Status
Available
Call number
Publication
Penguin (Non-Classics) (2004), Paperback, 368 pages
Description
"Four billion years ago, there was no freedom on our planet, because there was no life. What kinds of freedom have evolved since the origin of life? Can there be freedom and free will in a deterministic world? If you are free, are you responsible for being free, or just lucky?" "In Freedom Evolves, Daniel C. Dennett, the author of Darwin's Dangerous Idea and Consciousness Explained, sets out to answer these questions, showing how we, alone among the animals, have evolved minds that give us free will and morality. In a series of strikingly original arguments drawing on evolutionary biology, cognitive neuroscience, economics, and philosophy, he demonstrates that if we accept Darwin's reasoning, we can build from the simplest life forms all the way up to the best and deepest human thoughts on questions of morality and meaning, ethics and freedom."--Jacket.… (more)
Media reviews
Daniel Dennett has charted a new and welcome course between free will and scientific determinism in Freedom Evolves, says Mary Midgley
User reviews
LibraryThing member JollyContrarian
Daniel Dennett is not a man to shy from grand philosophical pronouncements. Having declared the book closed on the Mind debate in "Consciousness Explained" (others are still offering odds) and having found beyond reasonable doubt for the Botanist in the case of Darwin vs. God in "Darwin's Dangerous
Yes, I'm being a little ironic. But, for the most part, I'm a buyer: Dennett's books are certainly fascinating, and in large part compelling, and this one is no exception.
Just as there are similar strands between Consciousness Explained and Darwin's Dangerous Idea, there are some very familiar concepts here - old hands will recognise Conway's life world, the Prisoner's Dilemma, and Benjamin Libet's experiment which (seemed to) describe a "missing 300ms" between neural activity and consciousness of it - to the point where you might think to skip a few pages altogether.
This would be a mistake, however, for a reason which nicely complements Dennett's own "multiple drafts" theory of consciousness: repeated examination of the same ideas, in a new context, and with the benefit of a refined explanation, affords the reader new perspectives, and enhances comprehension of this book, but also the earlier ones. In the case of Libet's experiment, Dennett is much more compelling in his counterarguments than in Consciousness Explained - the revised draft gives a better view of the point.
What is so pleasing about all three books are the consistency of thoughts and ideas between them across what are at first glance disparate lines of inquiry - the unifying meta-theory here is Darwin's - applied in quite different (but clearly related) contexts. Dennett extends the application of his arguments to some economic and quasi-political situations - everyday life, to you and me, where these questions actually matter - and gets mostly the right results. (It never fails to amaze me how highly intelligent, extremely well educated, university professors in social sciences fail to grasp even the basic tenets of economic theory, so it is a welcome sign that one of their number might do, especially one who once publicly struggled with the Laffer curve)
I have two, related, complaints about Freedom Evolves. Of all the metaphysical conundrums, Free Will is - and ought to be - the least interesting, and most prone to catcalls from those in the cheap seats who think philosophy is wishy-washy, head-up-posterior, nonsense.
Where consciousness has profound practical implications for our understanding of the world and how to live in it (not least in the field of AI); and whether God exists or not has profound implications for our sense of morality, the free will debate has neither feature: we all think we are free to choose; as a brute fact either we are or we're not: but either way, we can't change it (if we're not free, then we aren't free to change to be free; if we are free, we're not free to decide not to be). Whatever the answer is, it can't make any difference to the way we live out our lives, since whether we're free to choose begs the very question we're asking.
That said, Dennett's Darwinian-influenced arguments are compelling in support of the case for free will.
What isn't so compelling is the small part of the book in which he allows metaphysics to tip over into ethics. For the second book in a row, Dennett has made some unwelcome noises about sketching out some sort of theory of moral objectivity. He doesn't dwell on it, as such, but it is definitely there: writing elliptically, I think Dennett attempts to make a case for a sort of Moral Objectivism to be derived from evolution. He says, as his book draws to a close:
"The philosopher's problem is to negotiate the transition from `is' to `ought', or more precisely to show how we might go beyond the `merely historical' fact that certain customs and policies have had, as a matter of fact, widespread societal endorsement, and get all the way to norms that command assent in all rational agents. Successful instances of this move are known. Bootstrapping has worked in the past, and it can work here as well. We don't need a skyhook."
I find this paragraph utterly baffling. It arrives so unannounced, and is so totally at odds with the very spirit and sense of everything else in Daniel Dennett's Darwin-influenced meta-theory, I just can't see what on earth possessed him to write it. What conceivable role could "norms commanding asset in all rational agents" in the gloriously unpredictable topography of the evolutionary journey possibly have?
Dennett compares this to the process of obtaining a (virtually) perfect straightedge over centuries by continually refining our technique for making straighter and straighter straightedges - apparently missing the point that in the case of the straightedge there is an immutable, single, unmistakable, universally understood abstract concept of a "perfectly straight line" which the manufactured straightedge is aiming to achieve; as such, it could scarcely be different to describing norms generally agreed amongst poorly defined (and constantly mutating) communities of individuals which have been developed unsystematically over time in reaction to drastically shifting environmental and societal factors to regulate the behaviour of a community which itself is moving randomly through design space (i.e., evolving).
Now, since when is transforming "is" to "ought" the philosopher's problem? Isn't the philosopher's job done when we can look at this wonderful model derived from Darwin's work, and say: Look, mum, no homunculus! No intelligent designer! No rules!
Having knocked off the three main metaphyiscal conundrums, you wonder what might be next on the agenda - "Right and Wrong: Finally Sorted" perhaps?
Show More
Idea", Daniel Dennett now purports to settle the third of the great metaphysical questions: Do we have free will? Not only that, indeed, but he purports - I think - to have found a method for achieving moral objectivity while he was at it. Good show, that man! Yes, I'm being a little ironic. But, for the most part, I'm a buyer: Dennett's books are certainly fascinating, and in large part compelling, and this one is no exception.
Just as there are similar strands between Consciousness Explained and Darwin's Dangerous Idea, there are some very familiar concepts here - old hands will recognise Conway's life world, the Prisoner's Dilemma, and Benjamin Libet's experiment which (seemed to) describe a "missing 300ms" between neural activity and consciousness of it - to the point where you might think to skip a few pages altogether.
This would be a mistake, however, for a reason which nicely complements Dennett's own "multiple drafts" theory of consciousness: repeated examination of the same ideas, in a new context, and with the benefit of a refined explanation, affords the reader new perspectives, and enhances comprehension of this book, but also the earlier ones. In the case of Libet's experiment, Dennett is much more compelling in his counterarguments than in Consciousness Explained - the revised draft gives a better view of the point.
What is so pleasing about all three books are the consistency of thoughts and ideas between them across what are at first glance disparate lines of inquiry - the unifying meta-theory here is Darwin's - applied in quite different (but clearly related) contexts. Dennett extends the application of his arguments to some economic and quasi-political situations - everyday life, to you and me, where these questions actually matter - and gets mostly the right results. (It never fails to amaze me how highly intelligent, extremely well educated, university professors in social sciences fail to grasp even the basic tenets of economic theory, so it is a welcome sign that one of their number might do, especially one who once publicly struggled with the Laffer curve)
I have two, related, complaints about Freedom Evolves. Of all the metaphysical conundrums, Free Will is - and ought to be - the least interesting, and most prone to catcalls from those in the cheap seats who think philosophy is wishy-washy, head-up-posterior, nonsense.
Where consciousness has profound practical implications for our understanding of the world and how to live in it (not least in the field of AI); and whether God exists or not has profound implications for our sense of morality, the free will debate has neither feature: we all think we are free to choose; as a brute fact either we are or we're not: but either way, we can't change it (if we're not free, then we aren't free to change to be free; if we are free, we're not free to decide not to be). Whatever the answer is, it can't make any difference to the way we live out our lives, since whether we're free to choose begs the very question we're asking.
That said, Dennett's Darwinian-influenced arguments are compelling in support of the case for free will.
What isn't so compelling is the small part of the book in which he allows metaphysics to tip over into ethics. For the second book in a row, Dennett has made some unwelcome noises about sketching out some sort of theory of moral objectivity. He doesn't dwell on it, as such, but it is definitely there: writing elliptically, I think Dennett attempts to make a case for a sort of Moral Objectivism to be derived from evolution. He says, as his book draws to a close:
"The philosopher's problem is to negotiate the transition from `is' to `ought', or more precisely to show how we might go beyond the `merely historical' fact that certain customs and policies have had, as a matter of fact, widespread societal endorsement, and get all the way to norms that command assent in all rational agents. Successful instances of this move are known. Bootstrapping has worked in the past, and it can work here as well. We don't need a skyhook."
I find this paragraph utterly baffling. It arrives so unannounced, and is so totally at odds with the very spirit and sense of everything else in Daniel Dennett's Darwin-influenced meta-theory, I just can't see what on earth possessed him to write it. What conceivable role could "norms commanding asset in all rational agents" in the gloriously unpredictable topography of the evolutionary journey possibly have?
Dennett compares this to the process of obtaining a (virtually) perfect straightedge over centuries by continually refining our technique for making straighter and straighter straightedges - apparently missing the point that in the case of the straightedge there is an immutable, single, unmistakable, universally understood abstract concept of a "perfectly straight line" which the manufactured straightedge is aiming to achieve; as such, it could scarcely be different to describing norms generally agreed amongst poorly defined (and constantly mutating) communities of individuals which have been developed unsystematically over time in reaction to drastically shifting environmental and societal factors to regulate the behaviour of a community which itself is moving randomly through design space (i.e., evolving).
Now, since when is transforming "is" to "ought" the philosopher's problem? Isn't the philosopher's job done when we can look at this wonderful model derived from Darwin's work, and say: Look, mum, no homunculus! No intelligent designer! No rules!
Having knocked off the three main metaphyiscal conundrums, you wonder what might be next on the agenda - "Right and Wrong: Finally Sorted" perhaps?
Show Less
LibraryThing member _Greg
Dennet deconstructs and refutes pretty much all earlier philosophical approaches to free will, both pro and con. Then he shows how it is possible to avoid all of the traditional paradoxes and find a sound basis for human free will.
LibraryThing member fpagan
Supposedly dumbed down a bit for people who are not professional philosophers, but it was still pretty hard going for me. I suspect that its presence on New Scientist's bestseller list was due mostly to the fame of the author. Certainly I have no doubts about what he is trying to prove: Free will,
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to the extent that the term means anything, has arisen through natural selection; the fact that materialism, and possibly determinism, is correct does not have the dire moral implications that the magic-and-mysticism crowd imagines it does. Show Less
LibraryThing member TomSlee
Dennett is one of my favourite writers: he is a brilliant thinker and witty writer who takes on big topics. And yet, and yet.
I found Consciousness Explained a real eye-opener, and Sweet Dreams an enjoyable dessert. And maybe if I'd read them in another order Freedom Evolves would be up there with
This is a long book to make a simple point - that determinism is compatible with free will. It's an important point, and one I agree with, but I was convinced after 50 pages and found decreasing returns over the remaining 250 or so pages.
So - a good read by a fine thinker and writer. But I do wish he could be briefer.
I found Consciousness Explained a real eye-opener, and Sweet Dreams an enjoyable dessert. And maybe if I'd read them in another order Freedom Evolves would be up there with
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Consciousness Explained in my rankings. But it isn't because Dennett's wit and repartee is also a bit long-winded, and a bit self-indulgent.This is a long book to make a simple point - that determinism is compatible with free will. It's an important point, and one I agree with, but I was convinced after 50 pages and found decreasing returns over the remaining 250 or so pages.
So - a good read by a fine thinker and writer. But I do wish he could be briefer.
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LibraryThing member bopje
A stunning book about determinism and free will. Reading it has changed my mind on any subject; Dennett added a new dimension to the realm of my thoughts. Written in a very clever style, the content of this work is easy to understand, hard to ignore.
LibraryThing member todd.gutschow
Borrowed from library. Excellent investigation into the concept of free will. For a long time I couldn't reconcile my firm commitment to a naturalistic world view, with my undeniable sense of personal identity and autonomy. Reading Dennet helped me discover some simple linguistic hurdles that were
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obstructing my progress. Definitely recommended if you are at all interested in the apparent conflict between freedom and determinism. Show Less
LibraryThing member ShiraC
Is free will an unscientific concept? Does evolution theory prove that we are all "really" just automatons? The answer (says Dennett) is NO, and in this book, he explains his reasoning. This is a book I periodically re-read, both becuase it is rich in information and analysis and because many of
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the ideas are a bit counterintuitive. I highly recommend this to anyone who wants to get beyond the basics of evolutionary thought. Show Less
LibraryThing member Ramirez
Please, note that the exposition and the writing should get 1/5.
And it's a shame, since the argument and Dennett's position are so interesting.
In a nutshell, Dennett claims that all the fear of genetic determinism and neuroscience is a phobia.
Human freedom and human responsability persist even now
And it's a shame, since the argument and Dennett's position are so interesting.
In a nutshell, Dennett claims that all the fear of genetic determinism and neuroscience is a phobia.
Human freedom and human responsability persist even now
Show More
that we're discovering the mind and debunking consciousness, Show Less
LibraryThing member gmicksmith
Always erudite, always instructive, and always frustratingly dense Dennett here does not disappoint again. He takes on the task of explaining how much or how little free will and freedom the being called a person has.
LibraryThing member Treebeard_404
This book was just heavier lifting than I am currently inclined to attempt. I hope to get back to it someday.
Awards
Royal Society Trivedi Science Book Prize (Longlist — 2004)
Language
Original publication date
2003
Physical description
368 p.; 8.03 inches
ISBN
0142003840 / 9780142003848