Status
Available
Call number
Collection
Publication
Penguin (2007), Edition: New Ed, 528 pages
Description
Advances a new theory of consciousness based on insights gleaned from the fields of neuroscience, psychology, and artificial intelligence, and clears away obsolete myths about the process of thinking in conscious beings.
User reviews
LibraryThing member JollyContrarian
Consciousness Explained is a hard, but very rewarding, book. I first read it five years ago, and thought I mostly got it, but on reflection, I realise now I probably didn't. After recently getting through Dennett's equally fascinating (and hard) "Darwin's Dangerous Idea" I read it again. It's
If you're considering reading Consciousness Explained, I recommend having a look at Darwin's Dangerous Idea first; some of the ideas Dennett expounds there, particularly on the nature of algorithmic progression, are extremely useful for getting a handle on Dennett's central theme in Consciousness Explained. Dennett's views in each are really quite closely related. However, the "intuitive gap" (i.e., the distance in credibility between what Dennett proposes and how things "seem" intuitively) is huge in the case of consciousness, but comparatively small for Evolution. To wit:
Consciousness: Intuitively, there's a "central meaner" in the brain sitting in a "Cartesian theatre" enjoying the son-et-lumière. Dennett says this is an illusion, and there is no "narrative centre" of consciousness at all - in not so many ways, consciousness itself is an illusion; an aggregation of multiple sensory inputs and outputs of the cerebellum, all of which are performing their own functions independently of each other. "BUT AN ILLUSION TO WHOM?" you want to scream. It just doesn't seem to make sense.
Evolution: Intuitively, the universe seems designed. It seems impossible that it could be the result of blind, unintelligent operations. Darwin says that this is nevertheless the case, through the algorithmic mechanism of reproduction, mutation and natural selection of multiple organisms performing their own functions independently of each other. This isn't such a stretch, especially as the notion of a designer of the universe is an even more problematic idea, when you give it a moment's thought.
And that's precisely the point. Dennett argues persuasively (as, of course, many have before him) that a Cartesian theatre is just such a preposterous idea as a designer of the universe. Once you've ruled it out, all you are left with is the mechanical functions of the brain (unless, with Roger Penrose, you want to say "Quantum Mechanics did it!"), so you don't have any choice in the matter: the only question is how to build these mechanical, independent operations up into something which can function like consciousness. Like evolution, an aggregation of algorithms can be a "crane" which can achieve more than a simple algorithm. And so on. When you account for the actual - heterophenomenological, if I may be so bold - quality of consciousness, you notice it's incomplete, it's bitty, it's missing stuff: it isn't quite the widescreen, 7.1 THX certified surround-sound audio-visual experience we think it is, which is all grist to Dennett's mill.
Dennett is open that this is an opening salvo rather than a complete theory, and I am very interested to find out where this has all led. To my mind too much time is spent on stimulus and response - qualia, visual images and the like - which ought to be comparatively easy to explain in terms of multiple drafts - and not enough time is spent explaining how on Dennett's theory a human being, who only *seems* to have consciousness, can create clearly intentional objects, such as this book review, or more critically, a book as coherent and persuasive as Dennett's. It is difficult to analyse this sort of intentional action without a "central meaner" to be putting the view. I think Dennett's view might be able to be developed in this direction, but to my mind insufficient resource was put into this endeavour.
As he does in Darwin's Dangerous Idea, Daniel Dennett courts controversy and seems to pick intemperate fights with his competitors, and you do wonder whether a few straw men aren't being erected. Certainly, there is the odd cheap shot, but that adds to the entertainment value - the idea of fully grown philosophers drawing handbags at forty paces is one which appeals to me, and Dennett's views on his major competitor John Searle have this quality.
But John Searle should perhaps take some comfort: Dennett may at times seem abrasive, but he surely doesn't *mean* to be.
If you know what I mean.
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properly sinking in now, and I think I mostly have it. I think. If you're considering reading Consciousness Explained, I recommend having a look at Darwin's Dangerous Idea first; some of the ideas Dennett expounds there, particularly on the nature of algorithmic progression, are extremely useful for getting a handle on Dennett's central theme in Consciousness Explained. Dennett's views in each are really quite closely related. However, the "intuitive gap" (i.e., the distance in credibility between what Dennett proposes and how things "seem" intuitively) is huge in the case of consciousness, but comparatively small for Evolution. To wit:
Consciousness: Intuitively, there's a "central meaner" in the brain sitting in a "Cartesian theatre" enjoying the son-et-lumière. Dennett says this is an illusion, and there is no "narrative centre" of consciousness at all - in not so many ways, consciousness itself is an illusion; an aggregation of multiple sensory inputs and outputs of the cerebellum, all of which are performing their own functions independently of each other. "BUT AN ILLUSION TO WHOM?" you want to scream. It just doesn't seem to make sense.
Evolution: Intuitively, the universe seems designed. It seems impossible that it could be the result of blind, unintelligent operations. Darwin says that this is nevertheless the case, through the algorithmic mechanism of reproduction, mutation and natural selection of multiple organisms performing their own functions independently of each other. This isn't such a stretch, especially as the notion of a designer of the universe is an even more problematic idea, when you give it a moment's thought.
And that's precisely the point. Dennett argues persuasively (as, of course, many have before him) that a Cartesian theatre is just such a preposterous idea as a designer of the universe. Once you've ruled it out, all you are left with is the mechanical functions of the brain (unless, with Roger Penrose, you want to say "Quantum Mechanics did it!"), so you don't have any choice in the matter: the only question is how to build these mechanical, independent operations up into something which can function like consciousness. Like evolution, an aggregation of algorithms can be a "crane" which can achieve more than a simple algorithm. And so on. When you account for the actual - heterophenomenological, if I may be so bold - quality of consciousness, you notice it's incomplete, it's bitty, it's missing stuff: it isn't quite the widescreen, 7.1 THX certified surround-sound audio-visual experience we think it is, which is all grist to Dennett's mill.
Dennett is open that this is an opening salvo rather than a complete theory, and I am very interested to find out where this has all led. To my mind too much time is spent on stimulus and response - qualia, visual images and the like - which ought to be comparatively easy to explain in terms of multiple drafts - and not enough time is spent explaining how on Dennett's theory a human being, who only *seems* to have consciousness, can create clearly intentional objects, such as this book review, or more critically, a book as coherent and persuasive as Dennett's. It is difficult to analyse this sort of intentional action without a "central meaner" to be putting the view. I think Dennett's view might be able to be developed in this direction, but to my mind insufficient resource was put into this endeavour.
As he does in Darwin's Dangerous Idea, Daniel Dennett courts controversy and seems to pick intemperate fights with his competitors, and you do wonder whether a few straw men aren't being erected. Certainly, there is the odd cheap shot, but that adds to the entertainment value - the idea of fully grown philosophers drawing handbags at forty paces is one which appeals to me, and Dennett's views on his major competitor John Searle have this quality.
But John Searle should perhaps take some comfort: Dennett may at times seem abrasive, but he surely doesn't *mean* to be.
If you know what I mean.
Show Less
LibraryThing member anandrajan
One of the most wrong headed books on consciousness. At times Dennett reminds me of Gates and Clinton on the witness stand.
LibraryThing member gregfromgilbert
I really tried sticking with this book but finally lost interest around page 436 (with only 32 pages left to go!).
LibraryThing member Jewsbury
The author is a philosopher. However, the book opens with some disturbing hyperbole about the nature of consciousness, revealing the author’s lack of knowledge about the philosophy of science. The book then launches into some painstakingly slow expositions. Halfway through the book he finally
He argues several points, in so doing making use of specially crafted unilluminating jargon such as Joycean, Vorsetzer, CADBLIND and zimbo. Firstly creating useful categories for non-identical things is subjective. Thus when we have a sequence of mental processes involving perceiving, deciding and acting, we cannot set objective demarcation lines. Likewise the set of underlying actions contributing to the consciousness self is fuzzy. Secondly the brain processes information in parallel, thereby providing multiple alternative opinions. Thirdly there is no command central in the brain; rather it uses a workspace to which all processes have two-way access.
Then he opines that every autonomous system controlled by high-level software running on a virtual serial architecture is conscious. Were this pseudo-definition to be what we commonly think of as consciousness, and were our brains such parallel processes, then he would have shown how an explanation of consciousness was possible.
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speeds up and he finished the introduction. At this point, he announces he will not actually say how the mind works just indicate how one might be able to explain consciousness. Revealingly, he disparages his colleagues in cognitive fields as conceited, arrogant and narrowly focussed. He says they just guess and do not have any answers. He argues several points, in so doing making use of specially crafted unilluminating jargon such as Joycean, Vorsetzer, CADBLIND and zimbo. Firstly creating useful categories for non-identical things is subjective. Thus when we have a sequence of mental processes involving perceiving, deciding and acting, we cannot set objective demarcation lines. Likewise the set of underlying actions contributing to the consciousness self is fuzzy. Secondly the brain processes information in parallel, thereby providing multiple alternative opinions. Thirdly there is no command central in the brain; rather it uses a workspace to which all processes have two-way access.
Then he opines that every autonomous system controlled by high-level software running on a virtual serial architecture is conscious. Were this pseudo-definition to be what we commonly think of as consciousness, and were our brains such parallel processes, then he would have shown how an explanation of consciousness was possible.
Show Less
LibraryThing member llasram
I haven't read this in several years, so I suspect that the science is somewhat out of date, but the philosophy is top-notch. I admit some possible carpenter’s-wooden-moon bias going on, but I honestly can’t see how a metaphysically materialistic consciousness could operate other than Dennett
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describes. Show Less
LibraryThing member GreyHead
Mini-review: This is not a book about NLP, and I doubt that the author has ever heard of NLP. Yet his thesis of the ‘mechanism of mind’ and of the how consciousness might work is, in my opinion, another significant piece in the jig-saw that links the NLP model with what might be called ‘more
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mainstream’ philosophy and, perhaps, ‘psychology’ though this book is definitely in the former class. Show Less
LibraryThing member _Greg
Dennet deconstructs and refutes most theories of human consciousness. He then proposes some models which can explain some facets of human consciousness. He does not explain the core mysteries of consciousness. This book is essential for anyone who would like to better understand human consciousness.
LibraryThing member m.a.harding
Dennetts views on qualia are rubbish but the rest is fantastic - a great synthesis and also original.
LibraryThing member scroeser
A detailed and extensive reexamination of consciousness. You may not agree with all of it, but it will certainly make you think.
LibraryThing member ShiraC
Not an easy read, but rewarding.
LibraryThing member Carl_Hayes
It's rough when you get to page 433 of a long, often tedious slog (detailed examinations of dozens of very specific experiments) and the author says "My explanation of consciousness is far from complete. One might even say that it was just a beginning..." Dude! His brain as computer and
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consciousness as software-effect and self as narrative center of gravity are all interesting, though seem less profound than he suggests. Would rather have read a highly abbreviated version of this ala Freud's Ego and the Id. It basically ends pointing to the Blade Runner idea: that a conscious robot that can suffer is not so far from us. Hard to excite the imagination with this idea when BR already did that quite awhile ago, and threw in contemplations on death, desire, memory and purpose as well! Show Less
LibraryThing member haig51
Daniel Dennett's eliminative materialism tries to cut through the hard problem of consciousness by completely removing the concept of qualia as a wrongheaded folk psychological epiphenomenon and replacing it with reductionist models of self-reflection and intentionality. To give him credit, if his
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thesis is correct then he really has explained consciousness, at least from a high-level conceptual perspective without the messy details. While I do think a lot of what he writes about is on the right track, I fear he goes one step too far by prematurely declaring qualia an illusion through a priori reasoning without any empirical justification. The problem of empirically understanding qualia is unique mainly because of the epistemological limitation of probing subjective experiences which breaks with the historically objective methods of scientific investigation. Dennett introduces heterophenomenology as a possible way to circumvent this limitation, but I feel it is just a sideshow that doesn't address the core of the problem. Furthermore, due to this epistemological limitation, the ontological reality of qualia is left as mysterious as ever, that doesn't mean it will always be mysterious, but for the moment it has not been explained, despite Dennett's claims. I can sympathize with Dennett's project, I don't think the alternatives to his views have been very fruitful either, for example, I agree with him that Chalmers' p-zombie thought experiment is an incoherent idea, however, just because your opponents are wrong doesn't mean you are right. I still liked the book, I think Dennett's ideas are helpful and point the way towards further research, but I'll stop short in agreeing with him that consciousness has been conceptually explained. Explained away, maybe, but not explained. Show Less
LibraryThing member georgeslacombe
Intriguing and exciting book on how our mind works
LibraryThing member jwhenderson
One of the seminal texts on the nature of consciousness, this a serious work of philosophy that can be understood by the general reader. Whether discussing the Cartesian dilemma or the theories of phenomenology Dennett delivers complicated concepts in a clear manner. The book is divided into three
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parts covering methods, the empirical theory of consciousness and philosophical issues. I enjoyed his ability to make difficult ideas accessible. Show Less
LibraryThing member steve02476
A fine book. Dennett's a creative and funny writer, and I think the book holds up well. There were a few parts I didn't quite get, but overall I felt like I could keep up with him. It helped that I've read some other of his stuff before, and some other related works. Of course "Explained" is a bit
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of a stretch, but I thought it was a good try. Show Less
LibraryThing member markm2315
Yes we have a soul, it is made of thousands of tiny robots.
Subjects
Awards
Language
Original language
English
Original publication date
1991
Physical description
528 p.; 7.8 inches
ISBN
9780140128673