Publication
Vintage (2014), 288 p.
Original publication date
2013
Collections
Awards
Kirkus Reviews Best Book of the Year (Nonfiction — 2013)
Description
Pulitzer-winning American historian Joseph Ellis tells an old story in a new way, with a freshness at once colorful and compelling. The summer months of 1776 witnessed the most consequential events in the story of our country's founding. While the thirteen colonies came together and agreed to secede from the British Empire, the British were dispatching the largest armada ever to cross the Atlantic to crush the rebellion in the cradle. The Continental Congress and the Continental Army were forced to make decisions on the run, improvising as history congealed around them. In a brilliant and seamless narrative, Ellis meticulously examines the most influential figures in this propitious moment, including George Washington, John Adams, Thomas Jefferson, Benjamin Franklin, and Britain's Admiral Lord Richard and General William Howe. He weaves together the political and military experiences as two sides of a single story, and shows how events on one front influenced outcomes on the other.--From publisher description.… (more)
User reviews
LibraryThing member nbmars
The Declaration of Independence was adopted in early July, 1776, in Philadelphia. At the same time, the newly formed Continental Army, under the command of George Washington, found itself in desperate straits in New York City, nearly surrounded by a clearly superior British army and cut off from
The British had attempted to subdue colonial unrest the previous year by occupying the City of Boston, which they rightly perceived to be a hotbed of revolutionary fervor. Their military position became untenable, however, when the newly formed Continental Army, augmented by large numbers of militiamen from the surrounding countryside, surrounded the city. After gaining a largely Pyrrhic victory at Bunker Hill, the British thought it wise to repair to Halifax until a more formidable force could be assembled.
Ellis observes that the events of the summer of 1776 have often been told from a purely military or a purely political viewpoint, but he believes they can be truly understood only as an interplay between the military and the political.
Representatives of each of the thirteen colonies convened the first Continental Congress in Philadelphia without a clear agenda. Only some of the delegates desired independence in the early days of the Congress. Many delegates pledged their loyalty to George III, blaming his ministers for the benighted policies of the North administration. [Lord North was Prime Minister of Great Britain from 1770 to 1782.] Two developments caused the delegates to become overwhelmingly disposed to independence. First, they learned that the king himself had decided to punish the Bostonians and other insurrectionary colonists by assembling a large armada to carry a fighting force of British regulars and Hessian mercenaries. Second, the delegates were emboldened by what they mistakenly perceived to have been a military success in Boston the previous autumn.
Ellis’s description of the politics of the issuance of the Declaration of Independence is amusing. Franklin was offered the job first, but he declined on the ground that he did not want his writing to be subject to editing by a committee. Jefferson took on the task, but spent much of the ensuing months grousing over the changes that the editing committee saw fit to make.
John Adams is described as the driving force behind a relatively unified movement to independence. He was aware that as yet there was little or no sense of nationhood among the delegates. He also understood the profound differences in attitudes between the southern and northern states to the issue of slavery, but convinced the delegates to defer their disagreements until after independence had been won.
Meanwhile, George Washington correctly intuited that the British would try to take the city of New York. He moved the bulk of the Continental Army to New York in the hope of defending the city. This was a military blunder because New York is situated on three islands (Manhattan, Staten, and Long), and the British navy had the ability to control the sea and provide logistical support and operational flexibility to the army that the Continentals could not hope to match.
Ellis provides a pulse-raising description of the hopeless situation of the Continental army on Long Island and its extremely lucky (miraculous?) escape to Manhattan, only to find itself once again trapped on an island! Washington once again proved up to the task of extricating the army to the mainland, after putting up a token resistance at Harlem Heights. While Washington longed to fight a large, decisive battle, his generals, more realistically assessing the American army as comprised of “unqualified officers, wholly undependable militia, and short-term enlisted troops,” reined him in. Ellis credits Washington’s army in the final analysis with being better at avoiding battles than actually fighting them. He cites that skill as one reason Washington was able to fight another day under more favorable circumstances.
Ellis also attributes much of Washington’s success in saving the army to the disinclination of the British military commanders [the brothers Admiral Sir Richard Howe (navy) and General William Howe (army)] to destroy the Continental army. Richard Howe viewed his role as a peace envoy who would sweet-talk the colonists into submitting to Royal authority. William Howe was reluctant to incur needless casualties, which he, having been at Bunker Hill, thought would be inevitable in a pitched battle once the Continentals had dug into defensible positions. Moreover, colonists had thought so highly of their older brother, Lord George Howe, killed in the French and Indian War, that they had funded a monument in his honor in Westminster Abbey. The surviving brothers hadn't forgotten. [Elsewhere ("Escape from Brooklyn," MHQ, Summer, 2013 at p. 28), historian Thomas Fleming conjectures that the opposition of the brothers to King George III also may have increased the sympathy of the two Howes with the grievances of the Americans.]
At the end of the book, Ellis raises the historical contrafactual of what might have happened to the independence movement if the British had moved aggressively against the Continental Army in New York. He assumes the American army would have been annihilated, but points out that another army could have been raised. He opines that the Continentals would have prevailed simply by surviving.
Evaluation: Ellis probably has not added many facts to our understanding of the events leading to independence, but his book is a trenchant and stimulating retelling of those facts. I listened to the audio version of this book, read capably by Stefan Rudnicki. I highly recommend either the written or audio version of this excellent overview of a crucial period of American history. It also serves as an excellent follow-up to Bunker Hill by Nathaniel Philbrick.
(JAB)
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any retreat by the British navy. Pulitzer Prize-winning author Joseph Ellis has delivered a fast paced narrative and lucid analysis of the political and military events of that dramatic time in Revolutionary Summer.The British had attempted to subdue colonial unrest the previous year by occupying the City of Boston, which they rightly perceived to be a hotbed of revolutionary fervor. Their military position became untenable, however, when the newly formed Continental Army, augmented by large numbers of militiamen from the surrounding countryside, surrounded the city. After gaining a largely Pyrrhic victory at Bunker Hill, the British thought it wise to repair to Halifax until a more formidable force could be assembled.
Ellis observes that the events of the summer of 1776 have often been told from a purely military or a purely political viewpoint, but he believes they can be truly understood only as an interplay between the military and the political.
Representatives of each of the thirteen colonies convened the first Continental Congress in Philadelphia without a clear agenda. Only some of the delegates desired independence in the early days of the Congress. Many delegates pledged their loyalty to George III, blaming his ministers for the benighted policies of the North administration. [Lord North was Prime Minister of Great Britain from 1770 to 1782.] Two developments caused the delegates to become overwhelmingly disposed to independence. First, they learned that the king himself had decided to punish the Bostonians and other insurrectionary colonists by assembling a large armada to carry a fighting force of British regulars and Hessian mercenaries. Second, the delegates were emboldened by what they mistakenly perceived to have been a military success in Boston the previous autumn.
Ellis’s description of the politics of the issuance of the Declaration of Independence is amusing. Franklin was offered the job first, but he declined on the ground that he did not want his writing to be subject to editing by a committee. Jefferson took on the task, but spent much of the ensuing months grousing over the changes that the editing committee saw fit to make.
John Adams is described as the driving force behind a relatively unified movement to independence. He was aware that as yet there was little or no sense of nationhood among the delegates. He also understood the profound differences in attitudes between the southern and northern states to the issue of slavery, but convinced the delegates to defer their disagreements until after independence had been won.
Meanwhile, George Washington correctly intuited that the British would try to take the city of New York. He moved the bulk of the Continental Army to New York in the hope of defending the city. This was a military blunder because New York is situated on three islands (Manhattan, Staten, and Long), and the British navy had the ability to control the sea and provide logistical support and operational flexibility to the army that the Continentals could not hope to match.
Ellis provides a pulse-raising description of the hopeless situation of the Continental army on Long Island and its extremely lucky (miraculous?) escape to Manhattan, only to find itself once again trapped on an island! Washington once again proved up to the task of extricating the army to the mainland, after putting up a token resistance at Harlem Heights. While Washington longed to fight a large, decisive battle, his generals, more realistically assessing the American army as comprised of “unqualified officers, wholly undependable militia, and short-term enlisted troops,” reined him in. Ellis credits Washington’s army in the final analysis with being better at avoiding battles than actually fighting them. He cites that skill as one reason Washington was able to fight another day under more favorable circumstances.
Ellis also attributes much of Washington’s success in saving the army to the disinclination of the British military commanders [the brothers Admiral Sir Richard Howe (navy) and General William Howe (army)] to destroy the Continental army. Richard Howe viewed his role as a peace envoy who would sweet-talk the colonists into submitting to Royal authority. William Howe was reluctant to incur needless casualties, which he, having been at Bunker Hill, thought would be inevitable in a pitched battle once the Continentals had dug into defensible positions. Moreover, colonists had thought so highly of their older brother, Lord George Howe, killed in the French and Indian War, that they had funded a monument in his honor in Westminster Abbey. The surviving brothers hadn't forgotten. [Elsewhere ("Escape from Brooklyn," MHQ, Summer, 2013 at p. 28), historian Thomas Fleming conjectures that the opposition of the brothers to King George III also may have increased the sympathy of the two Howes with the grievances of the Americans.]
At the end of the book, Ellis raises the historical contrafactual of what might have happened to the independence movement if the British had moved aggressively against the Continental Army in New York. He assumes the American army would have been annihilated, but points out that another army could have been raised. He opines that the Continentals would have prevailed simply by surviving.
Evaluation: Ellis probably has not added many facts to our understanding of the events leading to independence, but his book is a trenchant and stimulating retelling of those facts. I listened to the audio version of this book, read capably by Stefan Rudnicki. I highly recommend either the written or audio version of this excellent overview of a crucial period of American history. It also serves as an excellent follow-up to Bunker Hill by Nathaniel Philbrick.
(JAB)
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LibraryThing member Doondeck
Interesting and unique analysis of the beginning of the Revolutionary War. Some 'Necessary Fallacies" exposed and explained.
LibraryThing member SigmundFraud
Excellent. Very well written. This author has an exceptional handle on his subject as he should. He has written many books on the subject. Worth a detour.
LibraryThing member TerriBooks
Focusing on the 6 months that make up the summer (well, extended summer) of 1776, Ellis does a superb job of combining the political, social, and military aspects that changed the American Revolution from a worrisome uprising to a broad-based movement that changed history. The author is at his best
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when he tries to help us see from an 18th century perspective, to clear away our prejudices and assumptions that have accumulated in our national mythology. It's a great look at an amazing time in history and at some amazing leaders. Fascinating. Show Less
LibraryThing member michael.confoy.tamu
A nice short book that unites the work of the Continental Congress move to American independence and what was going and did happen on the battlefield between the Continental Army and the British Army in New York. The key American figures are John Adams, George Washington, Thomas Jefferson, Benjamin
Interesting Facts
John Adams was nicknamed “His Rotundness.”
It wasn’t until after much later in Jefferson’s life that he became famous for the Declaration of Independence. In fact, the Congressional Congress considered May 15, 1776 the most important date as this is when they voted on independence and appointed the committee to write the declaration.
Much of the militia sent to defend New York were armed with spears.
The British force that invaded New York was the largest armada to cross the Atlantic until the American Expeditionary Force in World War I.
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Franklin, and the lesser known General Nathanael Greene. For the British, the key figures are the British commander General William Howe, his brother Admiral Richard Howe, and General Henry Clinton.Interesting Facts
John Adams was nicknamed “His Rotundness.”
It wasn’t until after much later in Jefferson’s life that he became famous for the Declaration of Independence. In fact, the Congressional Congress considered May 15, 1776 the most important date as this is when they voted on independence and appointed the committee to write the declaration.
Much of the militia sent to defend New York were armed with spears.
The British force that invaded New York was the largest armada to cross the Atlantic until the American Expeditionary Force in World War I.
Show Less
LibraryThing member stevesmits
In this compact account Ellis describes with remarkable clarity the political and military events of the summer of 1776 from the perspectives of the Americans and the British. The colonies were leaning ever more strongly toward independence as the radical views of Adams, Franklin and others came to
One interesting sub-theme of the political development of the independence movement was the emergence of complex political questions that could have caused the emerging sense of unity to collapse: slavery, franchise rights, the form of central government, the relationship between and the respective powers of the state v. the central government and more. The founders, especially Adams, realized that it was dangerous to the primary objective of independence to try to tackle these at the outset and these were largely tabled for another day. That these issues perplexed and divided the republic for the following ninety years is, of course, the major theme of our history.
Support for “The Cause”, as it was termed, was heightened when it became known the Britain had dispatched a huge naval armada and thousands of soldiers to crush the independence movement. Public revulsion increased even more with the news that foreign mercenaries – the Hessians – were being employed to aid the British military. The British forces were lead by the brothers Howe – Richard for the navy and William for the army. The political and military strategy of the Howe’s became a major aspect of how the events unfolded; more on this later.
The book shifts the story adroitly between the political and military aspects. Washington had received accolades for besting the British in Boston. What was not so widely recognized was that he did not defeat the British in actual combat, but rather made their withdrawal necessary by positioning artillery (brought in a brilliant move overland from Fort Ticonderoga by the master artilleryman Henry Knox) in Dorchester Heights. Upon learning of the impending arrival of the British forces, Washington moved his army to New York, correctly surmising that this would be the target of the British attack. The problem for Washington, which he knew but for reasons of pride and honor did not shape his strategy, was that New York essentially could not be defended. The British navy controlled the bays and rivers and the army could in many ways trap an army trying to defend the island. The armies first clashed in present-day Brooklyn where the inexperienced Continental regulars and nearly useless militias were completely routed at Gowanus Heights by the British and Hessians. The Americans retreated to the fortified Brooklyn Heights. The British could likely have overcome the defensive position of the dispirited Americans (as Howe’s contemporaries and many historians contend), but chose not to. The Americans staged a near miraculous retreat across the East River to Manhattan where their vulnerable position was no better. Washington tried to entice the British to attack his heavily fortified position at Harlem Heights, but they would not take this bait either. Later Washington’s forces were compelled to abandon Manhattan altogether and make its way finally to New Jersey.
Ellis answers the question of why the British commander was not more aggressive; why he didn’t seek the annihilation of the American army, which certainly would have crushed the rebellion at its onset. The Howe’s saw their mission as one of convincing the Americans that their military cause was hopeless in the face of massive and highly experienced British forces. They believed that the rebels would see the futility of pursuing military resistance and the wisdom of a political solution. Destroying the American army would cost many British lives and was unnecessary since the Americans, especially after the showing of its army in New York, would see the light and sue for a negotiated peace. In this view the Howe’s were, of course, completely mistaken. The loss of New York did not eradicate the patriotic spirit of the independence leaders who, quite rightly, viewed a long and protracted war as a great advantage to their side. As they saw it they didn’t so much need to win the war as to not lose it. Time and space were the major advantages held by the Americans and in the end this proved to be decisive to the outcome
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dominate the moderate positions of those who believed reconciliation with Britain was desirable and possible. Ellis focuses quite a bit on John Adams whose strategy to moving the colonies toward independence was brilliantly conceived. Rather than pushing headlong to a decision of such magnitude Adams encouraged the colonies to gather sentiments from their populaces and this turned the issue in the direction of complete break from Britain. There had been a popular view that King George was sympathetic to the Americans’ complaints, but was being thwarted by parliament who held stubbornly to harsh views of their power over the economic interests of the colonies. The American conception of the cause of the tension shifted as realization of the King’s disdain for the rights of Americans became known. The list of “grievances” that composes so much of the Declaration of Independence significantly focused on wrongs inflicted by their sovereign; he was no longer their benevolent protector, he was the problem.One interesting sub-theme of the political development of the independence movement was the emergence of complex political questions that could have caused the emerging sense of unity to collapse: slavery, franchise rights, the form of central government, the relationship between and the respective powers of the state v. the central government and more. The founders, especially Adams, realized that it was dangerous to the primary objective of independence to try to tackle these at the outset and these were largely tabled for another day. That these issues perplexed and divided the republic for the following ninety years is, of course, the major theme of our history.
Support for “The Cause”, as it was termed, was heightened when it became known the Britain had dispatched a huge naval armada and thousands of soldiers to crush the independence movement. Public revulsion increased even more with the news that foreign mercenaries – the Hessians – were being employed to aid the British military. The British forces were lead by the brothers Howe – Richard for the navy and William for the army. The political and military strategy of the Howe’s became a major aspect of how the events unfolded; more on this later.
The book shifts the story adroitly between the political and military aspects. Washington had received accolades for besting the British in Boston. What was not so widely recognized was that he did not defeat the British in actual combat, but rather made their withdrawal necessary by positioning artillery (brought in a brilliant move overland from Fort Ticonderoga by the master artilleryman Henry Knox) in Dorchester Heights. Upon learning of the impending arrival of the British forces, Washington moved his army to New York, correctly surmising that this would be the target of the British attack. The problem for Washington, which he knew but for reasons of pride and honor did not shape his strategy, was that New York essentially could not be defended. The British navy controlled the bays and rivers and the army could in many ways trap an army trying to defend the island. The armies first clashed in present-day Brooklyn where the inexperienced Continental regulars and nearly useless militias were completely routed at Gowanus Heights by the British and Hessians. The Americans retreated to the fortified Brooklyn Heights. The British could likely have overcome the defensive position of the dispirited Americans (as Howe’s contemporaries and many historians contend), but chose not to. The Americans staged a near miraculous retreat across the East River to Manhattan where their vulnerable position was no better. Washington tried to entice the British to attack his heavily fortified position at Harlem Heights, but they would not take this bait either. Later Washington’s forces were compelled to abandon Manhattan altogether and make its way finally to New Jersey.
Ellis answers the question of why the British commander was not more aggressive; why he didn’t seek the annihilation of the American army, which certainly would have crushed the rebellion at its onset. The Howe’s saw their mission as one of convincing the Americans that their military cause was hopeless in the face of massive and highly experienced British forces. They believed that the rebels would see the futility of pursuing military resistance and the wisdom of a political solution. Destroying the American army would cost many British lives and was unnecessary since the Americans, especially after the showing of its army in New York, would see the light and sue for a negotiated peace. In this view the Howe’s were, of course, completely mistaken. The loss of New York did not eradicate the patriotic spirit of the independence leaders who, quite rightly, viewed a long and protracted war as a great advantage to their side. As they saw it they didn’t so much need to win the war as to not lose it. Time and space were the major advantages held by the Americans and in the end this proved to be decisive to the outcome
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LibraryThing member atozgrl
Ellis' thesis in this book is that 1776 is the key year in the story of the American Revolution, but that historians have tended to tell the story in separate accounts, focusing on either the political story in Philadelphia with the Continental Congress, or the military events in New York. But
The events surrounding the American Revolution are familiar, and we think we know what happened, but he provides details that I did not know. For one thing, we know all the stories about the deprivations that the Continental Army faced throughout the war. One of the problems being that enlistments were normally for just a year, so recruits were leaving at the time they had finally been trained, and they had to start over with new recruits. They were also usually woefully short of supplies. But Ellis points out that this was inevitable, because Americans at that time feared a standing army, and saw it as an embodiment of centralized military power, which was the very thing they were fighting against. Individual states were more interested in supplying their local militias than the Continental Army. And the Army was intended to be transitory, expanding as needed to fight battles, supplemented by the militias. This is a point I had never thought of before, and don't remember it being pointed out by any other historian. In describing the military campaign in New York, he makes it clear that the English forces had several opportunities to crush the Continental Army, but allowed it to escape to fight another day. Another surprise to me was that both General William Howe and his brother Admiral Richard Howe, leaders of the English army and navy, still actually hoped to broker a diplomatic solution and end the fighting. They hoped the superior show of force would cause the Americans to rethink their position. However, by the time they arrived, it was too late, and the Continental Congress could not be turned.
I found the book to be extremely well-written, clear and easy to read, with wit with an occasional touch of irony.
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Ellis argues that they were two sides of a single story that cannot truly be understood unless they are told together. These events were happening at the same time, and what happened in one place influenced outcomes in the other. He proceeds to give us the story, with details of what was happening on both fronts. He provides descriptive portraits of Washington, Jefferson, Adams, and Franklin, as well as some of the leading figures on the English side. His descriptions of the political and military situations are clear and revealing.The events surrounding the American Revolution are familiar, and we think we know what happened, but he provides details that I did not know. For one thing, we know all the stories about the deprivations that the Continental Army faced throughout the war. One of the problems being that enlistments were normally for just a year, so recruits were leaving at the time they had finally been trained, and they had to start over with new recruits. They were also usually woefully short of supplies. But Ellis points out that this was inevitable, because Americans at that time feared a standing army, and saw it as an embodiment of centralized military power, which was the very thing they were fighting against. Individual states were more interested in supplying their local militias than the Continental Army. And the Army was intended to be transitory, expanding as needed to fight battles, supplemented by the militias. This is a point I had never thought of before, and don't remember it being pointed out by any other historian. In describing the military campaign in New York, he makes it clear that the English forces had several opportunities to crush the Continental Army, but allowed it to escape to fight another day. Another surprise to me was that both General William Howe and his brother Admiral Richard Howe, leaders of the English army and navy, still actually hoped to broker a diplomatic solution and end the fighting. They hoped the superior show of force would cause the Americans to rethink their position. However, by the time they arrived, it was too late, and the Continental Congress could not be turned.
I found the book to be extremely well-written, clear and easy to read, with wit with an occasional touch of irony.
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LibraryThing member soleil-mare
Revolutionary Summer needs to be added to the Army's professional reading list.
LibraryThing member HistReader
Mr. Ellis offers a concise recount of one summer, or as he phrases it the end of the beginning of Americ's independence. Conversely, given tactical decisions on behalf of the British, there failure to deliver a decicisive blow to a fledgling rebel army, it was the beginning of the end for the
With shrewd observations, Mr. Ellis explains drafting of the Declaration of Independence, the relative impotence of the Contintal Congress and the fateful event on New York battlefields in the fall of 1776.
The one fault I found with this book was rough transitions between topics. Neatly compartmentalized evaluations of the political and military were well written and thoughtful. However, jumping between the two interrupted the flow.
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Brits.With shrewd observations, Mr. Ellis explains drafting of the Declaration of Independence, the relative impotence of the Contintal Congress and the fateful event on New York battlefields in the fall of 1776.
The one fault I found with this book was rough transitions between topics. Neatly compartmentalized evaluations of the political and military were well written and thoughtful. However, jumping between the two interrupted the flow.
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LibraryThing member la2bkk
I thoroughly enjoyed this book, which describes with clarity the two major and related driving forces behind the American Revolution: (1) the military led of course by Washington at the head of the Continental Army and (2) the political aspect led by the Continental Congress.
Mr. Ellis' book is a
Highly recommended.
Mr. Ellis' book is a
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contrast to the more popular 1776 by David McCullough, which although interesting often bogs the reader with minutiae. Revolutionary Summer is just the opposite- it informs the reader as to what is happening on the military and political fronts, why it is happening and why it is significant to the ultimate success of the Revolution.Highly recommended.
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LibraryThing member michigantrumpet
Joseph Ellis' concise take on the Summer of 1776 (literary license taken to stretch this well beyond the typical June, July, and August). Ellis posits two strand of historical inquiry: military and diplomatic/political. Surely there are many more, but two suffices for this overview of the critical
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lead up to, and early months of, the Revolutionary War. The collective Colonies' victory was perilously close to failure. Certainly not the assured victory we all assume from the perspective of 250 years. Much credit (or blame) rests with the British brothers Howe who failed to press their early military advantage on Long Island and Manhattan as they held hope for a diplomatic and political resolution. There are many more detailed and nuanced histories. This serves as a fine introduction to the birth of the nation. Show Less
LibraryThing member Vicki_Weisfeld
What a wonderful way Pulitzer Prize-winner Ellis has of distilling complicated historical events and people into a readable narrative! I’ve read his His Excellency, George Washington, too, and for the first time truly appreciated our first President. Both books are relatively short—around 200
In Revolutionary Summer, Ellis takes the reader through the events of 1776, both before and after the Declaration of Independence. He says most histories of that era concentrate either on the political machinations within Independence Hall or on the travails of George Washington leading the ragtag Continental Army. Ellis’s contention is that the two threads—military and political—are inextricably intertwined, and the fates of each depended on the other.
As an example, the individual colonies-cum-states put their local political autonomy (an early manifestation of “states’ rights”) above the needs of the combined entity that the delegates in Philadelphia were promoting. While they’d occasionally contribute a few ill-trained and ill-equipped militias to the cause, they wouldn’t necessarily respond to Washington’s pleas for more.
On the political side, says Ellis, “Virginia regarded itself as the most important player in this political crisis, and the Virginians sent their resolutions [regarding independence] to all the other colonies on the assumption that they set the standard for others to imitate.” This mindset accords perfectly with genealogical research I’ve done about my family, in which early Georgia settlers from Virginia generally held themselves in much higher esteem than the “uncouth and rowdy” settlers from the Carolinas (my people!).
On the military side, Ellis makes the interesting point that “both (the British and American) armies would have been better served if their respective commanders had exchanged places. For Howe, in targeting the territory rather than the Continental Army, pursued the cautious strategy when he should have been bold. And Washington, in his very decision to defend New York, pursued the bold strategy when he should have been cautious.”
This book is a highly readable refresher if you’ve neglected your American History since, say, 10th grade. The United States has a great historical legacy, but by and large greatness is not necessarily found in the teaching of history nor in its textbooks. Revolutionary Summer is a bracing corrective.
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pages—so if you need a doorstop, you’ll have to look elsewhere.In Revolutionary Summer, Ellis takes the reader through the events of 1776, both before and after the Declaration of Independence. He says most histories of that era concentrate either on the political machinations within Independence Hall or on the travails of George Washington leading the ragtag Continental Army. Ellis’s contention is that the two threads—military and political—are inextricably intertwined, and the fates of each depended on the other.
As an example, the individual colonies-cum-states put their local political autonomy (an early manifestation of “states’ rights”) above the needs of the combined entity that the delegates in Philadelphia were promoting. While they’d occasionally contribute a few ill-trained and ill-equipped militias to the cause, they wouldn’t necessarily respond to Washington’s pleas for more.
On the political side, says Ellis, “Virginia regarded itself as the most important player in this political crisis, and the Virginians sent their resolutions [regarding independence] to all the other colonies on the assumption that they set the standard for others to imitate.” This mindset accords perfectly with genealogical research I’ve done about my family, in which early Georgia settlers from Virginia generally held themselves in much higher esteem than the “uncouth and rowdy” settlers from the Carolinas (my people!).
On the military side, Ellis makes the interesting point that “both (the British and American) armies would have been better served if their respective commanders had exchanged places. For Howe, in targeting the territory rather than the Continental Army, pursued the cautious strategy when he should have been bold. And Washington, in his very decision to defend New York, pursued the bold strategy when he should have been cautious.”
This book is a highly readable refresher if you’ve neglected your American History since, say, 10th grade. The United States has a great historical legacy, but by and large greatness is not necessarily found in the teaching of history nor in its textbooks. Revolutionary Summer is a bracing corrective.
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LibraryThing member Jarratt
Nice succinct telling of the "summer" of 1776, from May to October, of the immediate lead up to out declaration to the military trials in New York.
LibraryThing member Schmerguls
5700. Revolutionary Summer The Birth of American Independence, by Joseph J. Ellis (read 26 Jul 2020) This is a very readable account of the events of 1776. It shows that we were very lucky that the British did not eliminate the American army when it was in New York City. When the British failed to
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eliminate the American Army in 1776 the chance of the British winning the war greatly dwindled. Show Less
LibraryThing member tuckerresearch
Professor and stolen-valorist Joseph J. Ellis has released another of his interesting, well-researched, and readable accounts of the Revolutionary era. If you liked his other works, like Founding Brothers, you will enjoy this book. It is an account of America's "Revolutionary Summer" (broadly
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construed) of 1776, covering the fight for Independence in Congress, the feelings of the people, and Washington's (often embarrassing) fight on the battlefield. It is told in a narrative form, but there are references to historical controversies and historiography. Ellis is a practicing, PhD'ed historian. as such, it is welcome to read this in conjunction with and compare it with David McCullough's 1776 (McCullough is a journalist-historian), which covers the same ground in a different fashion. Different perspectives and storytellers are always welcome. Ellis plumbs the primary sources for his account. There are pretty color plates and one map. Endnotes and index too. Show Less
LibraryThing member raschneid
A short but highly enjoyable listen, with accessible prose and heaps of military and political drama. If anything, I was disappointed that the story ended in the fall of 1776, as I wanted to hear what happened next!
This book delivers a lively narrative rather than a detailed political analysis of
This book delivers a lively narrative rather than a detailed political analysis of
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the summer of 1776, but I felt like Ellis provides a clear, if somewhat repetitive, account of how American and British political motivations played out in the battlefield and elsewhere. Am now keen to read more about revolutionary history (or at least see the film 1776, which I have unaccountably never watched). Show Less
Media reviews
You don’t need to buy a movie ticket to see this summer’s biggest blockbuster.
“Revolutionary Summer” achieves its major goal: to undermine the popular myth that the birth of the United States was an “Immaculate Conception,” a victory won by local militias rather than by “a standing army of regular soldiers.” Government mattered in 1776. Ellis outlines this
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argument through a series of individual sketches, many of them familiar to readers of his Pulitzer Prize-winning “Founding Brothers” and subtle biographies of Adams, Jefferson and Washington. No one is better at explicating the role of personal character in public life, particularly the ways in which a preoccupation with honor, or reputation, informed 18th-century gentlemen’s approach to power.
“Revolutionary Summer,” however, purports to be a history of national origins, not a collective biography of men who apparently talked only to one another. Make no mistake: the founding fathers earned the fame they coveted by making consequential decisions. But in the summer of 1776 they were concerned about much more than the British Army. The War for Independence was also a civil war within the British Empire and an episode in a continuing conflict over the fate of North America. Ellis’s book is not wrong; it’s just incomplete and superficial. Show Less
Language
Original language
English
ISBN
9780307946379
Physical description
288 p.; 7.97 inches
Pages
288