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An in-depth, hard-hitting account of the mistakes, miscalculations and myopia that have doomed America's automobile industry. In the 1990s, Detroit's Big Three automobile companies were riding high. The introduction of the minivan and the SUV had revitalized the industry, and it was widely believed that Detroit had miraculously overcome the threat of foreign imports and regained its ascendant position. As Micheline Maynard makes brilliantly clear in THE END OF DETROIT, however, the traditional American car industry was, in fact, headed for disaster. Maynard argues that by focusing on high-profit trucks and SUVs, the Big Three missed a golden opportunity to win back the American car-buyer. Foreign companies like Toyota and Honda solidified their dominance in family and economy cars, gained market share in high-margin luxury cars, and, in an ironic twist, soon stormed in with their own sophisticatedly engineered and marketed SUVs, pickups and minivans. Detroit, suffering from a "good enough" syndrome and wedded to ineffective marketing gimmicks like rebates and zero-percent financing, failed to give consumers what they really wanted--reliability, the latest technology and good design at a reasonable cost. Drawing on a wide range of interviews with industry leaders, including Toyota's Fujio Cho, Nissan's Carlos Ghosn, Chrysler's Dieter Zetsche, BMW's Helmut Panke, and GM's Robert Lutz, as well as car designers, engineers, test drivers and owners, Maynard presents a stark picture of the culture of arrogance and insularity that led American car manufacturers astray. Maynard predicts that, by the end of the decade, one of the American car makers will no longer exist in its present form.… (more)
User reviews
One chapter I read with great interest is describes the bombing missions on Japan. LeMay's analytical approach to warfare is an eye opener to me. It is the reason why I read the book. I am for peace and I am surrounded by like minded friends. I wanted to read about a man who was completely enveloped by war. I wanted to understand how his mind processes it and how he justifies his acts.
LeMay does mention lives lost, but overall he is for using the most powerful weapons he can to obliterate his enemy. He is not interested in politics. He is a soldier who is fulfilling the commands of his superiors.
He justifies killing civilians because it has always been part of warfare.
He thinks it is more humane to use one giant bomb, like a nuclear bomb, than smaller bombs. A giant bomb sends a better message to the top tier of the enemy.
Before the Nagasaki and Hiroshima bombs were dropped, the US heavily bombed Tokyo. Tokyo was mostly wooden buildings and LeMay orchestrated the bombing of civilians. It was a horrific event where the entire city was on fire.
LeMay was also involved with the planning of Nagasaki and Hiroshima bombings. He brags about his Tokyo bombing because he killed more people and he says it was worse than the nuclear blasts.
When I read this I began to see why he has been called a psychopath.
(not finished)
He was a member of the United States Army Air Corps during the 1930s and participated in some of the most significant events of the Corp during that time, such as the "bombing" of the USN battleship Utah and the locating of the liner Rex 800 miles off the coast of the USA, demonstrating the ability of the Army Air Corps to act as a strategic arm. He describes these activities, as well as his later WW2 and post war roles, rather well (you can read the Wiki link for LeMay for more info, it's really rather impressive).
LeMay's style as a first person writer (the contributions of Kator versus LeMay are not defined) is fairly readable, although there is a definite sense of someone who knows he is right telling the story. Towards the end of the book he does lose his talent for telling a story and instead indulges himself in political diatribes, so many may just want to skip the last part of the book.
Recommended to anyone who would like a very "I was there" view of some of the most critical command decisions of WW2 and the early Cold War.