Status
Available
Call number
Collections
Publication
Profile Books Ltd (1998), Edition: Main, 288 pages
Description
Jean-Francois Abgrall was a senior detective in the French police. He developed an extraordinary reputation for his psychological insights into criminal behaviour. He is now a private detective.
Media reviews
Zweifellos, die rabiate Aufforderung der Naturwissenschaftler, die Geisteswissenschaften sollten sich gefälligst um ihre eigenen Dinge kümmern und nicht Chaostheorie und Quantenmechanik für vage Vermutungen über Texte bemühen, tut gut. Der autoritäre Ton ist wunderbar; endlich schafft jemand
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Ordnung. Natürlich fragt man sich nach einer Weile aber doch, was die Physiker wohl mit Goethe angestellt hätten. Hätten sie die Chemie-Metapher in Goethes "Wahlverwandtschaften" wohl geduldet? Hätten sie nicht Goethes "Farbenlehre" im Namen Newtons verdammt? Gewiß, und zwar um so mehr, als sich Goethe ja hier ausdrücklich als Wissenschaftler verstand. Ist aber so das Mißtrauen in die Attacke erst einmal geweckt, wächst es begierig Show Less
User reviews
LibraryThing member JollyContrarian
Before I start, let me nail my colours to the mast: I'm pro-science, I'm pro-evolution, I really like the idea of rational enquiry and I'm a sceptic bordering on the cynical. I'm *not* some lentil-munching, kaftan-wearing, feng-shui-hugging hippie with airbrushed unicorns and a yin-yang sign on the
Now we've got that cleared up, let me say it straight: This book takes on some big arguments, but, other than humorously swatting some flies, loses hands down. All it succeeds in doing is illustrating that there are fakers, losers, charlatans and wankers to be found in the Social Sciences departments of any given University. Anyone who's been to university and didn't know that deserves a clip around the ear and to be sent to the back of the class. Now either Sokal didn't know that ( - ~clip~ -), or he's spent half his book shooting fish in a barrel. That might seem like good sport, but before long it becomes obvious it's a cheap thrill.
Having said that, I sincerely doubt that the titillation of seeing dumb French Feminists taken apart is what made this book such a splash: I think it's because of Sokal's purported intent: to undermine the notion of cognitive relativism, especially as it associated with modern philosophy of science, in particular the work of Thomas Kuhn and Paul Feyerabend. This is the battle: Sokal aligns with those who say scientists are the exclusive purveyors of a shining light called truth; the Barbarians at the gate are these simpering postmodernists who want to tear the temple down.
While the poseurs cited in this book are certainly (for the most part) phoneys or idiots, I think Thomas Kuhn was neither, and while Paul Feyerabend overplayed the court jester hand, he had some important things to say too.
So, to the first point: Proving that one writer (or a hundred, or a thousand) who purports to adhere to relativism is a charlatan doesn't establish anything about *the idea* of relativism. All you have established is that you have a found yourself a charlatan. Give yourself a star.
But while you're pinning it on, remember that postmodernists do not have a monopoly on illogical, bamboozling, balderdash:
Example: Sir Roger Penrose (Emeritus Rouse Ball professor of mathematics at Oxford University, no less) and his dreadful, lumpen-headed, and deliberately bamboozling anti-AI tract "The Emperor's New Mind". The very point of the (no doubt correct but nonetheless entirely irrelevant) science deluged on the reader in that book is to obscure the fact that the real emperor was Roger Penrose and his arguments on AI really blow the kumara.
Example: Noam Chomsky and Steven Pinker's Linguistic Nativism, which has held sway for a good thirty years in many linguistics departments, and is anything but post-modern: nativism holds that humans have an innate understanding of grammar hard wired into their biology. From my paltry readings in linguistics and the philosophy of language, my impression is that Pinker's and Chomsky's arguments are seriously flawed. (See: Sampson: "The Language Instinct Debate" for a thorough linguistic critique of nativism; see Rorty: "Contingency Irony, and Solidarity" for a philosophical perspective on the contingency of language). Make note of this example, as it becomes relevant later on.
Secondly, Sokal and Bricmont (quite deliberately) refuse to engage on certain topics, in particular on cultural or aesthetic relativism, which they say (without providing a reason) "raise very different issues". Take that star away, for this statement betrays a fundamental misunderstanding about relativism. Actually, ethical, aesthetic and cognitive relativisms raise different manifestations of *exactly* the same issue: Cognitive relativism, in that it relates to "epistemic" truth (as opposed to "moral" truth or "aesthetic" truth - both of which seem intuitively more questionable ideas) is simply a cut closer to the quick: indeed, the aesthetic and moral brands of relativism rely for their plausibility on cognitive relativism anyway (i.e. if the truths we understand about the physical universe are contingent on our language, then it follows that ideals of right and wrong and beauty must be similarly contingent on our language).
Thirdly, Sokal provides the following account of cognitive relativism:
"While scientists ... try to obtain an objective view ... of the world, relativist thinkers tell them that they are wasting their time and that such an enterprise is, in principle, an illusion"
Now that, to put it mildly, is a *very* punchy version of relativism, and not one that any credible relativist philosopher I know of (and certainly not Thomas Kuhn, who spent a whole book explaining how and why the process scientific discovery works) subscribes to.
That is, in the trade, known as a straw-man argument: You set it up to knock it over. Here goes:
P1: Relativists say science is a waste of time
P2: Science helps us reliably predict and react coherently to phenomena occurring in the world
P3: Things which help to predict and react to such phenomena have genuine utility
C1: Therefore, science has genuine utility
C2: Ergo, science is not a waste of time
Case closed. Is relativism dead? No: the problem is, most relativists I know would completely agree with all of the above argument except for premise 1. The cat is most definitely still out of the bag. (In a nutshell, all reasonably stated relativism says is that you can't know that your theory actually maps onto the actual configuration of the outside world; it may, it may not: logically there will always be some other possible explanation for the same set of data, however implausible or difficult to imagine, and in part that difficulty in imagination may be a function of the historical contingency of our belief in, and description of the world in terms of, the current "paradigm". Relativism simply says the best you can do is to know that, for now, your theory works, not that it is *true*. Though Sokal and Bricmont may disagree, I don't think this is controversial amongst philosophers nor, really, scientists.)
Lastly, in criticising an admittedly utterly ludicrous passage bestowed on the world by that splendidly silly feminist philosopher Julia Kristeva, Sokal makes the following footnote:
"...Kristeva seems to be appealing ... to the 'Sapir-Whorf thesis' in linguistics that is ...that our language radically conditions our view of the world. This thesis nowadays is sharply criticised by some linguists: see, for example Pinker ..."
Hold the phone. The implication is that the Sapir-Whorf thesis (as to the contingency of language) has been discredited, but by none other than Steven Pinker in his "The Language Instinct" which, as per the above, is at the very least a controversial piece of writing. This is an extremely important point, since it's utterly central to the credibility of the anti-relativist cause, and if one takes Geoffrey Sampson's book (cited above) at face value the nativist claims themselves are built on very suspect reasoning and scientific research. It seems to me (and to writers like Richard Rorty) that language must radically condition our view of the world, because that's the only basis on which we can even describe it.
At the end of the day, properly stated cognitive relativism is no a threat to modern scientific discourse, except that it relegates the scientist from "truth knower" or "person through whom you may have exclusive access to the truth" (sounds a bit like a grand high pooh-bah or - dare I say it - high priest, doesn't it?) to "person whose theory works the best for now" and who may be in competition for that status with other people in the community whether or not they're scientists.
If science *does* work better than feng shui or healing crystals (and I, for one, think it does) then this shouldn't be a particularly troubling way of looking at the world for a scientist who is at ease with his views and his value to the community. So it makes the knee-jerk reactions against relativism, from the likes of Sokal and elsewhere Richard Dawkins, all the more mystifying.
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side of my Kombi. Honestly. Now we've got that cleared up, let me say it straight: This book takes on some big arguments, but, other than humorously swatting some flies, loses hands down. All it succeeds in doing is illustrating that there are fakers, losers, charlatans and wankers to be found in the Social Sciences departments of any given University. Anyone who's been to university and didn't know that deserves a clip around the ear and to be sent to the back of the class. Now either Sokal didn't know that ( - ~clip~ -), or he's spent half his book shooting fish in a barrel. That might seem like good sport, but before long it becomes obvious it's a cheap thrill.
Having said that, I sincerely doubt that the titillation of seeing dumb French Feminists taken apart is what made this book such a splash: I think it's because of Sokal's purported intent: to undermine the notion of cognitive relativism, especially as it associated with modern philosophy of science, in particular the work of Thomas Kuhn and Paul Feyerabend. This is the battle: Sokal aligns with those who say scientists are the exclusive purveyors of a shining light called truth; the Barbarians at the gate are these simpering postmodernists who want to tear the temple down.
While the poseurs cited in this book are certainly (for the most part) phoneys or idiots, I think Thomas Kuhn was neither, and while Paul Feyerabend overplayed the court jester hand, he had some important things to say too.
So, to the first point: Proving that one writer (or a hundred, or a thousand) who purports to adhere to relativism is a charlatan doesn't establish anything about *the idea* of relativism. All you have established is that you have a found yourself a charlatan. Give yourself a star.
But while you're pinning it on, remember that postmodernists do not have a monopoly on illogical, bamboozling, balderdash:
Example: Sir Roger Penrose (Emeritus Rouse Ball professor of mathematics at Oxford University, no less) and his dreadful, lumpen-headed, and deliberately bamboozling anti-AI tract "The Emperor's New Mind". The very point of the (no doubt correct but nonetheless entirely irrelevant) science deluged on the reader in that book is to obscure the fact that the real emperor was Roger Penrose and his arguments on AI really blow the kumara.
Example: Noam Chomsky and Steven Pinker's Linguistic Nativism, which has held sway for a good thirty years in many linguistics departments, and is anything but post-modern: nativism holds that humans have an innate understanding of grammar hard wired into their biology. From my paltry readings in linguistics and the philosophy of language, my impression is that Pinker's and Chomsky's arguments are seriously flawed. (See: Sampson: "The Language Instinct Debate" for a thorough linguistic critique of nativism; see Rorty: "Contingency Irony, and Solidarity" for a philosophical perspective on the contingency of language). Make note of this example, as it becomes relevant later on.
Secondly, Sokal and Bricmont (quite deliberately) refuse to engage on certain topics, in particular on cultural or aesthetic relativism, which they say (without providing a reason) "raise very different issues". Take that star away, for this statement betrays a fundamental misunderstanding about relativism. Actually, ethical, aesthetic and cognitive relativisms raise different manifestations of *exactly* the same issue: Cognitive relativism, in that it relates to "epistemic" truth (as opposed to "moral" truth or "aesthetic" truth - both of which seem intuitively more questionable ideas) is simply a cut closer to the quick: indeed, the aesthetic and moral brands of relativism rely for their plausibility on cognitive relativism anyway (i.e. if the truths we understand about the physical universe are contingent on our language, then it follows that ideals of right and wrong and beauty must be similarly contingent on our language).
Thirdly, Sokal provides the following account of cognitive relativism:
"While scientists ... try to obtain an objective view ... of the world, relativist thinkers tell them that they are wasting their time and that such an enterprise is, in principle, an illusion"
Now that, to put it mildly, is a *very* punchy version of relativism, and not one that any credible relativist philosopher I know of (and certainly not Thomas Kuhn, who spent a whole book explaining how and why the process scientific discovery works) subscribes to.
That is, in the trade, known as a straw-man argument: You set it up to knock it over. Here goes:
P1: Relativists say science is a waste of time
P2: Science helps us reliably predict and react coherently to phenomena occurring in the world
P3: Things which help to predict and react to such phenomena have genuine utility
C1: Therefore, science has genuine utility
C2: Ergo, science is not a waste of time
Case closed. Is relativism dead? No: the problem is, most relativists I know would completely agree with all of the above argument except for premise 1. The cat is most definitely still out of the bag. (In a nutshell, all reasonably stated relativism says is that you can't know that your theory actually maps onto the actual configuration of the outside world; it may, it may not: logically there will always be some other possible explanation for the same set of data, however implausible or difficult to imagine, and in part that difficulty in imagination may be a function of the historical contingency of our belief in, and description of the world in terms of, the current "paradigm". Relativism simply says the best you can do is to know that, for now, your theory works, not that it is *true*. Though Sokal and Bricmont may disagree, I don't think this is controversial amongst philosophers nor, really, scientists.)
Lastly, in criticising an admittedly utterly ludicrous passage bestowed on the world by that splendidly silly feminist philosopher Julia Kristeva, Sokal makes the following footnote:
"...Kristeva seems to be appealing ... to the 'Sapir-Whorf thesis' in linguistics that is ...that our language radically conditions our view of the world. This thesis nowadays is sharply criticised by some linguists: see, for example Pinker ..."
Hold the phone. The implication is that the Sapir-Whorf thesis (as to the contingency of language) has been discredited, but by none other than Steven Pinker in his "The Language Instinct" which, as per the above, is at the very least a controversial piece of writing. This is an extremely important point, since it's utterly central to the credibility of the anti-relativist cause, and if one takes Geoffrey Sampson's book (cited above) at face value the nativist claims themselves are built on very suspect reasoning and scientific research. It seems to me (and to writers like Richard Rorty) that language must radically condition our view of the world, because that's the only basis on which we can even describe it.
At the end of the day, properly stated cognitive relativism is no a threat to modern scientific discourse, except that it relegates the scientist from "truth knower" or "person through whom you may have exclusive access to the truth" (sounds a bit like a grand high pooh-bah or - dare I say it - high priest, doesn't it?) to "person whose theory works the best for now" and who may be in competition for that status with other people in the community whether or not they're scientists.
If science *does* work better than feng shui or healing crystals (and I, for one, think it does) then this shouldn't be a particularly troubling way of looking at the world for a scientist who is at ease with his views and his value to the community. So it makes the knee-jerk reactions against relativism, from the likes of Sokal and elsewhere Richard Dawkins, all the more mystifying.
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LibraryThing member daschaich
An important message, but not enjoyable reading: In 1996, New York University physicist Alan Sokal wrote a paper, "Transgressing the Boundaries: Toward a Transformative Hermeneutics of Quantum Gravity", discussing how theories of quantum gravity prove that physical 'reality' is merely a social
"Fashionable Nonsense", coauthored by Sokal and Belgian physicist Jean Bricmont (originally published in French as "Impostures Intellectuelles" in 1997) is another product of the same research that prompted Sokal to perpetrate his hoax. Troubled in the mid-90s by reports of 'postmodern' intellectuals abusing scientific concepts in their work, Sokal did some research and found plenty of examples. A few were incorporated into his hoax, but there was not room for many of them there. To complement "Transgressing the Boundaries", Sokal and Bricmont compiled many of the most flagrant cases of scientific abuse into this volume, accompanied by clear explanations of what is wrong with the examples considered and how they are abusive.
The postmodern luminaries Sokal and Bricmont consider are Jacques Lacan, Julia Kristeva, Luce Irigaray, Bruno Latour, Jean Baudrillard, Gilles Deleuze, Felix Guattari and Paul Virilio. All are represented through lengthy extracts from their offending works. Many reviewers of this volume have claimed to find the nonsense spouted by these individuals inadvertently hilarious. I personally found it more depressing (and often painful) to read their twisted prose with at least a partially open mind. I couldn't bring myself to enjoy the book, though I recognize the service it does in battling obscurantism and abuse of scientific terminology. In addition there are three 'intermezzos': one on epistemic relativism in the philosophy of science that didn't overly impress me, as well as two more entertaining chapters on abuse and confusion related to chaos theory and Godel's theorem. Finally, "Fashionable Nonsense" includes Sokal's "Transgressing the Boundaries" and some related material in appendices.
As a second edition, Sokal and Bricmont have a valuable opportunity to clear up ambiguities and misunderstandings as well as address criticism of the original French "Impostures Intellectuelles". For instance, they are able to emphasize (repeatedly) that their purpose isn't to challenge postmodern philosophy as such, only "to denounce intellectual posturing and dishonesty" (16) as related to scientific concepts. In addition, they note that 'postmodernism' is not a strictly accurate term and is used in part "for convenience" (14) and refute accusations of being right-wing reactionary American intellectual imperialists (Sokal's leftist credentials include a pilgrimage to Nicaragua in the '80s to teach mathematics under the Sandinistas).
While the mid-90s furor over the 'science wars' seems to have died down, "Fashionable Nonsense" still performs a valuable service in exposing and debunking abuse of science, expanding the critique introduced by Sokal's hoax. Though I didn't find the book enjoyable reading, it effectively delivers an important message and constructive critique.
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construction and exploring the resulting progressive political implications and the need for a new "liberatory postmodern science" and mathematics. On the day it was published by the journal Social Text, Sokal revealed that it was nonsense: nothing more than "a melange of truths, half-truths, quarter-truths, falsehoods, non sequiturs, and syntactically correct sentences that have no meaning whatsoever", along with a large number of (regrettably accurate) fawning quotations of the editors of Social Text and other postmodern luminaries (268-269). How shocking."Fashionable Nonsense", coauthored by Sokal and Belgian physicist Jean Bricmont (originally published in French as "Impostures Intellectuelles" in 1997) is another product of the same research that prompted Sokal to perpetrate his hoax. Troubled in the mid-90s by reports of 'postmodern' intellectuals abusing scientific concepts in their work, Sokal did some research and found plenty of examples. A few were incorporated into his hoax, but there was not room for many of them there. To complement "Transgressing the Boundaries", Sokal and Bricmont compiled many of the most flagrant cases of scientific abuse into this volume, accompanied by clear explanations of what is wrong with the examples considered and how they are abusive.
The postmodern luminaries Sokal and Bricmont consider are Jacques Lacan, Julia Kristeva, Luce Irigaray, Bruno Latour, Jean Baudrillard, Gilles Deleuze, Felix Guattari and Paul Virilio. All are represented through lengthy extracts from their offending works. Many reviewers of this volume have claimed to find the nonsense spouted by these individuals inadvertently hilarious. I personally found it more depressing (and often painful) to read their twisted prose with at least a partially open mind. I couldn't bring myself to enjoy the book, though I recognize the service it does in battling obscurantism and abuse of scientific terminology. In addition there are three 'intermezzos': one on epistemic relativism in the philosophy of science that didn't overly impress me, as well as two more entertaining chapters on abuse and confusion related to chaos theory and Godel's theorem. Finally, "Fashionable Nonsense" includes Sokal's "Transgressing the Boundaries" and some related material in appendices.
As a second edition, Sokal and Bricmont have a valuable opportunity to clear up ambiguities and misunderstandings as well as address criticism of the original French "Impostures Intellectuelles". For instance, they are able to emphasize (repeatedly) that their purpose isn't to challenge postmodern philosophy as such, only "to denounce intellectual posturing and dishonesty" (16) as related to scientific concepts. In addition, they note that 'postmodernism' is not a strictly accurate term and is used in part "for convenience" (14) and refute accusations of being right-wing reactionary American intellectual imperialists (Sokal's leftist credentials include a pilgrimage to Nicaragua in the '80s to teach mathematics under the Sandinistas).
While the mid-90s furor over the 'science wars' seems to have died down, "Fashionable Nonsense" still performs a valuable service in exposing and debunking abuse of science, expanding the critique introduced by Sokal's hoax. Though I didn't find the book enjoyable reading, it effectively delivers an important message and constructive critique.
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LibraryThing member M.Campanella
...
Not to far after telling someone what it was I studied, they will ultimately bring up 'that guy who debunked post-modern philosophy by publishing a hoax article...'.
It gets a bit silly very quickly. Mostly because these people have very little idea; of the claims of post-modern philosophy; of
The quick points are this; the book is very accessible and the arguments are clear and well-reasoned.
But there are very many finer points to go over as well. The most important of which is that this book does very little to dismantle, or for that matter even attack, post-modern philosophy. BY analogy, were there a person who used a scientifically accurate (or inaccurate, as it were) narrative to argue for eugenics, would you take a rebuttal towards that as an attack biology as a discipline? Lacan, Kristeva, and Deleuze are not the culmination of philosophy, nor are they very representative of it. So much as Sokal applies a razor to their poor use of science, there is little lost and much gained.
And we should note that no one in this text is suggesting to let the baby slip down the drain, but merely pointing out that some of this bathwater has gotten rather murky.
Again, I liked this book. I think it should be required reading in the humanities. I have read enough of the author mentioned in it to know that they often do put forth some nonsense. But I recognize that no one can get everything right. Hell, even Sokal and Bricmont get somethings wrong - in this very text.
Not to far after telling someone what it was I studied, they will ultimately bring up 'that guy who debunked post-modern philosophy by publishing a hoax article...'.
It gets a bit silly very quickly. Mostly because these people have very little idea; of the claims of post-modern philosophy; of
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who specifically is debunked in this book and why; that publishing a hoax article does little more than prove the journals lack of credibility (a point Sokal himself emphasizes in this book); or for that matter the possibility of debunking an entire branch of anything. The people who cite this book (lauding or detracting) have likely never read it, something that can be proven with a quick glance at the Amazon reviews. This is something of a shame, as this book should certainly be required reading, particularly in the humanities departments that do their best to keep their heads in the sand about it.The quick points are this; the book is very accessible and the arguments are clear and well-reasoned.
But there are very many finer points to go over as well. The most important of which is that this book does very little to dismantle, or for that matter even attack, post-modern philosophy. BY analogy, were there a person who used a scientifically accurate (or inaccurate, as it were) narrative to argue for eugenics, would you take a rebuttal towards that as an attack biology as a discipline? Lacan, Kristeva, and Deleuze are not the culmination of philosophy, nor are they very representative of it. So much as Sokal applies a razor to their poor use of science, there is little lost and much gained.
And we should note that no one in this text is suggesting to let the baby slip down the drain, but merely pointing out that some of this bathwater has gotten rather murky.
Again, I liked this book. I think it should be required reading in the humanities. I have read enough of the author mentioned in it to know that they often do put forth some nonsense. But I recognize that no one can get everything right. Hell, even Sokal and Bricmont get somethings wrong - in this very text.
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LibraryThing member gregtmills
I'm not one to tangle with pomos, poststructuralists, and semioticians. Listen politely, aim for the gentleman's C, and move on. In their minds, something, somewhere is being fed that rings the dinnerbell for them. Good for them. (And Foucault and Eco really are top notch thinkers)
However, I am a
So if your expecting a thorough thrashing of postmodern theory, this aint it. But, if you are looking for a tale of a pin for pomposity, this should do.
However, I am a
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sucker for reading about cons, and Sokal smacked down a good one. What is priceless about this book for me was the reportage on the actual con, vs the laundry list attack on the Academes that frankly reads more like the incomplete notes for a potentially interesting critique of retarded pomo blather. The response from the aggrieved magazine editors (granted it's filtered through Sokal)is so wounded and whiney and LAME that you wonder just how much real dog eat dog interaction these folks put their poor cloistered lily necks out for. They must go through a lot of tissue at those MLA conventions!So if your expecting a thorough thrashing of postmodern theory, this aint it. But, if you are looking for a tale of a pin for pomposity, this should do.
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LibraryThing member jorgearanda
This is a necessary book that exposes the gibberish of many prominent postmodern philosophers. Its case is clear, and I am glad Sokal and Bricmont went through the trouble of wading through their literature to build such a solid argument. Their arguments on epistemologists (Kuhn and Feyerabend) are
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far weaker, though. Show Less
LibraryThing member ecw0647
In 1996, Alan Sokal submitted an article to Social Text entitled "Transgressing the Boundaries: Toward a Transformative Hermeneutics of Quantum Gravity." If that title means little to you, that's OK because the article was, in fact, nonsense. It was part of an elaborate hoax and parody that Sokal
This philosophy is particularly endemic to modern French philosophers who have attempted to appropriate the language of science in order to validate some of their thinking without understanding the science itself. Sokal, a renowned physicist, by filling his article with scientific balderdash and liberally citing the editors of Social Text (David Lodge's Law of Academic Life says "It is impossible to be excessive in flattery of one's peers.") had his article gleefully accepted, revealing the ignorance and vacuity of the pseudo-thinkers.
Fashionable Nonsense expands the revelations behind the parody and thoroughly reveals the emperor's nakedness. The authors, by analysis of several postmodernist French philosophers, show how they misuse, misrepresent, and misunderstand basic science. Sokal and Bricmont disclose how "deliberately obscure language" is used to hide confused thinking, that often if something is difficult to understand in the writings of these philosophers it's because they aren't saying anything.
Postmodernism, a trend fashionable in some social science and humanist circles, adopts the view that rejects the rationalism of the enlightenment and proposes that science is a "social construction" or "narration" and that there is no need to look for empirical evidence.
Unfortunately, much of postmodernist "thinking" has become associated with the left, a linkage Sokal abhors. He wants to defend the Left from a trendy segment of itself. As Michael Albert, wrote for Z Magazine, "There is nothing truthful, wise, human, or strategic about confusing hostility with injustice and oppression, which is leftist, with hostility to science and rationality, which is nonsense."
A follow-up article, published as an appendix to the book, was submitted to Social Text but was rejected as not meeting their intellectual standards! It must have been understandable and made sense. In it Sokal wrote, "I confess that I am an unabashed Old Leftist who never quite understood how deconstruction was supposed to help the working class. And I'm a stodgy old scientist who believes, naively, that there exists an external world, that there exist objective truths about that world, and that my job is to discover some of them."
This book is a delightful attack on intellectual confusion and a ringing call to obfuscate obfuscation.
reposted with minor editing 1/15/10
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was perpetrating on those who subscribe to "epistemic relativism," i.e., the belief that modern science is nothing more than myth, a "social construction." This philosophy is particularly endemic to modern French philosophers who have attempted to appropriate the language of science in order to validate some of their thinking without understanding the science itself. Sokal, a renowned physicist, by filling his article with scientific balderdash and liberally citing the editors of Social Text (David Lodge's Law of Academic Life says "It is impossible to be excessive in flattery of one's peers.") had his article gleefully accepted, revealing the ignorance and vacuity of the pseudo-thinkers.
Fashionable Nonsense expands the revelations behind the parody and thoroughly reveals the emperor's nakedness. The authors, by analysis of several postmodernist French philosophers, show how they misuse, misrepresent, and misunderstand basic science. Sokal and Bricmont disclose how "deliberately obscure language" is used to hide confused thinking, that often if something is difficult to understand in the writings of these philosophers it's because they aren't saying anything.
Postmodernism, a trend fashionable in some social science and humanist circles, adopts the view that rejects the rationalism of the enlightenment and proposes that science is a "social construction" or "narration" and that there is no need to look for empirical evidence.
Unfortunately, much of postmodernist "thinking" has become associated with the left, a linkage Sokal abhors. He wants to defend the Left from a trendy segment of itself. As Michael Albert, wrote for Z Magazine, "There is nothing truthful, wise, human, or strategic about confusing hostility with injustice and oppression, which is leftist, with hostility to science and rationality, which is nonsense."
A follow-up article, published as an appendix to the book, was submitted to Social Text but was rejected as not meeting their intellectual standards! It must have been understandable and made sense. In it Sokal wrote, "I confess that I am an unabashed Old Leftist who never quite understood how deconstruction was supposed to help the working class. And I'm a stodgy old scientist who believes, naively, that there exists an external world, that there exist objective truths about that world, and that my job is to discover some of them."
This book is a delightful attack on intellectual confusion and a ringing call to obfuscate obfuscation.
reposted with minor editing 1/15/10
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LibraryThing member Devil_llama
This book is a detailed description of the Sokal hoax, where the author submitted a paper made up of nonsense clauses and specious reasoning to a journal of social theory. It was accepted and printed; the author later published an article explaining it was a hoax designed to reveal the intellectual
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bankruptcy of parts of the academic world. In here, he and his co-author explain the hoax and discuss the problems with post-modernism and anti-intellectualism. It's a very good work, though the passages they cite from post-modernists authors are in many cases almost totally unreadable. The book is a little technical for lay readers. Show Less
LibraryThing member jpporter
In 1996 Alan Sokal (a physicist) published "Transgressing the Boundaries: Toward a Transformative Hermeneutics of Quantum Gravity" in the journal Social Text. The article took the rather novel position that reality (i.e. the external world) was a construct of society. The article (which is
Fashionable Nonsense is the English adaptation of an earlier book by Sokal and Bricmont (same title, written in French) that was produced after a conference in France that was extremely critical of Sokal (it doesn't help that most of the writers skewered by Sokal were French). The book presents extended discussions of the writers Sokal "abuses," expanding on the ideas these writers developed that actually showed that (a) they didn't really understand the scientific theories they were attempting to use; (b) they misapplied - either intentionally or unintentionally - scientific theories to social concepts; (c) they were trying to obfuscate the fact that they had nothing to offer behind a smoke screen of intellectual/scientific verbiage; and/or (d) they were simply leaching some legitimization for their own ideas from established science.
None of it very honorable stuff.
That Sokal was able to get his original article published in a major journal is itself proof that a serious problem exists in the humanities and social science. That people continued to challenge him even after he had explained his case and proved it shows the extent to which some in the humanities are desperate to find some kind of footing on terra firma - no matter how tenuous or ill-conceived the effort may be.
A must read for any academic.
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reproduced in this book) was intended as a parody of contemporary social and humanitarian scholarship - particularly the attempts by some theorists to claim that modern science (physics, in particular) proved social and cultural theories. Sokal's article is replete with citations from postmodernists and social constructionists tying science to humanities.Fashionable Nonsense is the English adaptation of an earlier book by Sokal and Bricmont (same title, written in French) that was produced after a conference in France that was extremely critical of Sokal (it doesn't help that most of the writers skewered by Sokal were French). The book presents extended discussions of the writers Sokal "abuses," expanding on the ideas these writers developed that actually showed that (a) they didn't really understand the scientific theories they were attempting to use; (b) they misapplied - either intentionally or unintentionally - scientific theories to social concepts; (c) they were trying to obfuscate the fact that they had nothing to offer behind a smoke screen of intellectual/scientific verbiage; and/or (d) they were simply leaching some legitimization for their own ideas from established science.
None of it very honorable stuff.
That Sokal was able to get his original article published in a major journal is itself proof that a serious problem exists in the humanities and social science. That people continued to challenge him even after he had explained his case and proved it shows the extent to which some in the humanities are desperate to find some kind of footing on terra firma - no matter how tenuous or ill-conceived the effort may be.
A must read for any academic.
Show Less
LibraryThing member Razinha
I can really appreciate what Sokal and Bricmont did here because I tore down Robert Anton Wilson's Quantum Psychology and that was a burdensome task. Authors of pseudoscientific nonsense seem to say whatever they want with no responsibility and the sheep fans and unsuspecting other readers don't
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know any different. And real scientists don't have the time to debunk every paper/book in which someone conscripts physical sciences for fuzzy, obfuscating purposes...nor should they have to. Show Less
LibraryThing member cpg
Battle vs. Nonsense Makes Strange Bedfellows
My political and social views are very, very different from Sokal's and Bricmont's (and I really don't care how much postmodernism damages the Left), but I have to appreciate their attempt to call on the carpet those who have misappropriated the
The lengthy quotes from French intellectuals that Sokal and Bricmont present in their book remind me of a weird combination of Mad Libs, the nonsense-talking inmate Damon Wayans played on "In Living Color", and a Babelfish translation attempt gone awry. (But, of course, translators can't be blamed for the nutty things these French(wo)men say, because their words apparently don't make any more sense in the original. _Fashionable Nonsense_ itself was originally published in France as _Impostures Intellectuelles_.) If my math students wrote like this, I'd probably not only fail them but also arrange for them to receive psychiatric treatment.
Why only 4 stars? While the book starts out fun, after a couple hundred pages it gets a little bit tiresome. You only have to read so many page-long excerpts of gibberish followed by commentary on the order of "Well, that didn't make any sense" to get the point. Sokal and Bricmont's attempt to be patient, fair, and scholarly is understandable and laudable, but I have to say I that I found myself longing for the poison-pen approach that Norman Levitt took in _Prometheus Bedeviled_.
My political and social views are very, very different from Sokal's and Bricmont's (and I really don't care how much postmodernism damages the Left), but I have to appreciate their attempt to call on the carpet those who have misappropriated the
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terminology, ideas, and results of math and physics in their work.The lengthy quotes from French intellectuals that Sokal and Bricmont present in their book remind me of a weird combination of Mad Libs, the nonsense-talking inmate Damon Wayans played on "In Living Color", and a Babelfish translation attempt gone awry. (But, of course, translators can't be blamed for the nutty things these French(wo)men say, because their words apparently don't make any more sense in the original. _Fashionable Nonsense_ itself was originally published in France as _Impostures Intellectuelles_.) If my math students wrote like this, I'd probably not only fail them but also arrange for them to receive psychiatric treatment.
Why only 4 stars? While the book starts out fun, after a couple hundred pages it gets a little bit tiresome. You only have to read so many page-long excerpts of gibberish followed by commentary on the order of "Well, that didn't make any sense" to get the point. Sokal and Bricmont's attempt to be patient, fair, and scholarly is understandable and laudable, but I have to say I that I found myself longing for the poison-pen approach that Norman Levitt took in _Prometheus Bedeviled_.
Show Less
Subjects
Language
Original language
French
Original publication date
1997
Physical description
288 p.; 5.47 inches
ISBN
1861970749 / 9781861970749