Protagoras and Meno

This volume contains new translations of two dialogues of Plato, the Protagoras and the Meno, together with explanatory notes and substantial interpretive essays. Robert C. Bartlett's translations are as literal as is compatible with sound English style and take into account important textual variations. Because the interpretive essays both sketch the general outlines of the dialogues and take up specific theoretical or philosophic difficulties, they will be of interest not only to those reading the dialogues for the first time but also to those already familiar with them. The Protagoras and the Meno are linked by the attention each pays to the idea of virtue: the latter dialogue focuses on the fundamental Socratic question, "What is virtue?"; the former on the specific virtue of courage, especially in its relation to wisdom. An appendix contains a short extract from Xenophon's Anabasis of Cyrus that vividly portrays the figure of Meno.… (more)

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LibraryThing member Lukerik

An excellent introduction for the general reader, but notes so sparse I wonder why they bothered at all. The translation of Meno is flowing and readable. I can't speak for Protagoras as I recently read someone else's translation. The two dialogues are a sensible fit though as they both deal with

virtue.

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LibraryThing member blake.rosser

A couple of the more enjoyable dialogues because they are much more accessible and they concern a more practical topic: virtue. That said, I find it hard to rate it high when I disagree with a large part of Socrates' argumentation and conclusions. I have no certainty that virtue is the same as

knowledge, as he states in both of them, and then dismisses later in the Meno. I do think it's possible to have knowledge and still act unvirtuously, unlike Socrates. And I do think that sometimes emotions, passions, or other sorts of impulses can over-ride knowledge in the course of decision-making, unlike Socrates. I vehemently disagree with the conclusion in the Meno that virtue is some sort of divine inspiration. And finally, I completely disagree that it cannot be taught. There is also Socrates' false modesty on great display in Protagoras, especially 361a. I wish I knew how much of this was Plato and how much was the genuine Socrates.

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LibraryThing member Fledgist

Plato examines the concepts of knowledge and virtue.

LibraryThing member madepercy

This short dialogue on the issue of virtue (arete) and whether it can be taught is apparently one of Plato's works from his second literary period, written after Book 1 but before the remaining books of The Republic. The introduction to this version is by the translator, Benjamin Jowett. There are

few references to other works in the modern academic tradition, but Jowett makes particular mention of Meno in relation to the works of Descartes, Locke, Bacon, Hume, Spinoza, and Berkeley. I found this interesting as I have been exploring deductive versus inductive methods of research in recent times. Plato tends to be deductive, in moving from general ideas and principles to specifics, whereas the inductive method draws on specific cases to lead to general principles. Karl Popper was not a fan of induction, it seems. That Plato draws on Pythagoras and Heraclitus is obvious, but Jowett points out that there is no explicitly stated link. Most interesting was Plato's finding (through the words of Socrates, p. 75):Then, Meno, the conclusion is that virtue comes to the virtuous by the gift of God.That this is an early work makes sense. I frequently adopt the Socratic method in my teaching (as does much of academe even if implicitly) and a few times I have received feedback that sums it up thus: The Socratic method sucks. I hate it. By the end of this work, I couldn't help think that Socrates was being egotistical. Sure, he tried to shock people to realise their ignorance, but in this case, and as important as the idea is to so many philosophers, but in particular, Heraclitus, I thought the finding was quite a cop-out. All that posturing to say what Heraclitus had said more eloquently? The big lesson for me is that the Socratic method, when practised by the un- or under-practised, could easily come off as it does in Meno. I am half-way through a cover-to-cover reading of The Republic at the moment, which seems better polished and far less obtuse. It may well be that Desmond Lee's translation is better than Jowetts's. But clearly, if I am to be better at using the Socratic method, I must take into account how an amateurish use of the method may come off as egotistical with my students. I can recall the instances where this may well have been the case. But the idea of deduction versus induction and Jowett's comments on Plato in relation to other philosophers ranging from Descartes to Spinoza are worthy of further exploration. Additionally, Jowett states that modern philosophy no longer asks the sort of questions asked by Plato (p. 29). I think this explains why Nietzsche's madman shouts in the market place (The Gay Science, section 125, p. 90):God is dead! ... And we have killed him!Here Plato has Socrates tell us that virtue is a gift of God, which I can see means that to be virtuous requires one to find God. Rather than the shopkeepers telling the madman that they didn't know we had lost Him, and in spite of Plato's unrefined use of the dialogue (compared to his more advanced, later use), it would seem that modern philosophers are the crowd looking on and laughing at Nietzsche's madman (or, if you prefer, Huxley's self-flagellating Savage), while all the time they have forgotten their very origins.

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LibraryThing member stillatim

I was reading some history book the other day when I realized I'd never read Protagoras. Well, now I have, and the Meno for good measure. As with too many Platonic dialogues, if they weren't by Plato and didn't feature Socrates, nobody would care: The Republic this ain't. Socrates' fundamental

question--"yes, but what is virtue, really?"--is a good one, but the obvious answer ("you're being fooled by a word into believing that the various human excellences must have some one thing in common") is never really raised, and everything else is just a bunch of fallacies of ambiguity.

On the other hand, and as ever, these texts are so fundamental to philosophy that they're still worth reading.

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