Status
Available
Call number
Publication
New York : Viking, 2010.
Description
In his major new history of the Russian conflict immortalized by Tolstoy in "War and Peace," Lieven provides an examination of the period from the Russian perspective, demonstrating that Napoleon's defeat in 1812 by the Russian army was just the beginning of what would be the longest military campaign in European history.
Media reviews
"Dominic Lieven, a professor of history at the London School of Economics, is a distinguished scholar of the czarist empire, and in this superb book he has written his masterpiece."
"Crafted by Dominic Lieven, perhaps one of the most distinguished specialists in nineteenth-century Russia of his generation, Russia Against Napoleon truly reaches the parts that other works do not."
User reviews
LibraryThing member GeoKaras
Really excellent analysis of the Campaigns of 1812, 1813 and 1814, from the Russian perspective. The strategic and tactical decisions are well covered and the diplomatic and political aspects of the campaigns are lucidly explained. Lieven's material on the mobilization of the Russian Army and the
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financial and logistics requirements for the Army are of particular merit. My only criticism would be that the maps are inadequate. However, read with the West Point Atlas of the Napoleonic Wars at the ready, it is the best book on the subject I have read. Show Less
LibraryThing member barlow304
A professor at the London School of Economics, Dominic Lieven has searched the Russian military archives and emerged with a wonderful narrative history of the Napoleonic Wars of 1812-1814, written from the Russian point of view. Among his more surprising discoveries: the Russians deliberately let
A central figure emerges, a single individual most responsible for Napoleon’s defeat: Czar Alexander I. He approved the strategy of the deep retreat and was a prime mover in the campaigns of 1813 and 1814. Indeed, his diplomatic policy was responsible for forming the coalition that ultimately invaded France and overthrew its emperor.
Narrative history at its best, this book covers the campaigns, the espionage, the diplomacy, and the battles that liberated Europe.
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Napoleon advance far into their homeland without offering battle, because they were convinced that his army could not withstand the rigors of such a long campaign. Although they did not expect Napoleon to make it all the way to Moscow, their strategy worked quite well, as the French army fell apart during the long retreat back to central Europe. A central figure emerges, a single individual most responsible for Napoleon’s defeat: Czar Alexander I. He approved the strategy of the deep retreat and was a prime mover in the campaigns of 1813 and 1814. Indeed, his diplomatic policy was responsible for forming the coalition that ultimately invaded France and overthrew its emperor.
Narrative history at its best, this book covers the campaigns, the espionage, the diplomacy, and the battles that liberated Europe.
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LibraryThing member prichardson
a great book that I enjoyed from start to finish. A few more maps may have been useful to explain the more detailed passgages but otherwise a fantastic read.
LibraryThing member Artymedon
The Author Mr. Lieven, had access to Russian archives to write a story of the 1812-1814 campaigns in which Russia contributed to the dismanteling of the Napoleonic Empire.
The strategy and the respective national myths of previous historians are well detailed in that for political reasons - the
In popular imagery, the Tolstoi [War and Peace] version of this campaign prevail only telling the fatal march to Moscow and back.
It is to the credit of Mr. Lieven that he goes further though the title of the book seem to infer that only Napoleon went at war against Russia even though he had assembled what would now be called a "coalition of the willing".
The strategy and the respective national myths of previous historians are well detailed in that for political reasons - the
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1827 coup by former generals of the 1812 campaigns to topple absolutism in Russia - more was written over the 1812 part of the campaign than on the next two years. This happened to diminish the importance of the fact that Russian armies marched - led by Prussian general - through western Europe with Platov's cossacks ending camping in Paris!In popular imagery, the Tolstoi [War and Peace] version of this campaign prevail only telling the fatal march to Moscow and back.
It is to the credit of Mr. Lieven that he goes further though the title of the book seem to infer that only Napoleon went at war against Russia even though he had assembled what would now be called a "coalition of the willing".
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LibraryThing member HadriantheBlind
It is a common misconception, popularized by nationalist sentiments and even Tolstoy himself, that the Russian army was not responsible as it truly was for the defeat of Napoleon in the East. General Winter is most often credited.
This book is a worthy corrective to some of the misconceptions of the
Strategic withdrawal was necessary, as well as a total war. Napoleon's army, although excellent in pitched battle, was incapable of sustained guerilla or total wars, as demonstrated in the Peninsular campaign.
Alexander I, in particular, is given credit for forming an alliance system, often by 'the scruff of his neighbors necks', as he bargained their compliance.
Even in peacetime, Russia threw its weight around, redrawing the territorial lines of Europe in the Congress of Berlin, redrawing German and Polish states according to their demands.
These campaigns still have very much to teach us, and Lieven does very well in bringing new facts to light.
Only major complaint is that some better maps would have been useful. It's hard to keep track of military campaigns without them.
This book is a worthy corrective to some of the misconceptions of the
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Russian campaign - that is, Russia was more responsible for defeating Napoleon than is given credit - by such preeminent sources as The Campaigns of Napoleon, and Tolstoy. The Russian state, although primitive and somewhat lacking in both a social and economic/industrial sense, was led by competent and farsighted leaders who made necessary strategic preparations for defeating an invasion of such magnitude.Strategic withdrawal was necessary, as well as a total war. Napoleon's army, although excellent in pitched battle, was incapable of sustained guerilla or total wars, as demonstrated in the Peninsular campaign.
Alexander I, in particular, is given credit for forming an alliance system, often by 'the scruff of his neighbors necks', as he bargained their compliance.
Even in peacetime, Russia threw its weight around, redrawing the territorial lines of Europe in the Congress of Berlin, redrawing German and Polish states according to their demands.
These campaigns still have very much to teach us, and Lieven does very well in bringing new facts to light.
Only major complaint is that some better maps would have been useful. It's hard to keep track of military campaigns without them.
Show Less
LibraryThing member apomonis
The most thoroughly researched, eye-opening, concise piece of military history I've ever read. A JOY to read.
Subjects
Awards
The Economist Best Books (2009.9)
Pol Roger Duff Cooper Prize (Shortlist — 2009)
Wolfson History Prize (Shortlist — 2010)
PEN Hessell-Tiltman Prize (Shortlist — 2010)
Language
Original publication date
2009
Physical description
871 p.; 24 inches
ISBN
0143118862 / 9780143118862