Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan and Bin Laden

by Steve Coll

Paperback, 2005

Status

Available

Call number

327

Genres

Publication

Penguin (2005), Paperback, 736 pages

Description

History. Politics. Nonfiction. HTML:Winner of the 2005 Pulitzer Prize �??The CIA itself would be hard put to beat his grasp of global events . . . Deeply satisfying.�?� �??The New York Review of BooksFrom the award-winning and bestselling author of Directorate S, the explosive first-hand account of America's secret history in Afghanistan. To what extent did America�??s best intelligence analysts grasp the rising thread of Islamist radicalism? Who tried to stop bin Laden and why did they fail? Comprehensively and for the first time, Pulitzer Prize-winning journalist Steve Coll recounts the history of the covert wars in Afghanistan that fueled Islamic militancy and sowed the seeds of the September 11 attacks. Based on scrupulous research and firsthand accounts by key government, intelligence, and military personnel both foreign and American, Ghost Wars details the secret history of the CIA�??s role in Afghanistan (including its covert operations against Soviet troops from 1979 to 1989), the rise of the Taliban, the emergence of bin Laden, and the failed efforts by U.S. forces to find and assassinate bin Laden… (more)

Media reviews

The New York Times Book Review

Coll has given us what is certainly the finest historical narrative so far on the origins of Al Qaeda in the post-Soviet rubble of Afghanistan. He has followed up that feat by threading together the complex roles played by diplomats and spies from Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and the United States into a

coherent story explaining how Afghanistan became such a welcoming haven for Al Qaeda.

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User reviews

LibraryThing member iftyzaidi

This is an outstanding account of American policy towards Afghanistan from about 1977 till September 2001 and more specifically about CIA operations within that country and aimed at dealing with the international Jihadists it spawned. Probably the best book of its kind that I have read as the

policy debates and decision-making process in the States is well-covered. One wishes that similiarly exhaustive accounts could be formulated of the decision-making processes in Islamabad and Riyadh (and possibly even Kandahar). If bureaucratic inertia played a large part in stimmying a re-evaluation of policy in Washington, did something similar happen elsewhere?

There are hints of this and other policy debates and arguements in Steve Coll's account, but are not well-fleshed out. (Also it must be remebered that sometimes these accounts come from self-serving sources - for example, it escapes me why western reporters base so much of their accounts of politics in Pakistan on the accounts of Mushahid Hussain - an oppurtunistic politician par excellence. Steve Coll quotes him here variously as an aide of Benazir Bhutto, a minister in Nawaz Sharif's government and as a journalist. I recall Adrian Levy and Catherine Scott-Clark had done something similar in excellent book on the Paksitani nuclear programme, 'Deception'.) To what extent were the tensions between army chief Gen Musharraf and Nawaz Sharif the result of differing views on Taliban/UBL policy? Owen-Benett Jones in her book on Pakistan seems to have thought it was a significant factor in the tensions that led to the coup. Steve Coll is dismissive of Nawaz Sharif's offer to create a Pakistan commando team to snatch Bin Laden, buying into the Musharraf govt's line that it was an eyewash and simply meant to create a bodyguard for Sharif independent of the army chain of command. One wonders then why when Sharif decided to take the risky step of dismissing Musharaf as the head of the army, his body guard contingent was deployed at a forward base on the border with Afghanistan instead of stationed in Islamabad to protect the PM? Certainly by all accounts the ISI's use of UBL's jihadist training camps to shelter Pakistani militants responsible for sectarian assasinations in Pakistan was a concern for Sharif (see Hassan Abbas' Pakistan's Drift Into Extremism' for more details of the Sharif govts dispute with the ISI over the activties of Jihadists in Pakistan).

Anyway, this isn't a criticism of Coll's work as such, which is fairly exhaustive as it is. Its simply pointing out an area of our understanding which still remains nebulous and worthy of study.

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LibraryThing member PCorrigan

Interesting and important reading even in 2017 with the basic facts leading up to 9/11 pretty well known by anyone who has devoted even modest attention to the subject. Where the book excels in my opinion is in describing just how U.S. policy is crafted at the highest levels. And it does not make

for reassuring reading. Competing agencies, agendas, philosophies and personalities at the highest levels of the U.S. Government make policy really, really difficult to get right or to change. That is just the nature of our system. The big takeaway from this book is how little has changed since those years. We remain tethered to Saudi Arabia and Pakistan in a way that almost defies belief. They were both shown in this book to have had huge roles in the rise and success of Islamic extremism whether through support of the Taliban or the funding of ideological madhouse madrassas that generated countless volunteers for the worldwide Jihad. Neither of those salient facts have changed in 16 years. The Saudis (and others) continue to fund Wahabist thought worldwide, the Paks (ISI) still support the Taliban and the U.S. continues to pretend both are our 'allies'. They say that generals like to fight the 'last war', especially if they won. The U.S. seems to still want to fight the last war (Cold War) as a national strategy, i.e. vs. the Russians. The only war that matters in the world today is the one against the ideology of Islam, which clearly seeks to dominate the world. It's kind of like reading Mein Kampf, the Koran spells out with great clarity the plans and goals of Islam but the West prefers to bury it's collective head in the dirt and scream about 'the Russians are coming'!

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LibraryThing member Borg-mx5

An incredibly detailed history of American involvement with Afghanistan and Osama Bin Laden prior to 09-11. If you are really a student of world affairs and not just interested in the hyperbole and headlines, this weighty (588 pages not including extensive notes) is worth the read.

LibraryThing member nbmars

This excellent chronicling of the CIA's involvement in Afghanistan from the Soviet invasion through September 10, 2001 is a valuable contribution to understanding the history of our interactions with Islamic Fundamentalists and perhaps more importantly, how and why they came to direct their jihad

against the U.S.

The 2005 Pulitzer Prize was given to the author for his careful research which included over two hundred interviews, as well as information from the 9/11 Report.

Mostly it is a book about missed opportunities, owing, as Coll suggests, to "indifference, lassitude, blindness, paralysis, and commercial greed" that shaped America's foreign policy in Afghanistan and South Asia. In spite of acute awareness of the threat of Islamic fundamentalism, both Bush administrations and in between them, Clinton's, continued to dither: intrabureaucratic disagreements over turfs and strategies, legal concerns, fear of another Desert One disaster, and deference to Pakistan and Saudi Arabia kept their hands tied. Washington was unwilling to threaten its supply of Saudi oil, nor did it want to jeopardize its influence on nuclear stability by angering Pakistan over terrorism. (Pakistan felt it needed jihadist fighters - trained obligingly by bin Laden - to tie down India's army in Kashmir.)

Tragically, Washington also declined to give more than token support to Ahmed Shah Massoud - known as "Lion of the Panjshir" - the Tajik guerilla leader in Afghanistan fighting the Taliban and al Qaeda who was assassinated by emissaries of bin Laden on September 9, 2001.

As the CIA's threat reporting about bin Laden surged during the spring of 2001, the Bush administration continued to defer action. On September 4, the Bush Cabinet approved a draft of a plan to step up aid to Massoud and to continue to monitor bin Laden with the "stated goal" of eliminating bin Laden and al Qaeda. Funding, however, was not discussed. On September 10, another meeting was called to finalize the "new" policies toward Afghanistan and Pakistan, policies that did not depart in any marked way from those of the Clinton years. The group decided to start with the diplomatic route, urging Mullah Omar to "expel" bin Laden - a strategy that had been tried repeatedly in the past to no avail.

Coll's story ends on this day, not in the U.S. but in Pakistan, where Hamid Karzai was preparing to flee for his life. His brother reached him with the news that Ahmed Shah Massoud was dead. "Hamid Karzai reacted in a single, brief sentence, as his brother recalled it: 'What an unlucky country.'" Unlucky indeed.

(JAF)

To my wife's excellent review, I would add that the book is not just about the CIA's activities before 9-11 [(or that, see "Legacy of Ashes"), but rather about the policies of the entire U.S. government toward Afghanistan, beginning with the Soviet invasion.

Importantly, it shows how difficult it is to deal with Islamic regimes - particularly Saudi Arabia and Pakistan - when it comes to our efforts to capture or in some way disable an Islamic enemy of the U.S. No matter how dangerous and downright evil Osama bin Ladin appears to Americans, he just doesn't look that bad to Muslims like the Saudi royal family or Pakistan's ISI. Thus, we get at most begrudging cooperation from each Islamic "ally," if not actual sabotaging of our efforts.

(JAB)

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LibraryThing member olfmanl

This book is well-researched and thorough. The writing style is journalistic.

LibraryThing member Black821Library

my son is in Afghanistan so this history helped me understand his job

LibraryThing member gmicksmith

In the early 1980s, a Palestinian ideologue named Abdullah Azzam was coordinating the jihad from Peshawar, near the Afghanistan border. Azzam, who also taught at Islamabad’s International Islamic University, visited America numerous times during the 1980s, urging support for the war in

Afghanistan .

Described as a charismatic orator, he told fanciful tales of Islamic warriors not being harmed by Soviet tanks and bullets, and slain martyrs whose corpses did not decay.

Azzam’s Peshawar center was known as the Afghan Bureau. His deputy and financier was a Saudi named Osama bin Laden. Azzam is regarded by many scholars as having laid the ideological groundwork for modern-day jihad. After his assassination in a 1989 bomb blast, bin Laden took over the bureau and developed what would become al-Qaeda.

Was the idealistic 19- or 20-year-old Barack Obama inquiring about the Afghanistan jihad?

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LibraryThing member cblaker

This book is essential reading for anyone interested in the War on Terror or Afghanistan. The list of important people in the beginning of the book is helpful when trying to keep track of all the characters with exotic names. Thoroughly researched, easy to follow, and readable. I highly recommend

this book.

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LibraryThing member choochtriplem

Ghost Wars is a look at the history of Afghanistan from a the early 1980's until 2001. The book describes the Soviet occupation of the country, the birth of radical ideals and the Taliban and the conditions that made it possible for Osama bin Laden to make the country the seat of his power.

An

excellent book for anyone interested in the countries history as well as people who want to understand the complities faced be the US and NATO forces currently in Afghanistan.

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LibraryThing member Schmerguls

I read this because it won the Pulitzer Nonfiction prize in 2005. It is an excellently researched book and clearly written, detailing carefully the events from Dec 1979 in Afghanistan till Sep 10, 2001. But it is painful reading, since one knows that all the work put into seeking to have things go

right in Afghanistan and stopping bin Laden's devil-inspired plans will not be successful.. I could not find much to blame as to the efforts made, at least during the Clinton administration. The Bush people really never got to the problem till it was too late. Important but not fun reading.

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LibraryThing member Tanasi1

This is an amazing look at the Afghanistan conflict beginning at the withdrawal of Soviet forces to the bombing of the world Trade Center. It examines the role of the CIA and Pakistan’s ISI in Afghanistan.

LibraryThing member ex_ottoyuhr

The title leaves little to the imagination, I suppose. This is a very interesting book, obviously nonfiction but not only reading like a novel, but begging to be fictionalized -- and not as a novel, but as a computer game of an unusual sort.

Hopefully it's not too callous of me to say that...

LibraryThing member reluctantm

The book is well-detailed and very clear for the amount of information it covers. However, I felt very cold and distant from the narrative.

LibraryThing member dinu

Very good book and very well written.

LibraryThing member chriskrycho

An outstanding book whose contents were infuriating.

LibraryThing member ProfH

Fascinating and depressing read--This is a good one for anyone who thinks that foreign relations aren't that complicated or who misses out on the necessity of knowing a region's history before entangling his or her country in a conflict.

LibraryThing member Ana55

Very informative

LibraryThing member LamSon

This book chronicles the rise of the jihadist movement, starting with mujahedin fighters in Afghanistan during the Soviet occupation in the 1980s. It continues with the rise of the Taliban and the influence and collaboration with bin Laden. The book ends on September 10, 2001. When reading this

book you’ll find yourself continually asking why THEY didn’t listen to THOSE who were shouting warnings.

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LibraryThing member antao

Essential, bloody, real and tragic.

One important underlying issue is what this means for the future, because there are similarities between the inflation of the Afghan government with western cash and the situation in South Vietnam during the 1960s and early 1970s. Does an Afghan security force

left to fend for itself go the way of the South Vietnamese military after "Vietnamisation"? Before you say you don't care, ask the family of every casualty in Afghanistan what their sacrifice was for.

The CIA has been doing this stuff for a long time. In fact, when Afghans were fist trying to rid themselves of the Taliban, (even today roughly 7% want them), the US had helped them with money, and paid Massoud to do it. Finally, AQ helped the Taliban assassinate Massoud, on 2001. Even now, I suppose, Karzai needs a bit of money to do things. The Trumptards shell out a lot more to Palestinians.

The West had a strange fascination for 20th century Afghanistan. This small, poor but unbelievably robust country became a symbol for foreign misadventure, mistakes, misguided policy and misplaced ambition. The sun never began to set on the Portuguese Empire here, like it did in Macau, Mozambique, Angola, Brasil, São Tomé and Príncipe, East Timor, Cape Verde, Guinea-Bissau, etc.; in Afghanistan the mighty Red Soviet Bear got trapped in the mountains, and the American eagle got its wings clipped. This astonishing account of these invasions, resistances, shadowy leaders and chess moves fully deserves its Pulitzer Prize. As well as a thorough, analytical military and political history, it's also something of a page turning thriller. There are CIA agents handing over briefcases of dollars in desert tents, disappearing American missiles, secret exchanges and coded messages. This is an essential read for anyone with an interest in foreign policy, the misery of modern realpolitik and the tragedies of war itself. There's the blood of many nations in these pages.

More than one article I've read online has observed that the West's obsession with it, dates back to Britain's pre-eminent geostrategist of the late 19th century Halford Mckinder who called Afghanistan 'the hinge of the earth' and that whoever controlled the hinge, controlled the world. He also called that area the Heartland, or the pivot, and is considered the father of geostrategy and geopolitics.

As this books amply shows, early conquerors, monarchs, republics couldn't govern without the "world's second oldest profession".

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LibraryThing member mdubois

A great overview of the involvement of the US in Pakistan, Afghanistan and their relationship with Saudi Arabia. This book chronicles the support for Afghan fighters during the Soviet invasion, the lack of accountability for CIA involvement in that war, and the consequences leading to the rise of

the Taliban, Al Qaeda, which culminates in the Sep 11, 2001 World Trade Center attacks.

The documentation here supports the decline of the CIA over the past 20 years and the inability of US intelligence gathering and covert operations to operate effectively against the new threats of terrorism, enemies that are not nation-states, and irregular forces.

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LibraryThing member piefuchs

Absolutely eye opening. Ghost Wars comes as close as possible to an unbiased, factual description of American foreign policy in the period leading up to 09/11/01. No one, from any party, or any government entity, is left unscathed.

Two prescient themes emerged from this book. The trials and

tribulations witnessed in the suburban office day to day, where decisions are made based on who toes don't get stepped on and who presents the squeaky wheel to the right person - to a distubing extent extend into the theatre of crucial government decisions. The people who understood the threat of Bin Laden, were not the right people. In fact the Taliban might have been recognized if it weren't for Jay Leno's wife ...(???!!!) ahhhhh celebrities. The other theme that grew throughout the book was the extent to which the American government was operating with a level of ignorance - due to a lack of effort - when it came to all matters on Afghanistan.

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LibraryThing member soraxtm

boy that was depressing

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