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What is fascism? By focusing on the concrete: what the fascists did rather than what they said, the esteemed historian Robert O. Paxton answers this question for the first time. From the first violent uniformed bands beating up "enemies of the state," through Mussolini's rise to power, to Germany's fascist radicalization in World War II, Paxton shows clearly why fascists came to power in some countries and not others, and he explores whether fascism could exist outside the early-twentieth-century European setting in which it emerged. The Anatomy of Fascism will have a lasting impact on our understanding of modern European history, just as Paxton's classic Vichy France redefined our vision of World War II. Based on a lifetime of research, this compelling and important book transforms our knowledge of fascism-"the major political innovation of the twentieth century, and the source of much of its pain.".… (more)
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Paxton s’ description of Fascism is very detailed and some of the chapters are brilliant. His major theory is placing himself in between researchers describing Fascism as a part of totalitarianism, and on other hand Leninism dogma that portray the ideology as a capitalist reaction to Communism. The major point is that while others have over valuated the first face of Fascism when it is small and pure, Paxton instead focus on 2 and 3 how Fascism came to power in Italy and Germany by abandoning most of the initial ideology. He summarize his own point of view with a citation of Frans Neuman: ”National socialism’s ideology is constantly shifting. It has certain magical beliefs...but it is not laid down in a series of categorical and dogmatic pronouncements”. The author certainly has a point showing that fascism is a populistic movement, but this is also the major weakness of this book. By putting the spotlight on how Hitler and Mussolini got to power, he certainly over valuates the ideological implications of the lack of scrutiny in two of histories worst power mongers. Both of these dictators would positively have sacrificed everything including their own mothers in their way to the top. So why do ideological interpretation of the alliances and baby kissing they used to get what they wanted? Does that really tell us of what kind of society these fascist leaders wanted? Instead that would be better shown in studying the fascist countries. Actually the chapters about just that hardly reach the level needed. The description of the radicalization of Nazi Germany and fascist Italy is confined to show how both countries had a certain goal of going to war, and the coming of the Holocaust. Thereby Paxton misses how both these countries transformed to plan and state controlled economies. Paxton also down play the similarities between Fascism and socialism by proposing that the victims of Stalin was mostly not women and children, which seems odd looking at, for example, the terror famine in Ukraine.
Also, there are some not especially well thought threw sentences associating Thatcherism and gun libertarians in US with Fascism that more qualifies as political slurs devoid of any resemblance of the level argumentation otherwise presented in this book. Interesting to read but lack some logic. A weak three out of five.
Throughout most of the nineteenth century, politics was the business of the educated elite; the common man was often disenfranchised from the most important parts of the political process. It wasn't until "the masses, full of beer and nonsense" (as Carlyle once acerbically noted) were fully integrated that fascism was possible.
Fascism is often associated with often any ideological stances, from anti-capitalism to anti-socialism to (perhaps most commonly) anti-Semitism. Paxton attempts to show that no one fascist regime espoused all of these ideas at the same time. For example, while fascists often did attack bourgeois capitalists for their flabby materialism, once they gained power, they often joined powers with them later in order to build political alliances. In fact, fascist hardliners usually fancied themselves as apolitical, and refused to engage in decadent liberal parliamentarianism. Of course, as history continually tells us, purity is no way to gain political power or legitimacy. It's simply not enough to don a colored shirt and start beating up foreigners and minorities. Paxton describes how fully realized fascist mobilization took "a comparable crisis, a comparable opening of political space, a comparable skill at alliance building, and comparable cooperation from existing elites."
Paxton states that, in the long term, all fascists regimes eventually devolve through a period of entropy in which they slough off their purist elements and become something much more resembling authoritarians than fascists. He refers to this as their period of "entropy," whereby they undergo a kind of political and cultural normalization along the lines of political elites. He claims that the one regime that did not undergo this phase was Hitler's Germany. The next-to-last chapter considers fascisms (or fascist-like regimes) in other parts of the world, especially Peron's Argentina.
All of this is meant as a series of lessons which should enable us to, in the end, limn some of the fascism's defining characteristics. His final analysis concludes that most successful fascisms have several common characteristics. Some of them include a "sense of overwhelming crisis," "the primacy of the group ... and the subordination of the individual to it," "dread of the group's decline under the corrosive effects of individualism liberalism," "the superiority of the leader's instincts over abstract and universal reason," and "beauty of violence and the efficacy of the will." While these aspects might not provide us with the fullest picture of fascism, it seems to provide a good baseline for scholarship, both past and future.
For a while, I have been reading "around fascism," especially William Johnston's "The Austrian Mind: An Intellectual and Social History, 1848-1938." I found Paxton's book really valuable in providing the material to connect some really important dots as far as setting the political tone for the possibility of fascism. Also, one of the most wonderful resources in the book is the thirty-page, topically organized bibliographical essay. There is enough material in there to keep anyone interested in the subject reading for quite a while.
The Anatomy of Fascism
Robert O. Paxton
P17:
Hannah Arendt
[Yes, the "neither right nor left" was part of European politics a century ago]
P215:
...some countries with a powerful cultural preparation (France, for example) became fascist only by conquest (if then).
P220:
Fascism... is still visible today. Fascism exists at the level of Stage One within all democratic countries... "Giving up free institutions," especially the freedoms of unpopular groups, os recurrently attractive to citizens of Western democracies... We know from tracing its path that fascism does not require a spectacular "march" on some capital to take root; seemingly anodyne decisions to tolerate lawless treatment of national "enemies" is enough. Something very close to classical fascism has reached Stage Two in a few deeply troubled societies. Its further progress is not inevitable, however. Further fascist advances toward power depend in part upon the severity of a crisis, but also very largely upon human choices, especially the choices of those holding economic, social, and political power. Determining the appropriate responses to fascist gains is not easy, since its cycle is not likely to repeat itself blindly. We stand a much better chance of responding wisely, however, if we understand how fascism succeeded in the past.
It was in part to answer that question that I picked up a copy of Robert O. Paxton's book. As a longtime historian of 20th century France and author of a seminal work on the Vichy regime, he brings a perspective to the question that is not predominantly Italian or German. This shows in the narrative, as his work uses fascist movements in nearly every European country to draw out commonalities that explain the fascist phenomenon. As he demonstrates, fascism can be traced as far back as the 1880s, with elements of it proposed by authors and politicians across Europe in order to mobilize the growing population of voters (thanks to new measures of enfranchisement) to causes other than communism. Until then, it was assumed by nearly everyone that such voters would be automatic supporters for socialist movements. Fascism proposed a different appeal, one based around nationalist elements which socialism ostensibly rejected.
Despite this, fascism remained undeveloped until it emerged in Italy in the aftermath of the First World War. This gave Benito Mussolini and his comrades a flexibility in crafting an appeal that won over the established elites in Italian politics and society. From this emerged a pattern that Paxton identifies in the emergence of fascism in both Italy and later in Germany, which was their acceptance by existing leaders as a precondition for power. Contrary to the myth of Mussolini's "March on Rome," nowhere did fascism take over by seizing power; instead they were offered it by conservative politicians as a solution to political turmoil and the threatened emergence of a radical left-wing alternative. It was the absence of an alternative on the right which led to the acceptance of fascism; where such alternatives (of a more traditional right-authoritarian variety) existed, fascism remained on the fringes. The nature of their ascent into power also defined the regimes that emerged, which were characterized by tension between fascists and more traditional conservatives, and often proved to be far less revolutionary in practice than their rhetoric promised.
Paxton's analysis is buttressed by a sure command of his subject. He ranges widely over the era, comparing and contrasting national groups in a way that allows him to come up an overarching analysis of it as a movement. All of this leads him to this final definition:
"Fascism may be defined as a form of political behavior marked by obsessive preoccupation with community decline, humiliation, or victimhood and by compensatory cults of unity, energy, and purity, in which a mass-based party of committed nationalist militants, working in uneasy but effective collaboration with traditional elites, abandons democratic liberties and pursues with redemptive violence and without ethical or legal restraints goals of internal cleansing and external expansion." (p. 218)
While elements of this are certainly present today, they are hardly unique to fascism and exist in various forms across the political spectrum. Just as important, as Paxton demonstrates, is the context: one in which existing institutions are so distrusted or discredited that the broader population is willing to sit by and watch as they are compromised, bypassed, or dismantled in the name of achieving fascism's goals. Paxton's arguments here, made a decade before Donald Trump first embarked on his candidacy, are as true now as they were then. Reading them helped me to appreciate better the challenge of fascism, both in interwar Europe and in our world today. Everyone seeking to understand it would do well to start with this perceptive and well-argued book.
Robert Paxton helped us glean lessons from the actions - not speeches - of fascism. Unlike other writers who only studied Germany and Italy, he analyzed other countries where fascism didn't do well.
In the end, he left us with an excellent definition of fascism. This book is marvellous.
Despite the deeper analysis the common threads of thought do appear throughout.