The Mask of Command

by John Keegan

Paperback, 1989

Status

Available

Call number

355.33041

Publication

Penguin Books Ltd (1989), Paperback

Description

The author asserts that generalship is a cultural activity as well as an exercise in power or military skill and that it provides great insights into particular eras or places.

User reviews

LibraryThing member thorold
This is vintage Keegan - four case studies from different historical periods (Alexander, Wellington, Grant and Hitler) exploring the nature and requirements of military command. The case studies are real virtuoso pieces of writing. In a remarkably small number of pages we are introduced to the
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political, technological and strategic situation he subject found himself in, given a lightning biography, and a detailed discussion of key points in his career. Probably the most impressive is the chapter on Hitler: Keegan has to give us a potted history of both World War I and World War II, point out why they were fought in the particular ways they were, and explain how Hitler's experience as a front-line soldier and messenger in the first war influenced his attitude to command in the second. Not bad for 75 pages.

The concluding chapter, pulling together the threads of the analysis and relating them to the modern world, is let down a little by the date of its composition. 1987 was not a good year to be writing about the future situation of the great powers...
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LibraryThing member RandyStafford
Its title comes from a theatrical metaphor, Keegan examining what a commander chooses to reveal of himself to his troops, what he conceals, and what he sometimes invents.

But the book is much more than that. Through an examination of the armies, times, and personalties of four commanders --
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Alexander the Great, Wellington, Grant, and Hitler (with a brief look at the command style of John F. Kennedy during the Cuban Missle Crisis) -- he shows us how command tactics and theatrics have evolved from Alexander's leading by example in the thick of battle, an heroic example, to the decidely unheroic and distant Hitler and Kennedy.

You'd expect, in a book like this, some look at the politics, military structure, and arms surrounding each leader. And that's present as well as a look at the mechanics of battlefield communication. We're also shown how each of the above leaders personifies some leadership style.

As with his The Face Of Battle, Keegan makes some of his most memorable points through telling details. We hear of how Alexander's leadership was constricted by the dust of battle, the impossibility of directing combat while heroically hacking at the foe himself; we see how Wellington was distanced from the battlefield by cannons, his vision even more clouded by the gray smoke of guns than Alexander's was by dust, and his intuitive estimation of how fast troops could move against enemies who had just discharged a volley; Keegan talks about the importance of clear and concise dispatches in 19th century battles and how Grant and Wellington's command of English served them well off the battleground; we read transcripts of a micromanaging Hitler who had far better recall of various weapons' characteristics than his commanders but a notable deficeit in strategic thinking.

I found it interesting that all the commanders Keegan chose were political leaders, half unifying military and political commands at once, the other half pursuing political careers after their generalships were over. He doesn't explicity say why this is so, but a concluding chapter on "post-heroic" leadership over nuclear forces implicitly argues for a new style of command by our current military-political leaders.

Whether you want a biography of any or all of the commanders studied in this book, a history of how warfare and the process of command changed through millennia, or a look at how a war leader must manipulate his followers with the right mix -- for his society and time -- of love, alienation, fear, and respect, this book is worth reading.
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LibraryThing member vguy
readable and informative as Keegan always is. Odd to include Hitler in his set, who was out of his depth as commander and took half a world down with him, whereas the other three (Alexander, Wellington, Grant) were undefeated throughout. But the Hitler profile & analysis is the most interesting.
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Shows how H learned from his own frontkaempfer experience, but perhaps then learned nothing else, that he boned up on the technical details of weapons and transport and floored his own generals with displays of (essentially trivial) memory feats, how he was even more of a chateau general than the WW1 chaps, with his HQ hundreds of miles from the front (and disruptingly shifting), how he basically collapsed as soon as he met with defeat in any form. the inexplicable is how he kept all those professionals under his thumb and the front line fighting till the last bullet. Keegan doesn't engage much with that. Alex and the Duke are well described but not much new; Grant is interesting: dogged, gruff, coming from nowhere, but with well-concealed intellectual qualities that came out in his Memoirs at the end of his life. The overall analysis in the last chapter is too short and abstract to come across well. Keegan at his best when there's a whiff of gunpowder or a whirr of arrows in the air.
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LibraryThing member gmicksmith
Once again, one of the best military historians around has examined the mask of command by examining three great generals in order to understand the nature of military leadershi. In scope it most reminds me of Victor Davis Hanson's similar work on three liberators.
LibraryThing member DinadansFriend
A certain part of military life is talking other people into risking their lives to accomplish the goals, worthy or unworthy of those who pay your salary. Of course there's an ideological element in some of this, and there's group solidarity as well, but the bottom line seems to be summed up above.
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Mr. Keegan has done a very good job defining the role of the officer, and his prose is competent.
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LibraryThing member nbmars
Keegan analyzes war generals, with a focus on Alexander the Great, the Duke of Wellington, Ulysses S. Grant, and Adolf Hitler. He argues that generalship can tell us a lot about a particular era or place, especially whether generals are considered “heroes” or “anti-heroes.” He
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writes:

“Generalship is, in short, much more than command of armies in the field. For an army is, to resort to cliche, an expression of the society from which it issues.” The purposes for which it fights and the way it does so will therefore be determined in large measure by what a society wants from a war and how far it expects its army to go in delivering that outcome.”

“Context,” he later avers, “is all.”

This macro view of generalship is so much more illuminating than the view from the ground.

On a more specific level, Keegan notes that the hopes and requirements of the soldiers a general leads must be reflected by great generals. He writes, “The leader of men in warfare can show himself to his followers only through a mask, a mask that he must make for himself, but a mask made in such form s will mark him to men of his time and place as the leer they want and need.”

It is a pity Keegan didn’t select George Washington for one of his highlighted generals. Washington was a master of theater, and of both meeting expectations and manipulating them in his favor. (For an excellent analysis of this, see Ron Chernow’s biography of Washington.)

No matter what his subject, however, Keegan is superbly adept at exposing all facets of military affairs in depth, and providing readers with fascinating and unexpected insights. This book is no exception.
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Language

Original publication date

1987

Physical description

400 p.; 7.7 inches

ISBN

0140114068 / 9780140114065
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