Status
Available
Collection
Publication
New York : Alfred A. Knopf, 2014.
Description
Biography & Autobiography. History. Politics. Nonfiction. HTML: From the former secretary of defense, a strikingly candid, vivid account of serving Presidents George W. Bush and Barack Obama during the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. When Robert M. Gates received a call from the White House, he thought he'd long left Washington politics behind: After working for six presidents in both the CIA and the National Security Council, he was happily serving as president of Texas A&M University. But when he was asked to help a nation mired in two wars and to aid the troops doing the fighting, he answered what he felt was the call of duty..
User reviews
LibraryThing member thewanderingjew
Defense Secretary Robert Gates has written quite a compelling book about his service to his country, his service to eight Presidents, in one capacity or another. His last position, as Secretary of Defense for both Presidents Bush and Obama is detailed thoroughly in this book.
For Secretary Gates, I
While he respected both administrations pretty equally, he found the Bush White House never mistrusted the military, and as a result, he often received rousing ovations. The Obama White House, on the other hand, was often suspicious of the military arm of the government and that was, and is, reflected in his reception by the men who serve this country and in his decision making. The men certainly respect the Commander and Chief and will follow his orders, whether or not they agree with them, but Obama’s administration often disregarded the advice of the high command and senior advisors. Many times, the Obama White House reacted to events politically, rather than with regard to what might bring about the best outcome.
Robert Gates describes the contentious mood surrounding the Bush White House when he began working for “W”. Democrats virulently opposed the administration and the atmosphere between himself and Congress was also adversarial. The Secretary’s job was not easy, as it was a daunting task to try to bring a war to a successful conclusion and the emotional drain on him was enervating. He was ultimately responsible for the lives of so many and the number of injuries and deaths was mounting. When politics played a part in the decisions made for our fighting men, it disgusted him. I got the distinct feeling that his relationship with President Bush was more open and honest than the one he had with President Obama, nevertheless, he believed that most of Obama’s decisions were correct, in the long run. Hillary Clinton supported most of his decisions as did Condi Rice, and he had a good working relationship with both women.
When he describes his dealings with Israel, he exhibits an intense dislike for Bibi Netanyahu. He preferred to work with Ehud Barak. I was a bit disappointed that he brought his dislike with him when he had to negotiate with the only democracy in the Middle East, our strong ally there, especially since his (Gates) approach to Iran was different from that of Netanyahu. He seemed to favor the needs of the Arab countries and dismiss the concerns of Israel, especially with regard to Saudi Arabia. Since they had never attacked Israel, he felt they posed no threat and that arming them would not harm Israel’s security. He viewed Barak as his friend and Netanyahu as an enemy, which is not a great attitude to take with you to diplomatic meetings. Obama also showed great disrespect for Netanyahu. While they understood that Israel resides within enemy territory, they didn’t fully seem to comprehend their issues and tended to minimize their concerns, while elaborating on those of the Arabs. I thought, in that case, there was a bit of tunnel vision, perhaps on all sides.
Gates never understood the magnitude of the leaks that came out of the Obama White House, which he often believed compromised our servicemen's safety. The administration reacted politically all the time, always in campaign mode, disregarding the potential danger of their remarks. They were hell-bent on taking all the credit for anything positive that happened while they blamed everyone else for the failures that occurred on their watch.
While Gates and Bush did not always agree, he found that George Bush took the advice of the advisers in the field, more often than not, because he was less concerned with the politics of winning than Obama’s administration was, and Obama’s advisers had very little military experience or managerial experience which also affected the decisions they made. The generals disagreed with Obama’s decisions, more often than not, and his ambassadors also hampered the efforts of the generals. There was an enormous amount of infighting between the military and the government officials and even among the members of their own staffs. Gates learned quickly that what Obama promised was not often what he did. He bowed to the lobbies that put pressure on his White House regardless of agreements he had made to do otherwise. He often broke promises and did not keep his word. Gates believed that he underestimated Karzai and Ambassador Eikenberry undermined America. We actively sought to unseat Karzai, and when he was not overthrown, we paid for our decisions with his continued mistrust of America. It was difficult to work with the inexperienced team of the Obama White House. He was also often disappointed in the way they portrayed George Bush. They were pretty unprofessional in that regard.
When Gates learned of the issues surrounding the poor treatment of the servicemen and women at the VA, predating this current scandal, he sought to fix it, but he was more concerned with the soldiers in the field who were returning with grievous injuries, rather than the treatment of soldiers who had served and were using the VA for injuries and illnesses unrelated to their military experience. Obama ignored the issue. Overall, the Obama team was inexperienced and unprepared for the monumental tasks facing them. The hierarchy was disregarded and often those with less power overruled those with greater seniority. This sometimes led to infighting and to inept decisions.
Although he managed very well during both administrations, he wanted very much to exit the White House. It was breaking him emotionally; writing letters of condolence, welcoming bodies back home, fighting with the administrations for better equipment to save lives, visiting the injured, some that could have been prevented with more modern and technologically advanced design, was wearing him down.
His feelings about Harry Reid, the Majority Leader of the Senate, were visceral. He believed his remarks were stupid, as when he announced that we lost the war, and that he served as a saboteur. He found Pelosi to be more interested in politics than in the success and outcome of the wars.
Secretary Gates believes that Obama’s style of micromanagement is detrimental but his thoughtfulness in making decisions was admirable. He and his staff often overstepped the boundaries, making announcements and decisions which were embarrassing to the generals. His courage in making the decision about the Bin Laden raid impressed Gates, but his need to take credit disturbed him, because it put many of those involved in potential danger. He often gave unauthorized commands, orders, because he and his staff were unaware of the rules of protocol. He was always acting for political gain, not the benefit of his country. Gates always supported President Obama, regardless of whether or not he agreed with his decision, even with regard to the schedule for the withdrawal of troops from Iraq and Afghanistan.
Decisions were often made based on the views of the junior advisers rather than more seasoned military personnel and political advisers, leading to unintended consequences, as with the Arab Spring in which the Muslim Brotherhood assumed command and Mubarak was abandoned. Still he expresses great respect and admiration for both President Obama and Hillary Clinton. Towards Vice President Biden, he does not mince words. He pretty much liked him, but he believed that every decision he made regarding foreign policy was incorrect and ill advised.
The book describes the transition from the Bush White House to the Obama White House and the enormous burden of responsibility that he bore upon his shoulders during his tenure. With regard to the national defense and security of the country, he was second to no one but the President. His descriptions of the injured and their courage when he visits hospitals, in particular the burn hospital, will tear at your heartstrings.
Because of the massive amount of detail in the book, it felt almost like a textbook about the Iraq and Afghanistan Wars, in addition to the many other conflicts that arose during his tenure, like tsunamis, earthquakes, the incident in Benghazi, the WikiLeaks scandal and Julian Assange, and the continuing effort to improve relationships with our allies and our enemies which occupied most of his waking hours. Although his position was powerful, he was human and felt the pressure of the duty required of him.
My major criticism of the book is that it was almost too detailed, and possibly just a bit too much justification for his own behavior and actions, although he does also admit the mistakes he made.
For Secretary Gates, I
Show More
got the distinct feeling that serving his country was not a job, but a calling. He identified strongly with the demands and suffering of the servicemen. He saw it as his duty to protect, respect and honor them. In this regard, he did not find both White Houses equal. While he respected both administrations pretty equally, he found the Bush White House never mistrusted the military, and as a result, he often received rousing ovations. The Obama White House, on the other hand, was often suspicious of the military arm of the government and that was, and is, reflected in his reception by the men who serve this country and in his decision making. The men certainly respect the Commander and Chief and will follow his orders, whether or not they agree with them, but Obama’s administration often disregarded the advice of the high command and senior advisors. Many times, the Obama White House reacted to events politically, rather than with regard to what might bring about the best outcome.
Robert Gates describes the contentious mood surrounding the Bush White House when he began working for “W”. Democrats virulently opposed the administration and the atmosphere between himself and Congress was also adversarial. The Secretary’s job was not easy, as it was a daunting task to try to bring a war to a successful conclusion and the emotional drain on him was enervating. He was ultimately responsible for the lives of so many and the number of injuries and deaths was mounting. When politics played a part in the decisions made for our fighting men, it disgusted him. I got the distinct feeling that his relationship with President Bush was more open and honest than the one he had with President Obama, nevertheless, he believed that most of Obama’s decisions were correct, in the long run. Hillary Clinton supported most of his decisions as did Condi Rice, and he had a good working relationship with both women.
When he describes his dealings with Israel, he exhibits an intense dislike for Bibi Netanyahu. He preferred to work with Ehud Barak. I was a bit disappointed that he brought his dislike with him when he had to negotiate with the only democracy in the Middle East, our strong ally there, especially since his (Gates) approach to Iran was different from that of Netanyahu. He seemed to favor the needs of the Arab countries and dismiss the concerns of Israel, especially with regard to Saudi Arabia. Since they had never attacked Israel, he felt they posed no threat and that arming them would not harm Israel’s security. He viewed Barak as his friend and Netanyahu as an enemy, which is not a great attitude to take with you to diplomatic meetings. Obama also showed great disrespect for Netanyahu. While they understood that Israel resides within enemy territory, they didn’t fully seem to comprehend their issues and tended to minimize their concerns, while elaborating on those of the Arabs. I thought, in that case, there was a bit of tunnel vision, perhaps on all sides.
Gates never understood the magnitude of the leaks that came out of the Obama White House, which he often believed compromised our servicemen's safety. The administration reacted politically all the time, always in campaign mode, disregarding the potential danger of their remarks. They were hell-bent on taking all the credit for anything positive that happened while they blamed everyone else for the failures that occurred on their watch.
While Gates and Bush did not always agree, he found that George Bush took the advice of the advisers in the field, more often than not, because he was less concerned with the politics of winning than Obama’s administration was, and Obama’s advisers had very little military experience or managerial experience which also affected the decisions they made. The generals disagreed with Obama’s decisions, more often than not, and his ambassadors also hampered the efforts of the generals. There was an enormous amount of infighting between the military and the government officials and even among the members of their own staffs. Gates learned quickly that what Obama promised was not often what he did. He bowed to the lobbies that put pressure on his White House regardless of agreements he had made to do otherwise. He often broke promises and did not keep his word. Gates believed that he underestimated Karzai and Ambassador Eikenberry undermined America. We actively sought to unseat Karzai, and when he was not overthrown, we paid for our decisions with his continued mistrust of America. It was difficult to work with the inexperienced team of the Obama White House. He was also often disappointed in the way they portrayed George Bush. They were pretty unprofessional in that regard.
When Gates learned of the issues surrounding the poor treatment of the servicemen and women at the VA, predating this current scandal, he sought to fix it, but he was more concerned with the soldiers in the field who were returning with grievous injuries, rather than the treatment of soldiers who had served and were using the VA for injuries and illnesses unrelated to their military experience. Obama ignored the issue. Overall, the Obama team was inexperienced and unprepared for the monumental tasks facing them. The hierarchy was disregarded and often those with less power overruled those with greater seniority. This sometimes led to infighting and to inept decisions.
Although he managed very well during both administrations, he wanted very much to exit the White House. It was breaking him emotionally; writing letters of condolence, welcoming bodies back home, fighting with the administrations for better equipment to save lives, visiting the injured, some that could have been prevented with more modern and technologically advanced design, was wearing him down.
His feelings about Harry Reid, the Majority Leader of the Senate, were visceral. He believed his remarks were stupid, as when he announced that we lost the war, and that he served as a saboteur. He found Pelosi to be more interested in politics than in the success and outcome of the wars.
Secretary Gates believes that Obama’s style of micromanagement is detrimental but his thoughtfulness in making decisions was admirable. He and his staff often overstepped the boundaries, making announcements and decisions which were embarrassing to the generals. His courage in making the decision about the Bin Laden raid impressed Gates, but his need to take credit disturbed him, because it put many of those involved in potential danger. He often gave unauthorized commands, orders, because he and his staff were unaware of the rules of protocol. He was always acting for political gain, not the benefit of his country. Gates always supported President Obama, regardless of whether or not he agreed with his decision, even with regard to the schedule for the withdrawal of troops from Iraq and Afghanistan.
Decisions were often made based on the views of the junior advisers rather than more seasoned military personnel and political advisers, leading to unintended consequences, as with the Arab Spring in which the Muslim Brotherhood assumed command and Mubarak was abandoned. Still he expresses great respect and admiration for both President Obama and Hillary Clinton. Towards Vice President Biden, he does not mince words. He pretty much liked him, but he believed that every decision he made regarding foreign policy was incorrect and ill advised.
The book describes the transition from the Bush White House to the Obama White House and the enormous burden of responsibility that he bore upon his shoulders during his tenure. With regard to the national defense and security of the country, he was second to no one but the President. His descriptions of the injured and their courage when he visits hospitals, in particular the burn hospital, will tear at your heartstrings.
Because of the massive amount of detail in the book, it felt almost like a textbook about the Iraq and Afghanistan Wars, in addition to the many other conflicts that arose during his tenure, like tsunamis, earthquakes, the incident in Benghazi, the WikiLeaks scandal and Julian Assange, and the continuing effort to improve relationships with our allies and our enemies which occupied most of his waking hours. Although his position was powerful, he was human and felt the pressure of the duty required of him.
My major criticism of the book is that it was almost too detailed, and possibly just a bit too much justification for his own behavior and actions, although he does also admit the mistakes he made.
Show Less
LibraryThing member justindtapp
One of the best memoirs I have ever read, especially by a Cabinet member. This is a helpful book both in terms of an example of both management and leadership; not only of Gates' styles and practices but also Bush and Obama's. I contrast this to Timothy Geithner's memoir which contained nothing in
"I did not like my job," "I loathed the job," etc. Gates did not seek the job nor did he want to stay there. He became too emotionally involved (quite obvious if you saw the 60 Minutes interview with him) to make unbiased decisions about the "young men and women" he was trying his best to protect.
Gates was over an agency with 3.2 million employees and a $1 trillion budget. He gives insight into the management of that budget, as he was heavily involved (and praised) for cutting programs, pushing back against Congress' projects, and moving funding to programs that badly needed it.
When he went to Washington he sought the counsel of many, and I appreciated his sharing that process. Every good leader and manager learns from other leaders and managers. Gates already enjoyed bipartisan support and friendships from having served in seven previous administrations, Obama was the 8th President he served. He was also the first Secretary of Defense ever to work for consecutive Presidents from two different political parties. That makes this book an unprecedented read.
This book is very relevant to several current events, and I find that not enough commentators seem to have read Gates' memoirs.
Gates was a Russian history scholar which led him into the CIA in 1968. He understands Putin as one who longs for a previous version of Russian empire. Gates is critical of NATO's aggressive expansion in the 1990s, seeing it from Putin's point of view. He told Putin that he would not accept international criticism over moving troops from Texas to California, so he completely understood why Putin chafed at criticism of Russian bases in the Ukraine and Central Asia. He essentially predicts what Russian reaction would be if it saw Ukraine moving Westward.
Gates opposed the Obama Administration's desire to create a no-fly zone in Libya as a costly misuse of resources with unintended consequences. "I was stubborn, but not insubordinate."
He (and allegedly Secretary of State Clinton) repeatedly criticizes the Administration's micromanagement of military actions as unprecedented compared to the seven previous administrations (except Nixon) under which Gates had worked. Candidate Obama argued that the President did not have the authority to unilaterally order military action in a foreign country without an imminent threat to the U.S. Various lawyers from Defense and the State Department contended that he had no authority to engage forces in Libya for more than 60 days. President Obama instead sided with White House lawyers that argued that he could keep forces engaged there indefinitely. The micromanagement continued in other areas such as Hatian relief.
Gates worried about the influence of the Israelis and the Saudis in the Bush White House. He did not want to attack Iran, basically sees himself as getting the administration out of that jam. Only time he "lost his cool" was with King Abdullah, who was waxing forth about the weakness of the U.S. and how he wanted the U.S. to protect Saudi Arabia by attacking Iran. Gates did not like talk of sacrifice of U.S. men & women when the Saudis were willing to sacrifice nothing. Abdullah described Gates as "turning over the table" in the meeting. Abdullah thanked him for his candor and said it was the first time he actually knew the Administration's true position. Gates writes that the State Department recommended Obama not say much during Iran's Green Revolution, but in hindsight he thinks the Administration should have been more vocal in support of the protests.
Gates also worked to reform the Department of Veteran Affairs after scandals involving mistreatment of soldiers. He worried that his successor would not be up to the task of keeping VA's feet to the fire to reform. He particularly worked on better information flow going to veterans who were seeking care in a complicated system. He does not have high praise for VA.
There is little insight into Syria, but Gates opposed open American assistance for the Israelis in bombing a Syrian nuclear facility in 2007, which Israel later did itself.
He never directly criticizes Rumsfeld or other predecessors, but it's clear he felt he'd inherited a mismanaged mess. Besides the VA messes, Afghanistan had gotten woefully little attention and too many programs pushed by congressmen eager for jobs and votes had been unopposed.
Gates entered the Bush Administration after serving on the Iraq Study Group that, among other things, recommended a large increase in troop presence to stem the violence. He admired Bush's courage for going with "the surge" after most of the top generals opposed it. Gates cites the acquisition and further development of armored MRAP vehicles as his biggest personal accomplishment, saving hundreds of lives and limbs from IEDs. He was frustrated in pushing against his commanders who did not want the vehicle. I think he felt we did the best we could in Iraq, providing security and an opportunity for the fledgling democracy to get off the ground, but knew it was always too much to expect the Iraqis to build a functioning democracy and federal government the likes of which it had never seen before. He never trumpets political successes in Iraq the way Bush and Condoleeza Rice do in their memoirs.
Obama disappointed Gates in being different on issues as a candidate than he was as President. He felt that Obama campaigned on more attention for Afghanistan but that, once in office, Obama never had "passion for the mission." Gates laments that Joe Biden decided to be an even stronger influence on the President than Dick Cheney had been, something contrary to what Biden had said during the campaign. Biden and other staffers were constantly putting articles and opinions in front of Obama to argue that his generals were borderline insubordinate and trying to undermine confidence in the White House. Gates heard Obama say "I am giving an order," which he'd never known a President or any other civilian leader (including Secretary of Defense) say. Gates was offended by the statement and writes that it shows Obama and Biden's unfamiliarity with military culture.
In Obama's defense, he did agree to a troop surge. "The mission" in Afghanistan was never quite clear, which Gates also admits. Is it building a strong central government? Defeating the Taliban (which is ultimately impossible)? Gates admits that in some situations it is impossible to "win" but very possible to "lose," which he was afraid of in both Afghanistan and Iraq. Gates just hated how much domestic politics played into Obama's decisions and how all actions were so micromanaged. He felt the Stanley McChrystal affair was inevitable. Biden and other advisers were just looking for an opportunity for Obama to take a public action that would show that he was "in charge" over his military leadership.Gates was sickened by the politics and wanted to resign in 2010. He and Admiral Mullen are repeatedly put in awkward situations as the young Obama team criticizes Bush-era decisions that Gates and Mullen were instrumental in influencing. Biden seems eager to abandon Afghanistan altogether.
He contrast's Obama's lack of desire to forge working relationships with other foreign leaders with that of Bush and other presidents. But both Bush and Obama made decisions that went against their political base, decisions for which Gates has "utmost respect." However, the Obama White House was in campaign mode and put much more weight on domestic political concerns than the Bush team. Gates' harshest criticism of Obama comes from Obama having broken his word to Gates twice in the budget process, after Gates had worked out numbers with both Obama and the OMB director (both Orszag and Lew).One time, Obama gave Gates an expensive bottle of vodka and an apology for "driving him to drink." He felt Obama also went against his word in the process of repealing Don't Ask Don't Tell. Obama was frustrated with procedure and enforcement of laws he believed were wrong. (This is disturbing to me as the President should not feel above the law, didn't we learn this problem with Nixon?) "I'm the leader of the free world and I can't do anything," Obama is quoted as saying. Gates writes that Obama is pragmatic, thoughtful and professional in his anger, his feelings always passed quickly.
Gates also has harsh criticism for Congress, even though he maintains a respect for their role. He laments the current "scorched earth" battle between Congress and the White House for political points. He admits that both Congress and the media treated him very kindly compared to other high-ranking officials. He had good relationships with both parties, including with Secretary of State Clinton. Both Obama and Gates treated Gates with "great generosity."
In the end, Gates hung on because of the kids on the battlefield. It was awkward him to meet A&M graduates to whom he had handed diplomas to (as President of Texas A&M) on the battlefield. He was not above weeping in front of them.This is a great memoir of someone who hated his job yet did it remarkably well and had unprecedented bipartisan respect. 5 stars, must read
Show More
the way of describing leadership or management."I did not like my job," "I loathed the job," etc. Gates did not seek the job nor did he want to stay there. He became too emotionally involved (quite obvious if you saw the 60 Minutes interview with him) to make unbiased decisions about the "young men and women" he was trying his best to protect.
Gates was over an agency with 3.2 million employees and a $1 trillion budget. He gives insight into the management of that budget, as he was heavily involved (and praised) for cutting programs, pushing back against Congress' projects, and moving funding to programs that badly needed it.
When he went to Washington he sought the counsel of many, and I appreciated his sharing that process. Every good leader and manager learns from other leaders and managers. Gates already enjoyed bipartisan support and friendships from having served in seven previous administrations, Obama was the 8th President he served. He was also the first Secretary of Defense ever to work for consecutive Presidents from two different political parties. That makes this book an unprecedented read.
This book is very relevant to several current events, and I find that not enough commentators seem to have read Gates' memoirs.
Gates was a Russian history scholar which led him into the CIA in 1968. He understands Putin as one who longs for a previous version of Russian empire. Gates is critical of NATO's aggressive expansion in the 1990s, seeing it from Putin's point of view. He told Putin that he would not accept international criticism over moving troops from Texas to California, so he completely understood why Putin chafed at criticism of Russian bases in the Ukraine and Central Asia. He essentially predicts what Russian reaction would be if it saw Ukraine moving Westward.
Gates opposed the Obama Administration's desire to create a no-fly zone in Libya as a costly misuse of resources with unintended consequences. "I was stubborn, but not insubordinate."
He (and allegedly Secretary of State Clinton) repeatedly criticizes the Administration's micromanagement of military actions as unprecedented compared to the seven previous administrations (except Nixon) under which Gates had worked. Candidate Obama argued that the President did not have the authority to unilaterally order military action in a foreign country without an imminent threat to the U.S. Various lawyers from Defense and the State Department contended that he had no authority to engage forces in Libya for more than 60 days. President Obama instead sided with White House lawyers that argued that he could keep forces engaged there indefinitely. The micromanagement continued in other areas such as Hatian relief.
Gates worried about the influence of the Israelis and the Saudis in the Bush White House. He did not want to attack Iran, basically sees himself as getting the administration out of that jam. Only time he "lost his cool" was with King Abdullah, who was waxing forth about the weakness of the U.S. and how he wanted the U.S. to protect Saudi Arabia by attacking Iran. Gates did not like talk of sacrifice of U.S. men & women when the Saudis were willing to sacrifice nothing. Abdullah described Gates as "turning over the table" in the meeting. Abdullah thanked him for his candor and said it was the first time he actually knew the Administration's true position. Gates writes that the State Department recommended Obama not say much during Iran's Green Revolution, but in hindsight he thinks the Administration should have been more vocal in support of the protests.
Gates also worked to reform the Department of Veteran Affairs after scandals involving mistreatment of soldiers. He worried that his successor would not be up to the task of keeping VA's feet to the fire to reform. He particularly worked on better information flow going to veterans who were seeking care in a complicated system. He does not have high praise for VA.
There is little insight into Syria, but Gates opposed open American assistance for the Israelis in bombing a Syrian nuclear facility in 2007, which Israel later did itself.
He never directly criticizes Rumsfeld or other predecessors, but it's clear he felt he'd inherited a mismanaged mess. Besides the VA messes, Afghanistan had gotten woefully little attention and too many programs pushed by congressmen eager for jobs and votes had been unopposed.
Gates entered the Bush Administration after serving on the Iraq Study Group that, among other things, recommended a large increase in troop presence to stem the violence. He admired Bush's courage for going with "the surge" after most of the top generals opposed it. Gates cites the acquisition and further development of armored MRAP vehicles as his biggest personal accomplishment, saving hundreds of lives and limbs from IEDs. He was frustrated in pushing against his commanders who did not want the vehicle. I think he felt we did the best we could in Iraq, providing security and an opportunity for the fledgling democracy to get off the ground, but knew it was always too much to expect the Iraqis to build a functioning democracy and federal government the likes of which it had never seen before. He never trumpets political successes in Iraq the way Bush and Condoleeza Rice do in their memoirs.
Obama disappointed Gates in being different on issues as a candidate than he was as President. He felt that Obama campaigned on more attention for Afghanistan but that, once in office, Obama never had "passion for the mission." Gates laments that Joe Biden decided to be an even stronger influence on the President than Dick Cheney had been, something contrary to what Biden had said during the campaign. Biden and other staffers were constantly putting articles and opinions in front of Obama to argue that his generals were borderline insubordinate and trying to undermine confidence in the White House. Gates heard Obama say "I am giving an order," which he'd never known a President or any other civilian leader (including Secretary of Defense) say. Gates was offended by the statement and writes that it shows Obama and Biden's unfamiliarity with military culture.
In Obama's defense, he did agree to a troop surge. "The mission" in Afghanistan was never quite clear, which Gates also admits. Is it building a strong central government? Defeating the Taliban (which is ultimately impossible)? Gates admits that in some situations it is impossible to "win" but very possible to "lose," which he was afraid of in both Afghanistan and Iraq. Gates just hated how much domestic politics played into Obama's decisions and how all actions were so micromanaged. He felt the Stanley McChrystal affair was inevitable. Biden and other advisers were just looking for an opportunity for Obama to take a public action that would show that he was "in charge" over his military leadership.Gates was sickened by the politics and wanted to resign in 2010. He and Admiral Mullen are repeatedly put in awkward situations as the young Obama team criticizes Bush-era decisions that Gates and Mullen were instrumental in influencing. Biden seems eager to abandon Afghanistan altogether.
He contrast's Obama's lack of desire to forge working relationships with other foreign leaders with that of Bush and other presidents. But both Bush and Obama made decisions that went against their political base, decisions for which Gates has "utmost respect." However, the Obama White House was in campaign mode and put much more weight on domestic political concerns than the Bush team. Gates' harshest criticism of Obama comes from Obama having broken his word to Gates twice in the budget process, after Gates had worked out numbers with both Obama and the OMB director (both Orszag and Lew).One time, Obama gave Gates an expensive bottle of vodka and an apology for "driving him to drink." He felt Obama also went against his word in the process of repealing Don't Ask Don't Tell. Obama was frustrated with procedure and enforcement of laws he believed were wrong. (This is disturbing to me as the President should not feel above the law, didn't we learn this problem with Nixon?) "I'm the leader of the free world and I can't do anything," Obama is quoted as saying. Gates writes that Obama is pragmatic, thoughtful and professional in his anger, his feelings always passed quickly.
Gates also has harsh criticism for Congress, even though he maintains a respect for their role. He laments the current "scorched earth" battle between Congress and the White House for political points. He admits that both Congress and the media treated him very kindly compared to other high-ranking officials. He had good relationships with both parties, including with Secretary of State Clinton. Both Obama and Gates treated Gates with "great generosity."
In the end, Gates hung on because of the kids on the battlefield. It was awkward him to meet A&M graduates to whom he had handed diplomas to (as President of Texas A&M) on the battlefield. He was not above weeping in front of them.This is a great memoir of someone who hated his job yet did it remarkably well and had unprecedented bipartisan respect. 5 stars, must read
Show Less
LibraryThing member marilynsantiago
Great book, having a hard time putting it down.
LibraryThing member garnero
A balanced and insightful account by Gates of his stewardship of the DOD while prosecuting two wars. His descriptions of the temperaments and styles of decision making of both Bush and Obama were alone worth the read. I came away with respect for both men in spite of my political leanings, and deep
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admiration for Gates himself. It is a remarkable memoir. Show Less
LibraryThing member SigmundFraud
An important book and a compelling read. You do have to slog through a lot of the Iraq strategy but there is so much about the last two years of the Bush Administration and the first two years of the Obama Administration that is of great interest and bipartisan history. Obama doesn't come off so
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well. He is too controlling and so ponderous that by the time a decision is made the crisis may be past. Show Less
LibraryThing member RobertP
Excellent memoir. Not a pot boiler, but a Secretary of Defense should not kiss and tell. Rahpther, it is a well-written, apparently objective, and detailed look at his time in the US Defense ministry. He is not falsely modest but neither does he appear to be egotistical. All in all well worth
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reading for a sense of how America does foreign policy. Show Less
LibraryThing member drawoh2014
I learned early in my meager career that public service is not for the feint of heart. And, Robert M. Gates put his heart and mind on the line every day for four years serving Presidents Bush (44) and Obama, in bringing the Iraq and Afghan wars under better management. Gates continually fought the
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Congress and The White House to ensure the Department of Defense had the money and equipment they needed to prosecute two wars, all but lost when he joined the Bush Administration. Gates does not play the blame game in assessing why things had gone so badly, however, the steps he undertook and convinced the president to take were bold, decisive and historic. What Gates did not foresee was how thoroughly he would feel bonded to each and every serviceman that served under his commanders. Each night he personally wrote letters of condolence to the families, mothers, fathers, of those who had paid the ultimate sacrifice in defending their nation's freedom. He made countless trips to ware zones and while there he ate lunches with servicemen and women involved in the day to day combat. When back in Washington Gates regularly attended burials at Arlington National Cemetery. He got along well with both presents he served, and in the final analysis, gives both Bush and Obama high grades for leadership. I thought the book would be boring because it's about the military, the Congress, The Pentagon and a government that's become entirely dysfunctional. I was surprised at how enjoyable a read this was and would recommend it to anyone who wants to know that good, dedicated people serve the United States Government and leave the best of themselves at their job every day. Show Less
LibraryThing member bowedbookshelf
“War is inevitably tragic, inefficient, and uncertain.”
This memoir is subtitled Memoirs of a Secretary at War and Gates brings home the fact that it was not only the American public who did not seem to think or act as though we were engaged in war (two wars!) in the years since 2003, but it was
Gates organizes this memoir of his life in the G.W. Bush and Obama White Houses by big sections: by country (e.g. Russia, Iraq, Iran) and by his tasks (e.g., War with the Pentagon, War with Congress). He is frank about what he thought at the time he was asked to work on budgets and troop allocations in the two lengthy wars of Iraq and Afghanistan, but despite his personal dislike for the opinions of several of the folks he had to work with often, he did not often let his feelings get in the way of the business of the American people. He worked closely with Tom Donilon after Donilon became National Security Advisor to President Obama in 2010, but Donilon and Gates often disagreed on issues when Donilon was Deputy National Security Advisor to NSA chief Jim Jones early in the Obama Administration.
“That’s an order.”
“Obama’s order [about the troop levels in Afghanistan] at Biden’s urging demonstrated in my view the complete unfamiliarity of both men with the American military culture. That order was unnecessary and insulting, proof positive of the depth of the Obama White House’s distrust of the nation’s military leadership…The President announced the troop surge at West Point on December first [2009]… In the end I felt this national security debate had been driven more by the White House staff and domestic politics than any other in my entire experience…I thought Obama did the right things on national security, but everything came across as politically calculated...I was frustrated with a valuable process that had gone on way too long. To be fair, though, national interest had trumped politics as the President made a tough decision that was contrary to the advice of all his political advisors and almost certainly the least popular of the options before him in terms of his political constituents. On reflection, I believe that all of us at the senior-most level did not serve the President well in this process. Our team of rivals let personal feelings and distrust cloud our perceptions and recommendations. Contending teams presented alternatives to the President that were considerably more black and white than warranted. A more collegial process one that tried to identify points of agreement rather than sharpen differences would have had a more harmonious conclusion and done less damage to the relationship between the military and the Commander in Chief…”
Gates is straightforward in what he supported throughout his time as Secretary of Defense for two presidents, and talks candidly about his assessment of people and the things they did that he liked or did not like. Biden, who Gates claimed was on the wrong side of every major policy initiative throughout his time in office, was personally likeable, but Gates felt he was too often focused on political outcomes. One could of course argue that Biden felt this was his “job,” to be the one voice among many that did not focus on the needs of one department, but instead focused on the political ramifications. Gates gives Obama credit for looking at all ramifications and making some difficult calls despite the political fallout.
I had an epiphany halfway through this memoir. The poisonous political climate in Washington defeated Obama in a way that elections did not. He may have been elected as a result of the decline of both political parties, both in terms of their efficacy and in terms of popular perceptions of the parties. Gates talks about the endless leaks from his department and from the White House, and how they poisoned the atmosphere even further, forcing spokespeople to line up politically palatable positions in advance of meetings outlining possible consequences of these positions. Gates states he thought the Obama White House and Obama personally were suspicious of the armed services and the men that lead them. Perhaps Obama grew more and more suspicious as his Administration suffered through leaks and the vitriol spewing from Congress. Obama may simply have felt the sands shifting beneath him. Gates recognizes that Obama faced the most difficult opening years of any President he can remember, being involved in two wars, a financial crisis at home, and constant threats and crises overseas.
Gates survived long in the changing political climate in Washington because he had common sense and political savvy. When it comes right down to it, what is the Secretary of Defense? He is not a general, who commands troop movements. In some cases, the Secretary does not even have military experience, beyond a short stint in one of the services. He is not elected, but appointed. He distills and conveys information from the defense arm to the political, executive arm. He is a conduit.
Perhaps the President should always choose a person for Secretary of Defense who does not want the job, as Gates claimed he did not. Objectively, it is difficult to argue that Gates was not successful in the position. He was first appointed by a Republican and asked to stay by a Democrat. A person who does not want the job may not have a particular axe to grind or a personal agenda. Gates looked at Pentagon and Veteran’s Administration intransigence with the same scalded eye he cast upon the bitter infighting and jockeying for power he saw in the Congress and the “micromanaging” he saw among the National Security Staff (NSS). One has to ask oneself why anyone would want the job if not for personal aggrandizement. Gates says it was his “Duty.”
“Wars are a lot easier to get into than out of…The argument against military action is almost never about capabilities but whether it is wise. As Petraeus said early on in Iraq, “Tell me how this ends.” Too often the question is not even asked…American presidents… are too quick to reach for a gun…Too many American ideologues call for the use of military action as the first option rather than a last resort…Obama’s pivot to Asia was framed almost entirely in military terms as opposed to economic or political priorities. And so the rest of the world sees America above all else as a militaristic country too quick to launch planes, cruise missiles and armed drones deep into sovereign countries or ungoverned spaces. I strongly believe American must continue to fulfill its global responsibilities: we are the indispensable nation and few international problems can be addressed successfully without our leadership. But, we also need to better appreciate that there are limits to what the United States…can do in an often cruel and challenging world…not every outrage, every act of aggression, every oppression or every crisis can or should elicit an American military response. We are enamored of technology…but war has become for too many, among them defense experts, members of Congress, executive branch officials, and the American public as well, a kind of arcade video game: bloodless, painless, and odorless…War is inevitably tragic, inefficient, and uncertain.”
If this book interests you but seems like an impossible dream to read because of its size, I urge you to read the last chapter. In this, Gates talks directly to us about his understanding of and experience in office, sharing insights and realities about the use of military force. Additionally, an interview added at the end summarizes several points he makes at greater length in his book. This is a remarkable document that is as open and candid as the man. It is impossible not to like and respect him, and thank him for handling a very difficult job in a very difficult time. We were lucky he was there to save us from ourselves. He reminds us to thank the military men and women who, because of their sacrifice, allow us to live our lives with the abundance that we do. I wish we, as citizens, would strive to remember our own duty when it comes to our country and our community.
This memoir is subtitled Memoirs of a Secretary at War and Gates brings home the fact that it was not only the American public who did not seem to think or act as though we were engaged in war (two wars!) in the years since 2003, but it was
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also the Pentagon, which went about its "business as usual." This should not be as shocking to me as it is, since I lived also during this time and knew well that we felt no impact unless we had someone in the fight. Gates reminds us to think about our hand-jerk reaction to use military force in place of other, more measured responses and reminds us that there "the biggest doves in Washington wear uniforms" because the military leaders have seen the cost of war.Gates organizes this memoir of his life in the G.W. Bush and Obama White Houses by big sections: by country (e.g. Russia, Iraq, Iran) and by his tasks (e.g., War with the Pentagon, War with Congress). He is frank about what he thought at the time he was asked to work on budgets and troop allocations in the two lengthy wars of Iraq and Afghanistan, but despite his personal dislike for the opinions of several of the folks he had to work with often, he did not often let his feelings get in the way of the business of the American people. He worked closely with Tom Donilon after Donilon became National Security Advisor to President Obama in 2010, but Donilon and Gates often disagreed on issues when Donilon was Deputy National Security Advisor to NSA chief Jim Jones early in the Obama Administration.
“That’s an order.”
“Obama’s order [about the troop levels in Afghanistan] at Biden’s urging demonstrated in my view the complete unfamiliarity of both men with the American military culture. That order was unnecessary and insulting, proof positive of the depth of the Obama White House’s distrust of the nation’s military leadership…The President announced the troop surge at West Point on December first [2009]… In the end I felt this national security debate had been driven more by the White House staff and domestic politics than any other in my entire experience…I thought Obama did the right things on national security, but everything came across as politically calculated...I was frustrated with a valuable process that had gone on way too long. To be fair, though, national interest had trumped politics as the President made a tough decision that was contrary to the advice of all his political advisors and almost certainly the least popular of the options before him in terms of his political constituents. On reflection, I believe that all of us at the senior-most level did not serve the President well in this process. Our team of rivals let personal feelings and distrust cloud our perceptions and recommendations. Contending teams presented alternatives to the President that were considerably more black and white than warranted. A more collegial process one that tried to identify points of agreement rather than sharpen differences would have had a more harmonious conclusion and done less damage to the relationship between the military and the Commander in Chief…”
Gates is straightforward in what he supported throughout his time as Secretary of Defense for two presidents, and talks candidly about his assessment of people and the things they did that he liked or did not like. Biden, who Gates claimed was on the wrong side of every major policy initiative throughout his time in office, was personally likeable, but Gates felt he was too often focused on political outcomes. One could of course argue that Biden felt this was his “job,” to be the one voice among many that did not focus on the needs of one department, but instead focused on the political ramifications. Gates gives Obama credit for looking at all ramifications and making some difficult calls despite the political fallout.
I had an epiphany halfway through this memoir. The poisonous political climate in Washington defeated Obama in a way that elections did not. He may have been elected as a result of the decline of both political parties, both in terms of their efficacy and in terms of popular perceptions of the parties. Gates talks about the endless leaks from his department and from the White House, and how they poisoned the atmosphere even further, forcing spokespeople to line up politically palatable positions in advance of meetings outlining possible consequences of these positions. Gates states he thought the Obama White House and Obama personally were suspicious of the armed services and the men that lead them. Perhaps Obama grew more and more suspicious as his Administration suffered through leaks and the vitriol spewing from Congress. Obama may simply have felt the sands shifting beneath him. Gates recognizes that Obama faced the most difficult opening years of any President he can remember, being involved in two wars, a financial crisis at home, and constant threats and crises overseas.
Gates survived long in the changing political climate in Washington because he had common sense and political savvy. When it comes right down to it, what is the Secretary of Defense? He is not a general, who commands troop movements. In some cases, the Secretary does not even have military experience, beyond a short stint in one of the services. He is not elected, but appointed. He distills and conveys information from the defense arm to the political, executive arm. He is a conduit.
Perhaps the President should always choose a person for Secretary of Defense who does not want the job, as Gates claimed he did not. Objectively, it is difficult to argue that Gates was not successful in the position. He was first appointed by a Republican and asked to stay by a Democrat. A person who does not want the job may not have a particular axe to grind or a personal agenda. Gates looked at Pentagon and Veteran’s Administration intransigence with the same scalded eye he cast upon the bitter infighting and jockeying for power he saw in the Congress and the “micromanaging” he saw among the National Security Staff (NSS). One has to ask oneself why anyone would want the job if not for personal aggrandizement. Gates says it was his “Duty.”
“Wars are a lot easier to get into than out of…The argument against military action is almost never about capabilities but whether it is wise. As Petraeus said early on in Iraq, “Tell me how this ends.” Too often the question is not even asked…American presidents… are too quick to reach for a gun…Too many American ideologues call for the use of military action as the first option rather than a last resort…Obama’s pivot to Asia was framed almost entirely in military terms as opposed to economic or political priorities. And so the rest of the world sees America above all else as a militaristic country too quick to launch planes, cruise missiles and armed drones deep into sovereign countries or ungoverned spaces. I strongly believe American must continue to fulfill its global responsibilities: we are the indispensable nation and few international problems can be addressed successfully without our leadership. But, we also need to better appreciate that there are limits to what the United States…can do in an often cruel and challenging world…not every outrage, every act of aggression, every oppression or every crisis can or should elicit an American military response. We are enamored of technology…but war has become for too many, among them defense experts, members of Congress, executive branch officials, and the American public as well, a kind of arcade video game: bloodless, painless, and odorless…War is inevitably tragic, inefficient, and uncertain.”
If this book interests you but seems like an impossible dream to read because of its size, I urge you to read the last chapter. In this, Gates talks directly to us about his understanding of and experience in office, sharing insights and realities about the use of military force. Additionally, an interview added at the end summarizes several points he makes at greater length in his book. This is a remarkable document that is as open and candid as the man. It is impossible not to like and respect him, and thank him for handling a very difficult job in a very difficult time. We were lucky he was there to save us from ourselves. He reminds us to thank the military men and women who, because of their sacrifice, allow us to live our lives with the abundance that we do. I wish we, as citizens, would strive to remember our own duty when it comes to our country and our community.
Show Less
LibraryThing member nbmars
Duty, by Robert M. Gates, is a no-holds-barred, candid account of the operation of the Department of Defense (DoD) and of the deliberations of the cabinet and national security apparatus under Presidents George W. Bush and Barak Obama. Gates doesn’t appear to pull any punches, and there is some
Much of this memoir concerns the wars fought by the U.S. in Iraq and Afghanistan. Gates, who had previously been head of the CIA, firmly believed that Saddam had weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and was a dangerous megalomaniac, and so Gates had supported the decision to go to war. In 2006, before becoming Secretary of Defense, Gates served on the Iraq Study Group (“ISG”), a group of distinguished national security experts which recommended a “surge” - a substantial increase in the number of American combat troops to create security in Bagdad. President Bush carried out the surge in spite of a lack of support from Democrats as well as the joint chiefs and heads of the various services. Similarly, Obama supported a surge in Afghanistan in spite of opposition. Gates commends both of these men for their decisions.
Gates’ impressions of foreign leaders are particularly interesting. He thought Dimitri Medvedev showed promise as being a statesman with whom we could work, but he didn’t last long enough to fulfill that promise. While Bush claimed to have looked into Vladimir Putin’s soul and saw a man he could trust, Gates regarded him as “a stone-cold killer.” He considered Benjamin Netanyahu to be egomaniacal and duplicitous. Hamid Karzai, he charged, is ineffectual and crooked.
Gates describes in detail the internal debates over what to do about the Arab uprisings. Gates opposed intervening militarily in Libya, and felt we were much too quick to withdraw our support for Mubarak.
For Congress, Gates has nothing but scorn despite allowing that it is an important part of government and a potential guardian of our liberty. To Gates, “Congress is best viewed from a distance—the farther the better—because up close, it is truly ugly.” He categorizes the House Foreign Affairs Committee as “rude, nasty and stupid.” The worst of the Congressmen were the hypocrites who accused the DoD of fiscal inefficiency, but who opposed any of his attempts to close unneeded bases in their districts or to discontinue unnecessary weapons programs that had suppliers in their districts. He would prepare for congressional hearings by answering “the way I really wanted to, barking and cursing and getting the anger and frustration out of my system, so that my public testimony could be dispassionate and respectful.”
Hillary Clinton receives very high praise for her wisdom, intelligence, and effort. Joe Biden is described as “impossible not to like,” but almost always wrong on serious national security issues and far too sensitive to the political repercussions from the Democratic “base.”
We finished the book perplexed as to how conservative commentators in early reviews of this book could have possibly seen this memoir as an indictment of Obama. If those commentators were honest, they would admit that Gates held Obama in very high regard. For example, he describes Obama’s decision to execute the raid on Bin Laden in violation of Pakistani sovereignty “one of the most courageous decisions I had ever witnessed at the White House.” In fact, Gates is far more critical of George W. Bush’s policies (though not of Bush personally). His complaints about the Obama administration mostly pertain to what he labels as micromanagement by staffers and bureaucrats. He does discuss Obama’s distrust of his generals, but then goes on to admit that Obama was justified in his concerns.
Gates accomplished a great deal during his tenure as Secretary. He oversaw the conduct of two wars simultaneously. He directed the redesign of the heavily armored vehicles used to transport troops, greatly reducing the incidence of injuries due to improvised explosive devices. Under his tenure, the DoD also greatly reduced the time it took to medevac injured soldiers from the battle field. Gates also claimed that he made sure that injured veterans received better medical care after their service had concluded.
Gates is no shrinking violet, and has a high opinion of himself. But there is no denying that he has served in important and influential positions in the American government, and that, at the very least, his insights and impressions provide a valuable perspective of America’s role in the world from an insider.
Evaluation: There is definitely a bias to this story - for example, Gates’ discussion of American concerns in Iraq and Afghanistan never once mention our interest in the oil fields of Iraq or the pipeline project in Afghanistan. But that very omission lends importance to this book too, and will provide plenty of grist for historians and political scientists.
We listened to the audiobook read by George Newbern, who did a perfectly acceptable job. Highly recommended for those with an interest in how our government operates (or doesn't, as the case may be).
(JAF and JAB)
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very meaty stuff in this book. It is clear from the bridges burned in this book that Gates does not want, or at least anticipate, any further involvement in the political arena. In fact, he appears to detest politicians. However, he respects both Bush and Obama whom he describes as acting more like statesmen than politicians the vast majority of the time.Much of this memoir concerns the wars fought by the U.S. in Iraq and Afghanistan. Gates, who had previously been head of the CIA, firmly believed that Saddam had weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and was a dangerous megalomaniac, and so Gates had supported the decision to go to war. In 2006, before becoming Secretary of Defense, Gates served on the Iraq Study Group (“ISG”), a group of distinguished national security experts which recommended a “surge” - a substantial increase in the number of American combat troops to create security in Bagdad. President Bush carried out the surge in spite of a lack of support from Democrats as well as the joint chiefs and heads of the various services. Similarly, Obama supported a surge in Afghanistan in spite of opposition. Gates commends both of these men for their decisions.
Gates’ impressions of foreign leaders are particularly interesting. He thought Dimitri Medvedev showed promise as being a statesman with whom we could work, but he didn’t last long enough to fulfill that promise. While Bush claimed to have looked into Vladimir Putin’s soul and saw a man he could trust, Gates regarded him as “a stone-cold killer.” He considered Benjamin Netanyahu to be egomaniacal and duplicitous. Hamid Karzai, he charged, is ineffectual and crooked.
Gates describes in detail the internal debates over what to do about the Arab uprisings. Gates opposed intervening militarily in Libya, and felt we were much too quick to withdraw our support for Mubarak.
For Congress, Gates has nothing but scorn despite allowing that it is an important part of government and a potential guardian of our liberty. To Gates, “Congress is best viewed from a distance—the farther the better—because up close, it is truly ugly.” He categorizes the House Foreign Affairs Committee as “rude, nasty and stupid.” The worst of the Congressmen were the hypocrites who accused the DoD of fiscal inefficiency, but who opposed any of his attempts to close unneeded bases in their districts or to discontinue unnecessary weapons programs that had suppliers in their districts. He would prepare for congressional hearings by answering “the way I really wanted to, barking and cursing and getting the anger and frustration out of my system, so that my public testimony could be dispassionate and respectful.”
Hillary Clinton receives very high praise for her wisdom, intelligence, and effort. Joe Biden is described as “impossible not to like,” but almost always wrong on serious national security issues and far too sensitive to the political repercussions from the Democratic “base.”
We finished the book perplexed as to how conservative commentators in early reviews of this book could have possibly seen this memoir as an indictment of Obama. If those commentators were honest, they would admit that Gates held Obama in very high regard. For example, he describes Obama’s decision to execute the raid on Bin Laden in violation of Pakistani sovereignty “one of the most courageous decisions I had ever witnessed at the White House.” In fact, Gates is far more critical of George W. Bush’s policies (though not of Bush personally). His complaints about the Obama administration mostly pertain to what he labels as micromanagement by staffers and bureaucrats. He does discuss Obama’s distrust of his generals, but then goes on to admit that Obama was justified in his concerns.
Gates accomplished a great deal during his tenure as Secretary. He oversaw the conduct of two wars simultaneously. He directed the redesign of the heavily armored vehicles used to transport troops, greatly reducing the incidence of injuries due to improvised explosive devices. Under his tenure, the DoD also greatly reduced the time it took to medevac injured soldiers from the battle field. Gates also claimed that he made sure that injured veterans received better medical care after their service had concluded.
Gates is no shrinking violet, and has a high opinion of himself. But there is no denying that he has served in important and influential positions in the American government, and that, at the very least, his insights and impressions provide a valuable perspective of America’s role in the world from an insider.
Evaluation: There is definitely a bias to this story - for example, Gates’ discussion of American concerns in Iraq and Afghanistan never once mention our interest in the oil fields of Iraq or the pipeline project in Afghanistan. But that very omission lends importance to this book too, and will provide plenty of grist for historians and political scientists.
We listened to the audiobook read by George Newbern, who did a perfectly acceptable job. Highly recommended for those with an interest in how our government operates (or doesn't, as the case may be).
(JAF and JAB)
Show Less
LibraryThing member mielniczuk
Made me think differently about George Bush. Still don't agree with most of his politics, but now have more respect for his presidency.
Gates' determined but ultimately failed attempt to change military budgeting and procurement practices speaks volumes about both foreign policy and domestic
Gates' determined but ultimately failed attempt to change military budgeting and procurement practices speaks volumes about both foreign policy and domestic
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politics. Show Less
LibraryThing member utbw42
A direct, clinical examination of the time that Robert Gates spent as Secretary of Defense under Bush and Obama, narrated by Gates himself, this book provides the reader with outstanding and often surprising information on what Gates did and put up with during his service as secdef. One gets a
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feeling and understanding of just how difficult a job he had, and that all his training for this job is truly on-the-job. I still cannot figure out how someone can deal with that much stress and function day-to-day. Gates describes 9/11, the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and how he felt responsible for the lives of our servicemen every single day. His take on both Bush and Obama was very interesting, being that he served the same capacity under two very polar opposite administrations. My hat's off to this man for his service. Show Less
LibraryThing member texasstorm
I read this book a little late, and it turned out to be the exact week that Afghanistan fell to the Taliban (in August 2021). Throughout the book, Gates rants against Biden for not believing there could be a good result in the war there and for not supporting the military strategy enough. Well, now
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Biden is cast as being the one who lost Afghanistan (not by everyone, of course) when the result was pretty much as Biden predicted. Gates comes off as an admirable and competent Defense Secretary who cares about the troops, but in view of the Taliban takeover, it's difficult in 2021 to read this book about good intentions and hard work and feel optimistic about the future, especially when the next Defense Secretary may not be as smart and even-handed as this guy. Show Less
LibraryThing member AZBob1951
After 69 terrible days,and finally turning to the speed-reader's trick of a moving horizontal ruler, I finished the horribly edited (or perhaps written) 'Duty: Memoirs of a Secretary at War.' This almost 600-paged book could have easily been 150 to 200 pages less. If I wasn't autistic I would not
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have felt the need to finish it. What compounded the horror is that after trudging through 565 pages and 14 Chapters, the last Chapter is titled 'Reflections' where he basically sums up what he wrote in the prior 500-plus pages. Unbelievable. Show Less
Awards
NPR: Books We Love (2014)