, Germany, Russia, Austria-Hungary, and Italy) were competing for hegemony in several dimensions:

First, they wanted to be seen as strong and powerful military states.

Second, they wanted as big a share of the colonial pie as they could grab. Colonies could be exploited for natural resources, laborers, soldiers, and the psychological benefit of the impression of world dominance. Britain and, to a lesser extent France, had stolen a march on the others by gobbling up large tracts of Africa, India, and China. In addition, the Ottoman Empire was correctly viewed as on the verge of dissolution, which would soon open up great opportunities for colonizing oil rich areas of the Middle East. Germany in particular was trying to make up for lost time. Each of the powers feared that if it didn’t leap into the fray first, it would lose out, and a hated rival would steal “its place in the sun.”

Third, each, albeit in varying degrees, had a sense of racial and/or ethnic superiority, which contributed to their determination to dominate lesser groups.

Fourth, the very powerful memes of nationalism, radicalism, and anti-Semitism all were roiling around in the air and causing destabilization.

An important factor adding to instability was the fact that no one Power was in position to dominate the others. Accordingly, all the Powers sought to ally themselves with any other strong Powers whose interests did not conflict too seriously with their own. By 1910, Europe had divided into two rather hostile (but not yet warring) camps: (1) the Triple Alliance—Germany, Austria-Hungary, and (rather reluctantly) Italy; and (2) the Entente—France and Russia and (maybe) England.

Members of both the Alliance and the Entente perceived their own agreements to be primarily defensive in nature. But MacMillan points out that those same arrangements seemed to outsiders to be offensive in purpose. As a result, every continental Power perceived itself to be surrounded by hostile forces, and endeavored to prepare for what seemed like an inevitable outbreak of war.

In addition, advances in technology, particularly railroads, made it possible to mobilize a country’s army in a much shorter time than in previous years. This situation created pressure on the others to be ready to mobilize at a moment’s notice. Otherwise, you could be caught at a great disadvantage, if an enemy Power was ready to deploy before you were.

Thus, Europe was a powder keg, with players just waiting for an excuse to light the fuse. The Balkans, being the most volatile area at the time, was merely the most likely source of the much-anticipated spark. [Ironically, Europe had weathered at least three very close calls (the Moroccan Crisis and two Balkan Wars) between 1908 and 1913 that had nearly resulted in war but were smoothed out in the end. But the pressure was building, and no leader took the necessary steps to defuse the new crisis adequately.] After the death of Franz Ferdinand, Austria-Hungary issued a humiliating ultimatum to Serbia that could never be accepted, and the game was on.

Discussion: This is a detailed history of the period immediately preceding World War I, rather than a history of the war itself. To that end, MacMillan tells you everything you always wanted to know about the situation in Europe at that time. While she spreads plenty of blame all around, she is probably in the camp assigning the most blame for the war to Germany, with its possibly insane kaiser and its power-hungry and ideologically extremist ministers.

One criticism is that the author could have forgone the minutiae about the predilections of various ministers and their wives for fishing or gardening and the like. In their place, she would have served readers better by adding background on the popular writers of the time, such as Houston Stewart Chamberlain, whose influential book Foundations of the Nineteenth Century (1899) argued that Germany, constituted primarily of the (allegedly) superior Aryan race, needed to come out triumphant in the never-ending struggle among ‘the chaos of races.” [Chamberlain was British, but later became a German citizen.] The anonymous and infamous Protocols of the Elders of Zion, first published in Russia in 1903, and positing a worldwide Jewish conspiracy to take over the world, was also widely translated and disseminated. Many of the racist tracts at the turn of the century, such as The Social Role of the Aryan by the Frenchman Georges Vacher de Lapouge (1899) explicitly cited Darwin to provide a scientific imprimatur to the advocacy of racial eugenics. These ideas caught fire among the political and intellectual elite in Europe at the century’s end, and indeed, were still fueling social policy before and during World War II. Some background on these writings would have provided a much-needed explanation for the currents of thought that roiled these turbulent times, and would have helped displace another commonly held misconception that it was mainly the unsatisfactory resolution of World War I that resulted in World War II.

Evaluation: This book is an excellent addition to any World War I library. MacMillan provides a fascinating backstory to many of the events leading up to the war. While some may take issue with her emphases, this book is definitely worth consideration.

We listened to an audio version of this book. The narrator, actor Richard Burnip, is quite competent and has a delightful British accent. Our only complaint is that each disc ended and then started over with nary a breath in between.

Show Less

So there’s that humorous moment out there: someone asking about how World War I started, and how the explanation would take many hours or days.

It’s funny because it’s true, and it’s true because of the sheer futility of the whole enterprise. World War I started because of diplomatic

Show More

failures and fears about dishonor, weakness, and good old-fashioned prejudice juiced by the newer phenomenon of nationalism.

And so it takes a book of over 800 pages to describe what brought Europe to war in 1914, well described by Margaret MacMillan in the well titled The War That Ended Peace: The Road to 1914.

The author began by describing Europe’s situation in the late nineteenth century. She then considers each major participant and their experience of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, and the relationships among them. She describes a world in which the various powers are all run by a small elite coterie who know each other well, are often related to each other, and could present a picture of a broadly cosmopolitan continent. She focuses on certain characters who reflect the cosmopolitan attitudes of the day, people who maintain friendships and good times with people throughout Europe. She is able to speak of how many were vacationing in areas which would soon become enemy territory within weeks in the summer of 1914.

She then describes the various crises which arose in the late 19th and early 20th century which, in retrospect, set up the conditions for war in 1914: twice about Morocco, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the Balkan wars. In each of these situations some felt they were dishonored or shown as weak. Over time Germany convinced itself it was being encircled for nefarious reasons; France and Russia likewise looked warily on Germany and its belligerence; Austria-Hungary is always on the precipice of breaking apart.

The assassination of Franz Ferdinand in late June 1914 is described as well as its immediate aftereffects. Almost no one, at the time, expected this to be the catalyst for war. And yet, with decision after decision, war became inevitable. When it came it did so more suddenly than anyone had imagined. And it would prove more horrible than anyone could have ever feared.

World War I was truly the war that ended peace. Cosmopolitan Europe was shattered; the age of progress was irretrievably reversed. The German, Austro-Hungarian, Ottoman, and Russian Empires would not survive the war. World War II, in many respects, was a continuation of World War I, the German attempt at retrieving the honor they lost in the first conflict. Even in victory Britain and France would be exhausted twice and would ultimately lose their empires. Europe remains industrialized and among the advanced nations but destroyed their power and influence in these conflicts. The difference between Europe in 1913 and 1919 is stark; all the more so by 1953.

So what caused the war? Yes, Germany declared war on Russia since Russia was mobilizing since Austria-Hungary had declared war on Serbia. Austria-Hungary went for broke to either absorb the South Slavs or collapse in a blaze of glory, fueled by the conservative aristocracy fearing dishonor and weakness more than anything else. Germany proved overly confident in their war plans and believed their own rhetoric about themselves, the French, the British, and ultimately the Americans (and would do so again twenty-five years later). Everyone was convinced they could go on the offensive and overpower their enemies quickly even though all available evidence demonstrated the defensive advantage thanks to advanced armament technology. They were too proud to learn from the experience of the “savages” in the American Civil War or the Boer War.

Untold millions suffered because of the hubris of that elite coterie of the fin de siècle. Modern democratic Europe arose from its ashes.

Such things could happen again. And it always starts with an aggrieved elite concerned about prospective irrelevance perceived as dishonor and weakness. Economic ties are not sufficient to avoid it. And, apparently, we never learn.

Show Less

The War That Ended Peace, Margaret MacMillan

Causes of Peace?

There are no causes of peace---only lack of causes of war. That's my take on the lessons of this book. Let me state right up front that this is not a book about World War One; this is a book about the causes of World War One.

To save you

Show More

time and money, I'll summarize for you: greed, chauvinism (the rise of nationalities), class struggle (the self-absorption of the upper classes vs. the rise of middle class aspirations vs. the growing self-awareness of the working class) and just plain stupidity. Archduke Ferdinand was indeed a lame excuse for a war---but then, any excuse is a good excuse if you're going to start a war anyway.

But there are still some very good reasons to persevere and read this book.

The book starts with an exploration of the attitude that was prevalent in the world at that time---that "war was now impossible." This was exemplified by the Paris Universal Exposition of 1900, which is used to explore the reasons for optimism. There had been a longer period of almost universal peace than ever before recorded; there was so much international trade that a war would be worse than catastrophic for everyone involved; that there was so much international scientific and industrial development and growth that it's inconceivable for the entire world to start "shooting itself in the foot" [my words here].

And then MacMillan spends chapters describing the competing psychologies of the local players in the greater European cultures: the royals, the government officials, the bureaucrats, the upper-, middle- and working-classes. One by one, MacMillan explores the psyches (def. soul, mind, spirit; or we may say emotional, intellectual and cultural essences) of almost every country then existing in Europe.

As she describes the German power structure and we decide that Germany was indeed the source of all evil in the world, she then goes on to France, and then Russia, and then Great Britain and we're left with no undamaged rudder in these "ships of state." And just when we find ourselves lamenting the status of the poor innocent by-standers (not the least being Italy and the Ottoman Empire)---countries like Serbia, Rumania, Greece, Albania, etc. who were physically at the mercy of the larger forces in Europe---we learn that they are at least as bad, if not worse, because they want a "piece of the action" in China, in Africa, in South America (and in the decaying Ottoman Empire).

And all through this MacMillan occasionally interjects notes on the parallels with today---which should inspire some fruitful contemplation on Santayana's “Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it” (in The Life of Reason, 1905).

Each and every country wanted security (which requires strength—i.e. military power); prosperity (which requires trade outlets—i.e. colonies); and respect (which requires strength—i.e. military power).

Just recently I heard an interview on the radio:
"Who I support [in the 2012 Presidential elections] is not important, what's important is that America is strong, respected and safe." Cindy McCain interviewed on NPR (Wikipedia: "an American businesswoman, philanthropist, and humanitarian, and the wife of United States Senator John McCain")

One of the most entertaining aspects of this book for me is the exploration of the individuals who were making, or trying to make, the political decisions in their nations. MacMillan describes at least a dozen different personalities from each country in gross detail. No one nation had a monopoly on men of greed, arrogance and stupidity and we see their flaws as described by their contemporaries.

As an example: Jean Jaurès was a French Socialist leader of the time and a strong anti-militarist.

It was typical of Jaurés that the cause was more important than himself and that he did not bear grudges. In his own life his friendships crossed ideological lines and in politics he was always ready to reach out to his opponents. "His human sympathy was universal," said Romain Rolland, "that he could be neither nihilistic or fanatical. Every act of intolerance repelled him."

Jaurés was assassinated at the start of the war.

Or Sergei Sazonov, Russian foreign minister from November 1910 to July 1916

[Sazonov] Unlike some of his colleagues…was upright and honest and even his enemies agreed that he was a thorough gentleman and a loyal servant of both the Tsar and Russia. And, as described by Baron Taube, who worked with him in the Foreign Ministry, would have done well in the hierarchy of the Russian Orthodox Church. He was not … cut out to be Foreign Minister: "Sickly by nature, overly sensitive and a little sentimental, nervous and even neurotic, Sazonov was the type of womanly Slav par excellence, easy and generous but soft and vague, constantly changing because of this impressions and intuitions, resisting all sustained efforts at thinking, incapable of following through his reasoning to the logical end."

In this manner we get some interesting insights into the leaders of the world: the German Kaiser, the Russian Tsar, the French President, the British Prime Minister and all their associated political and military advisors. And what they thought of each other.

With the growth of the industrial revolution we get the growth of the proletariat and the growth of the media and the growth of the use of propaganda.

The industrial revolution made it possible to have bigger armies and Europe's population growth had enlarged the pool of manpower. And the new media found that creating international enemies sold papers.

Quoting German poet Stefan George (1868-1933)

"…the cowardly years of trash and triviality" led people to welcome war as something to cleanse society.

From the Journal of the Royal United Services Institution in 1898: "Is not war the grand scheme of nature by which degenerate, weak or otherwise harmful states are eliminated from the concerted action of civilized nations, and assimilated to those who are strong, vital, and beneficial in their influences? Undoubtedly this is so …"

It seems that every nation made an effort to instill a negative attitude in its people for whoever the enemy of the day was. There were few "non-villains" in this story.

And, interestingly, MacMillan points out that terrorists abounded during and after the turn of the century…and for the same causes and rationales as today. If this review weren't already too long I'd give some examples. But there just doesn't seem to be anything new under the sun.

If you want to know the causes of WW 1, it was basic human stupidity and the weakness of humanity to see beyond its own tribal noses. [that's me again]

"The Great War was not produced by a single cause but by a combination and, in the end, by human decisions." Margaret MacMillan

What frightens me is that we, meaning you and I, have not changed so very much from those who started and fought the Great War.

What gives me hope and encouragement is that we've managed to survive as long as we have. In spite of ourselves.

Show Less

This is a masterful work. In 20 chapters and an Epilogue the history of Europe so far as it relates to World War One is lucidly set out in chronological order covering the time from 1900 to 1914, At first I thought it was not telling much new but as the events are set out and the book leads to its

Show More

climax one is utterly caught up in the account. The author does not spend time on original sources, but her selection of facts from the many books consulted (all, thankfully, identified in a 16-page bibliography) sets out a panorama stunning to contemplate.and which I thought shows the pertinent events in the pre-war world in a vivid way. Reading the book one realizes that some of the questions relating to the genesis of the War cannot be answered definitively but I think she points to probable answers.

Show Less

Yes, it's another book about The Causes of the First World War. This one takes a more traditional view of matters, but is well written and thorough, and avoids giving any pat answers. It's Complicated. I've got my own views, but I don't disagree fundamentally with the general ethos of either book.

Show More

I will say that the more I read about the period, the more I dislike Asquith.

Show Less

Not my first go at reading the events that lead to the start of the Great War, perhaps not as clear cut as general history courses would have you believe. A well written book that manages to keep a foot in the present as well, making the events relevant to the modern reader.

Decent read setting the scene on how the major powers were developing over the previous 20 years which meant that war would be inevitable. I prefer Clarke's The Sleepwalkers which give more detail on actual events and the specific of the situation in the Balkans.

A masterpiece. Deals with the difficult topic of the significance of personalities in historical events.

First rate book and as usual for McMillan an easy read for such a complex topic. I wonder if this could have been handled in a shorter book without so much detail? A personal thing. I did make the mistake of taking this away on a road trip - not the ideal environment for a review hence possible my

Show More

comment.

Show Less

Well written and well researched, this account of the origins of World War I provides an excellent overview. I find it intriguing that the reasons for the Great War continue to be studied and debated 100 years later. My one complaint about this book is that the author didn't really answer the

Show More

question she set out to answer: why did peace fail? It had proven to be successful in so many previous incidents.

Show Less

A comprehensive book that looks at all the major players in the allies and the triple alliance, not just the country leaders, but foreign ministers, military, etc. It is quite involved and requires focus if you are not familiar with all these people. The only criticism is that the author clearly

Show More

has some opinions and often uses modern (2000ish) examples to illustrate her point-even if it remains to be seen if those illustrations are accurate. This could lead to a shorter shelf life of an otherwise impressive work.

Show Less

Wonderfully well researched and expertly told. Provides an excellent insight to the frame of mind of the various leaders of Europe and the rising nationalism of their populations at the time. I can't wait to read her earlier book, Paris 1919, to see how it all ends.

This book is a very readable contribution to the public knowledge about the run-up to WWI. What I noticed about it is the relatively large number of references to the foreign affairs of the period 2001 to 2012. The more substantive strength is the survey of the Balkan crises that had a cumulative

Show More

effect in dulling the fears that a major war could erupt among the great powers.
The other large books dealing with this event have had differing focuses regarding the background. " The Guns of August" concentrated on the interlocking alliance mechanism, creating an avalanche scenario for the outbreak. "Dreadnought" by Massie was concerned with a detailed study of both the British, French, and German cabinets and high command, to outline the political and military group-think that made the alliances work. In "the Proud Tower" Tuchman revisited the broader social scene to shore up her rather narrow portrait with supporting detail. The massive Gilbert Martin Winston Churchill centred biography with supporting documents was a very narrow look.
MacMillan is a clever writer, and her vision does reveal scary similarities between the WWI situation, and the present world, with its running low-key wars and the hovering possibility of a great power flare-up, say over the Ukraine with the warm early summer of 1914. Thus I recommend it heartily as a lush experience, with a very frightening sting in its tail.

Show Less

The period before World War 1 seems to come into season roughly every generation. A new crop of historians begin to plough the rich field of controversy, blame and nostalgia in search of new insights, or at least to fulfill the insatiable appetite of a new generation of readers. The appeal lies in

Show More

a number of factors - the complex interaction of events, motives and personalities bears all the fascination of the most gripping of true crimes. Like the Jack the Ripper case, the books and documentaries continue to pour forth.
The cycle began soon after the conclusion of hostilities, as participants published studies and document collections designed to deflect blame. The effort was not purely academic as Germany sought to escape the massive reparations demanded at Versailles, underpinned by the famous ‘War Guilt’ clause. The German histories were reinforced by US historians including Harry Barnes and Sidney Fay. He argued that all the powers were to blame. The most significant author arguing against these ‘revisionist’ works was Italian Luigi Albertini who spent almost twenty years writing Le origini della guerra del 1914 (1942). In its English edition it contained over 2000 pages of research and explanations, having interviewed virtually all of the surviving participants in the immediate events of summer 1914. His books are still recognised as one of the best sources.
After the Second World War had been digested another generation approached the topic, with the benefit of greater distance. Ironically it was Fritz Fischer, a German historian who became virtually the first historian for decades to put virtually the entire blame for the war on Germany in his landmark work Griff Nach der Weltmacht (1961). He was strongly attacked as a traitor by other German historians. The provocative English historian A J P Taylor argued for a complacent reliance on the old “Concert of Europe” and unstoppable military plans in War By Timetable.
The centennial of the war saw an astonishing number of fresh works appear on the subject. Probably Margaret MacMillan’s The War That Ended Peace is one of the most prominent, although The Sleepwalkers by Christopher Clark has apparently achieved the most publicity and high sales, especially in Germany where over 200,000 copies are reported to have sold. This is likely to be partially due to Clark’s views being closer to Taylor’s than Fischer’s! A bookshelf could be filled with just some of the other efforts - Sean McMeekin’s The Russian Origins of the First World War and July 1914, Paul Ham’s 1914: The Year The World Ended, Max Hasting’s Catastrophe, David Fromkin’s Europe’s Last Summer, T.G. Otte’s July Crisis. Over coming years I will review and compare some of these works.
MacMillan’s book seemed like a good reliable place to begin my quest. Understanding the twentieth century for most people over forty with an interest in history is a gripping pursuit. All of us either personally or through our family have seen the effects of a century of profound change and extraordinary violence. The so-called thirty years war (not a term I personally agree with) hung over the lives of the late Victorians and the ‘great generation’ of the early twentieth century, and despite its destruction also acted as the catalyst for the age of prosperity that followed. Finding the explanation for the carnage of the trenches and the holocaust leads us to July 1914, but one quickly realises that the quest begins earlier.
Michael Howard in The Oxford History of the Twentieth Century begins his chapter on the World Wars at the turn of the century with two events that suggested that European world hegemony was under threat - the defeat of Spain by the USA, and the humiliation of Russia by Japan. MacMillan also begins her story in the milieu of 1900 with the Paris Exposition as centrepiece. She describes a world of faith in science and Progress with a capital P. The book then turns to diplomacy. The first few chapters zoom in on Germany and Britain, the leading nations economically and in Germany’s case apparently gripped by jealousy. The book describes how the nascent alliances of 1900 - the Dual Alliance of Austria-Hungary and Germany, the Franco-Russian alliance - became ever more important as crutches of security. Russia relied on French finance. France’s lingering fear of Germany following the Franco-Prussian War lead her to dream of an alliance where she could “lean simultaneously on Russia and England against Germany”. Germany ended up tied to Austria-Hungary almost by default. As a German ambassador said: “How often do I ask myself whether it is really worth it to attach ourselves so firmly to this state which is almost falling apart and to continue the exhausting work of pulling it along with us. But I cannot see any other constellation that could replace … an alliance with the Central European power”.
MacMillan expertly ranges through the great powers, analysing their power structures, diplomacy, strategic options and the outlook of their leadership.
This is old fashioned diplomatic history. We arrive at chapter 9 before we ask “What Were They Thinking?”, an examination of European’s world view. MacMillan makes clear her belief that the decisions for and against war “were made by a surprisingly small number, and those men - few women played a role - came largely but not entirely from the upper classes”. Most of the chapter focusses on the elite - the arts, philosophy and in particular social darwinism. Nationalism and imperialism were natural outgrowths of elite obsessions with power and vitality. Militarism and war became glamourous.
MacMillan then explores social movements and beliefs in more detail - the peace movements and conversely the military planners. “A general war, fought at the heart of Europe, was becoming thinkable”. Again we focus on that ‘small number’ - intellectuals, financiers and the peace movement. Most of the countries of western Europe by this time had (or close to had) universal male suffrage. MacMillan spends a few pages on the Second International which through some member parties such as the SPD in Germany had a mass membership. This coverage is good, but again focusses on the leadership. One of the problems with this approach to history emphasising the individual and diplomacy is the risk of ignoring the masses. Perhaps this isn’t so serious in this period when we know that the final decision-making was taken by Presidents, Foreign Secretaries, Emperors and General Staffs. It does seem important though to consider what the views of the majority were, what influence they had through the limited democratic process and to what extent they impacted upon decision making. The sense from the book is very little but I would have liked to see a bit more consideration of this, even if the conclusion was that the ‘great man’ theory in looking at the end of peace is entirely justified.
And so from the war plans we move to the final eight chapters, a rich and detailed narrative of the crises, Sarajevo assassination and the end of the “Concert of Europe”. The impression of bluster and of crises averted is built up deftly and makes the complacency of summer 1914 (above all that of British foreign secretary Sir Edward Grey) comprehensible. The length of time from the assassination to the outbreak of war, usually brushed over, is revealed in full as a month of slow, contingent and unpredictable developments. I was almost on the edge of my seat at the end of July as German Chancellor Bethmann Hollweg suggested that Germany would not take any territory from France after the war, and would respect Belgium’s integrity after the war. I think MacMillan is a little kind in even suggesting that this might have been a genuine attempt at avoiding a general war. Most of the German and Austro-Hungarian diplomacy in July seems disingenuous. This is not to say that others were faultless. Doubtless Grey’s opaqueness with regards to Britain’s intentions betrayed uncertainty and left an opening for Germany to engage in wishful thinking.
MacMillan’s excellent Introduction supplies most of the interpretation in the book, as well as her attitude to the past and its study. “Very little in history is inevitable”, “the part played in human affairs by mistakes, muddle or simply poor timing”, “inertia, memories of past clashes or fear of betrayal”, “a fundamentally weak character”. She certainly doesn’t ignore “the arms race, rigid military plans, economic rivalry, trade wars, imperialism with its scramble for colonies, or the alliance systems dividing Europe into unfriendly camps”. The book does tend though to reinforce the importance of the character and decisions of individuals, chance and the course of events. MacMillan does find some factors “more culpable” (blameworthy?) than others - Austria-Hungary’s intense desire to punish Serbia, Germany’s uncompromising backing of her, Russia’s haste to mobilise. More profitable however is the deeper examination of the previous couple of decades to identify why in summer 1914, with yet another crisis, war instead of continued peace was chosen. This book is an excellent source of information and explanation to understanding the reasons behind that decision.

Show Less

I love reading history and didn't know all that much about World War i so when someone recommended The War That Ended Peace I had to get a copy.

This is the most detailed book I have ever read about the long weary road up to the First World War.

The author goes back properly I think to before the

Show More

turn of the century and captures a lot of good information about the various national insecurities and the various national paranoia. There are capsule biographies of many long forgotten statesmen whose words and deeds add color and texture to the landscape.

(The Modern world reminds me muchly of the time before 1914 for the general touchiness of various world leaders the fanatic nationalism (or sectionalism) and the sense that what "everyone knows" to be true today may turn out not be true after all.)

Perhaps in the end World War I was just a set of toppling dominoes that would have toppled anyway sooner or later.

But you know this week I put it down about half finished and I doubt i will pick it up again. When you study every tree root to branch sometimes you lose sight of the forest.

Show Less

Engaging history that looks at the roughly fifteen year period before the outbreak of World War I, though of course there are interludes where history going back further is examined. What is quite intriguing is that the author shows the sheer number of close calls for war, and makes you wonder

Show More

whether World War I really was the surprise that many thought it was. One annoyance is that the author repeatedly uses the word "unkindly" to describe some cutting remark or other. Another tic was three citations to Wind in the Willows in the space of a few pages; even if Toad and Wilhelm II had something in common, that's a bit much. One big positive: a superb choice of illustrations and political cartoons to go with the text, one of the strengths of the book. It would be unkindly not to recommend this.

Show Less

I read this book following Robert Massie's Dreadnought as I wanted a book which covered the other countries involved in WWI and the lead up to their decisions to go to war. I got what I wanted here, with a chapter per major country roughly, but I wish the book had been more detailed. I suppose I'm

Show More

spoiled after Dreadnought for how detailed it was for Britain and Germany, but there were times where I knew the history was more complex than stated, but for sake of space MacMillan had to summarize the matter. Still, this book makes a great overview of the road to 1914 for anyone who only knows of the assassination at Sarajevo. That was only the final straw on the proverbial camel's back.

Show Less

The War that Ended the Peace by Margaret MacMillan Published in November 2013
If the “Guns of August” by Barbara Tuchman and other similar books wetted your appetite in your search for the reasons that initiated WW1, then this is a must read. Beware, although an extremely easy read, this book is

Show More

real long at 645 pages of narrative and is followed by excellent notes, a long bibliography and an excellent index. The publisher is also to be congratulated by providing a good number of clear and most legible maps and other photographic illustrations. MacMillan is Provost of St Anthony’s College, Oxford and this book is a fully supported Academic Treatise. The book is well chaptered in a good Chronological time line and is well researched. To my view there is a mite too much trivia, such data can be considered as supporting evidence to illuminate traits of key individuals. I labored through the book but gained my best insight into the years leading from 1870 up to the start of the five major powers plus others who entered into hostilities in August 1914. Clearly in my view this book is the best in its class.
In my view this is the best and fullest account of factors that led to the onset of hostilities. I have read 10 such books that sought out the reasons as to why the war ever occurred.
The hatred of Austria-Hungary‘s Conrad for Serbia comes across most strongly. Details of all the major individuals are never lacking across all the major contenders. War-mongering was not limited to Germany. The major crises from 1907 through 1914 are well covered in the sequence as they unfolded.
My conclusion from reading this fine history is that the two major empires, namely: 1) the Austrian-Hungary and 2) the Ottoman empires were extremely unstable and therefore most volatile. The Entente (Russia, France, England) and the Alliance (Hungary-Austria, Germany, Italy) powers were forever attempting to increase their colonial influences and the peace was most fragile. The period 1905 to 1914 was close to war many times and major or minor crises could have caused a major war to break out over seemingly minor events associated with Morocco in 1905 or yet again in 1911 or due to unrest in the Balkans in each and any year between 1906 and 1914.
As a result of my excitement, I find that I must immediately read MacMillan’s 2007 published book entitled “Paris 1919” without pausing to take in any fictional entertainment. (Mike Hodges: May 2014)

Show Less

This book begins with the Paris Exposition of 1900 and after twenty long chapters, ends with an epilogue on the declarations of war by the principal protagonists in August 1914. It is extremely well written; a major historical work of Europe during the first fourteen years of the twentieth century.

Show More

Each chapter details the separate historical events at some length that caused or may have eventually caused the war that ended the peace. Sixty-five million served, 9 million died and 20 million were wounded. It brought down four European empires and weakened the colonial powers of Britain and France and also spawned communism and fascism.

Throughout the book, Margaret draws some similarities between the first decade of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. Chapter sixteen is about The Balkan Wars in 1912/13 and does this sound ever so familiar today? Has anything really changed in 100 years? I quote -"The growth of National movements had welded peoples together, but it had also divided Orthodox from Catholic or Muslim, Albanians from Slavs and Croats, Serbs, Slovines, Bulgarians or Macedonians from each other. While the people of the Balkans had coexisted and intermingled, often for long periods of peace through the centuries, the establishment of National states in the nineteenth century had too often been accompanied by burning of villages, massacres, expulsions of minorities and lasting vendettas."

The writer explains that the 'Great War' was not produced by a single cause but by a combination of decisions. What the arms race did was raise the level of tensions in Europe and put pressure on decision makers to pull the trigger before the enemy did. Even although the major players talked of peace and expressed their horror of war, their sense of honour prevented any retreat.

One can read this splendid book and still ask how the assassination in Sarajevo of the heir to the throne of Austria-Hungary could bring about the clash between Europe's major and minor nations. Margaret MacMillan has written a long book to pose that question and concludes that the search for a full explanation which began the day the first battle was fought, continues to this day. Recommended serious reading.

Show Less