Status
Available
Call number
Publication
Simon & Schuster (1996), Paperback, 320 pages
Description
From influential British historian A. J. P. Taylor comes the audio edition of The Origins of the Second World War. Controversial for its thesis that Hitler was an opportunist with no thorough plan, The Origins of the Second World War is an extensive exploration of the international politics and foreign policy that led up to the one of the bloodiest conflicts of the twentieth century. Originally published in 1961, The Origins of the Second World War is a classic of modern history. A. J. P. Taylor's years of research helped change the long-accepted view that Adolf Hitler had wanted and planned in detail for a war. With clear and relatable prose, Taylor articulately depicts the diplomatic mistakes from both the Allied and Axis powers that led to the outbreak of World War II. A groundbreaking work, The Origins of the Second World War "is an almost faultless masterpiece, perfectly proportioned, perfectly controlled" (The Observer).… (more)
User reviews
LibraryThing member Smiley
Often sighted as revisionist, this books lays out how the Allied powers were complicit in Hitler's making of a greater Germany. Partly because they recognized the WWI treaty as unfair. Partly because all the allied leaders had lived through the wholesale carnage of that war and did not want it
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repeated and partly they thought Hitler could be bought. Show Less
LibraryThing member tuckerresearch
Ah, the glory that is Taylor, the first history superstar. An apologist for Hitler? Surely not! Maybe?
LibraryThing member MMaelo
A true revisionist, I loved reading Taylor's masterpiece. Well written and very controversial A must have for any scholar interested in the topic of total war and social change.
LibraryThing member nivramkoorb
I read this book while on a month vacation in Paris so it was very timely being on French soil during the reading. Taylor tries to separate Hitler the politician from Hitler the monster that killed 6 million people in the concentration camps Basically, the treaty of Versailles set off the events
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that led to World War II. Much of the book deals with the constant creation and uncreation of treaties and the ultimate goal of not repeating the carnage of World War I. The book leads us to believe that Hitler never really wanted to fight France and England and it all sort of just happened. Taylor's take has been disputed but I always find that history written 57 years ago fascinating. This book helps us understand the lessons of history. Show Less
LibraryThing member Dilip-Kumar
This is a sort of iconic work on the origins of the second world war, and obviously it would be presumptuous to make a critical comment. The book is mercifully not big (only slightly over 300 pages), and hence can be condumed without a strain. As for the author's style, it is rational, non-pompous,
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and speaks directly to the reader. Many of its paragraphs are rounded off with a pithy and inspired aphorism that sums up the whole thing aptly. As for the author's general approach, it seems that Hitler did not have any pre-detrermined grand aim to subjugate the world, and could have been satisfied if the French and British had allowed him to take over Poland (they had alrwady conceded Austria and Czechoslovakia). Thius theory is somewhat like the judgment that the British fell into the Indian empire in a fit of absent-mindedness. Of Hitler's antipathy to the Jews and other unfortunates, there is hardly any mention. Of course, I could not make a cogent appraisal of this approach, as I have not read the author's other works.One wonders, however. Show Less
LibraryThing member Cecrow
In 1960, historian A.J.P. Taylor reviewed again the evidence available that described the series of political events between the two world wars. He dispensed with 'common knowledge' and worked from the records to arrive at his own conclusions. These boil down to some basic points: Hitler had no
Hitler was not a master strategist who executed a plan years in the making. He had vague ideas about a greater Germany and took opportunities to pursue it as those opportunities came to hand. That they arose so readily was more a factor of empathy for Germany's treatment in Versailles, and the stirring nationalism of neighbouring German peoples in Austria and elsewhere. At the end of the day this does not in fact paint a dramatically different picture from anyone else's assessment: Hitler is still bad, Chamberlain is still foolish. But if Hitler was not a frightening mastermind, the sketch drawn of him is still something just as frightening: a democratically elected tyrant guided only by his megalomania who did not share the decorum of the rest of the world order. A man who would act impulsively and outrageously when others only talked that way. He had no superior wisdom, pulled no puppet strings. He only liked power, and he liked to use it. You do not have to look nearly as far to find examples of people like that all around you.
The strategy of appeasement is much maligned, a backing down in the face of aggression. Taylor contextualizes this in its setting. Statesmen in the 1920s and 1930s had to grapple with fallout from the treaty at Versailles. It was not, in fact, a workable document in how it treated Germany; partly in it outrageous terms but primarily because there was never any means provided to enforce it if necessary. The disagreement among allies as to whether Germany deserved the harsh terms and/or could even survive them was a key factor. Certainly the German people didn't accept them, and used them as a scapegoat for literally everything that ever went wrong until Hitler came to power. Consequently British (willing) and French (grudging) diplomats allowed that some of the treaty's terms should justifiably be undone somehow, some way. It's unfortunate that Hitler happened to be the one in power, and that his way involved infantry, tanks and bluster. This proved particularly effective in the face of his opponents' already soft position.
Lastly, there is Taylor's blunders argument. It was proven to Hitler multiple times that the western powers (Britain and France) would not react to the point of war in the face of provocation. Mussolini would have had to withdraw from Abyssinia, Hitler from the Rhineland and his intervention in the Spanish Civil War, if Britain and France had reacted more strongly. Later, when Hitler stood a chance of military resistance, they were even more reluctant to do so over Austria or Czechslovakia, and demonstrated a horrible lack of regard for those countries' sovereignty. This explains Hitler's ready determination to invade Poland. He didn't expect any different a response. The lesson here is that when you are going to draw a line in the sand, be very firm and clear about it: think Cuban Missile Crisis.
Many years ago I read 'Rise and Fall of the Third Reich' which also covered all of this ground, was written at almost the same time and is just as heralded a work if not more. I wish I had read these books in closer proximity so I could contrast their perspectives.
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master plan, he was a master opportunist; appeasement did not seem nearly so weak or unreasonable a strategy in the heat of the moment, lacking foreknowledge; and World War II erupted more from a result of blunders than intentions. For all of these he builds a case based on evidence that he can point to (and it makes for an interesting exercise), but in terms of conclusions this winds up feeling like the proverbial "sound and fury signifying nothing." The faulty treaty of Versailles still set up Europe for another disaster, and Hitler was still a bully always threatening to use force and ready to go back on his word to achieve whatever next end he had in mind, a sequence of which seemed to have no final end in sight. Poland drew the line that nobody else would draw by absolutely refusing to negotiate with him, and thus a line was crossed. I'm more interested in the three points above that Taylor seems to win, rather than his suspect logic about shared blame for war.Hitler was not a master strategist who executed a plan years in the making. He had vague ideas about a greater Germany and took opportunities to pursue it as those opportunities came to hand. That they arose so readily was more a factor of empathy for Germany's treatment in Versailles, and the stirring nationalism of neighbouring German peoples in Austria and elsewhere. At the end of the day this does not in fact paint a dramatically different picture from anyone else's assessment: Hitler is still bad, Chamberlain is still foolish. But if Hitler was not a frightening mastermind, the sketch drawn of him is still something just as frightening: a democratically elected tyrant guided only by his megalomania who did not share the decorum of the rest of the world order. A man who would act impulsively and outrageously when others only talked that way. He had no superior wisdom, pulled no puppet strings. He only liked power, and he liked to use it. You do not have to look nearly as far to find examples of people like that all around you.
The strategy of appeasement is much maligned, a backing down in the face of aggression. Taylor contextualizes this in its setting. Statesmen in the 1920s and 1930s had to grapple with fallout from the treaty at Versailles. It was not, in fact, a workable document in how it treated Germany; partly in it outrageous terms but primarily because there was never any means provided to enforce it if necessary. The disagreement among allies as to whether Germany deserved the harsh terms and/or could even survive them was a key factor. Certainly the German people didn't accept them, and used them as a scapegoat for literally everything that ever went wrong until Hitler came to power. Consequently British (willing) and French (grudging) diplomats allowed that some of the treaty's terms should justifiably be undone somehow, some way. It's unfortunate that Hitler happened to be the one in power, and that his way involved infantry, tanks and bluster. This proved particularly effective in the face of his opponents' already soft position.
Lastly, there is Taylor's blunders argument. It was proven to Hitler multiple times that the western powers (Britain and France) would not react to the point of war in the face of provocation. Mussolini would have had to withdraw from Abyssinia, Hitler from the Rhineland and his intervention in the Spanish Civil War, if Britain and France had reacted more strongly. Later, when Hitler stood a chance of military resistance, they were even more reluctant to do so over Austria or Czechslovakia, and demonstrated a horrible lack of regard for those countries' sovereignty. This explains Hitler's ready determination to invade Poland. He didn't expect any different a response. The lesson here is that when you are going to draw a line in the sand, be very firm and clear about it: think Cuban Missile Crisis.
Many years ago I read 'Rise and Fall of the Third Reich' which also covered all of this ground, was written at almost the same time and is just as heralded a work if not more. I wish I had read these books in closer proximity so I could contrast their perspectives.
Show Less
Subjects
Awards
501 Must-Read Books (Emma Beare, 2006) (History)
Language
Original publication date
1961
Physical description
320 p.; 6.9 inches
ISBN
0684829479 / 9780684829470
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