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Biography & Autobiography. History. Military. Nonfiction. HTML:NEW YORK TIMES BESTSELLER � The extraordinary story of the World War II air, land, and sea campaign that brought the U.S. Navy to the apex of its strength and marked the rise of the United States as a global superpower Winner, Commodore John Barry Book Award, Navy League of the United States � Winner, John Lehman Distinguished Naval Historian Award, Naval Order of the United States With its thunderous assault on the Mariana Islands in June 1944, the United States crossed the threshold of total war. In this tour de force of dramatic storytelling, distilled from extensive research in newly discovered primary sources, James D. Hornfischer brings to life the campaign that was the fulcrum of the drive to compel Tokyo to surrender�and that forever changed the art of modern war. With a close focus on high commanders, front-line combatants, and ordinary people, American and Japanese alike, Hornfischer tells the story of the climactic end of the Pacific War as has never been done before. Here are the epic seaborne invasions of Saipan, Tinian, and Guam, the stunning aerial battles of the Great Marianas Turkey Shoot, the first large-scale use of Navy underwater demolition teams, the largest banzai attack of the war, and the daring combat operations large and small that made possible the strategic bombing offensive culminating in the atomic strikes on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. From the seas of the Central Pacific to the shores of Japan itself, The Fleet at Flood Tide is a stirring, authoritative, and cinematic portrayal of World War II�s world-changing finale. Illustrated with original maps and more than 120 dramatic photographs �Quite simply, popular and scholarly military history at its best.��Victor Davis Hanson, author of Carnage and Culture �The dean of World War II naval history . . . In his capable hands, the story races along like an intense thriller. . . . Narrative nonfiction at its finest�a book simply not to be missed.��James M. Scott, Charleston Post and Courier �An impressively lucid account . . . admirable, fascinating.��The Wall Street Journal �An extraordinary memorial to the courageous�and a cautionary note to a world that remains unstable and turbulent today.��Admiral James Stavridis, former Supreme Allied Commander, NATO, author of Sea Power �A masterful, fresh account . . . ably expands on the prior offerings of such classic naval historians as Samuel Eliot Morison.��The Dallas Morning News.… (more)
User reviews
Other campaigns and battles, such as Iwo Jima and Leyte Gulf are given less attention than one would expect. In his defense, though, these battles have received a lot of attention from historians. Flags of Our Fathers (James Bradley) and The Heart of Hell: The Untold Story of Courage and Sacrifice in the Shadow of Iwo Jima (Weiss) are creditable accounts of Iwo Jima and Sea of Thunder: Four Commanders and the Last Great Naval Campaign 1941-1945 (Evan Thomas) and the aforementioned The Last Stand of the Tin Can Sailors are excellent accounts of the Battle of Leyte Gulf.
Hornfischer is as adept at describing an expanded war as he is a single battle. His extensive research relies heavily on primary sources ranging from government officials in Washington and Tokyo, officers in Navy wardrooms, pilots in their cockpits, Marines on the beach and even, despite the extreme paucity or survivors, from Japanese soldiers and civilians on Saipan.
Bottom line: Hornfischer’s books read more like a Tom Clancy thriller than a history book. His skill at stitching together a story that contains all the horror and tragedy, sacrifice and heroism is unparalleled. I cannot recommend his books enough.
*Quotations are cited from an advanced reading copy and may not be the same as appears in the final published edition. The review was based on an advanced reading copy obtained at no cost from the publisher in exchange for an unbiased review. While this does take any ‘not worth what I paid for it’ statements out of my review, it otherwise has no impact on the content of my review.
FYI: On a 5-point scale I assign stars based on my assessment of what the book needs in the way of improvements:
*5 Stars – Nothing at all. If it ain’t broke, don’t fix it.
*4 Stars – It could stand for a few tweaks here and there but it’s pretty good as it is.
*3 Stars – A solid C grade. Some serious rewriting would be needed in order for this book to be considered great or memorable.
*2 Stars – This book needs a lot of work. A good start would be to change the plot, the character development, the writing style and the ending.
*1 Star - The only thing that would improve this book is a good bonfire.
It was well written, factual with good notes, and had good maps.
The narrative starts with the Marianas Campaign and concludes at war's
It is a good book and well worth reading by the beginner or intermediate reader.
Hornfischer concludes that the psychological mindset of the Japanese leadership was the ultimate center of gravity in the war, justifying the use of the worst weapons we had available to break the deadlock that paralyzed the Japanese government's power of decision. In some ways I'm more convinced of this argument than I might have been, say, ten years ago, as I've become much more aware of weaknesses of the Meiji State that allowed the Japanese military to arrogate too much authority. Still, there are times when Hornfischer doesn't seem like he convinces himself with his own argument, as accepting the principles of Total War is an acceptance of the overthrow of all the restrains that aim to maintain proportionality; sometimes ugly is just ugly.
However, I also think those who argued that Hiroshima was really the opening shot of the Soviet-American Cold War, and that this foreclosed a better relationship with Stalin were/are kidding themselves; though that's an argument for another day. Still, to give those folks their due, I have to accept that there's an element of the U.S. government sleep-walking their own way through the decision making process which sticks with me from all that I've read about it. The American choice to use atomic weapons was as riddled with second guessing, sloppy thinking, and self-serving careerism as the Japanese process of avoiding national suicide. This is a long-winded way of saying that FDR was derelict in preparing Truman to preside over the final decision, and even if the right decision was ultimately made, it is not very satisfying. Overall, I still prefer Richard Frank's "Downfall" as an examination of the 1945 endgame, though Hornfischer takes into account Harold Bix's "Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan," which ascribed much more political culpability to the Japanese sovereign than had been done previously. I suppose I'm arguing that another parallel examination of American and Japanese decision-making processes might be in order; hopefully Richard Frank completes his new trilogy about World War II viewed through the filter of the Sino-Japanese war.