Status
Available
Call number
Library's review
Indeholder kapitlerne "A Rigid System", "To the Chernobyl Sarcophagus", "Moscow Does Not Believe in Tears", "A Hierarchy of Vassals and Chiefs", "Apes on a Treadmill", ""The Bomber Will Always Get Through" (I)", ""The Bomber Will Always Get Through" (II)", "The Sorcerer's Apprentices (I)", "The
Bogen starter med en rædselsvækkende gennemgang af Tjernobyl-ulykken og beretter om helikopterbesætninger, der flyver ind over den nøgne reaktorkerne og dumper sandsække. Låget - kaldet pyatachok, eller en russisk femøre - på 1000 tons er blæst halvt af - og der er fri adgang til den brændende kerne. Brrr. Tjernobyl er en følge af at al sovjetisk infrastruktur var underlagt militæret, så for at kunne tappe plutonium ud af brændselsstavene lettest muligt var der huller i indkapslingen.
Derefter får vi en beskrivelse af Gorbatjev og historien om rustningskapløb og senere nedrustning.
Åbning af arkiverne viste at der var 62 russiske kernevåben på og i nærheden af Cuba. Kennedy gjorde klogt i ikke at optrappe konflikten til krig.
Poitikerne lavede en kategorifejl: "what philosophy calls a category mistake, an assumption that nuclear explosives are military weapons in any meaningful sense of the term, and that [therefore] a sufficient quantity of such weapons can make us secure."
Så jo flere og jo større våben, jo større sikkerhed?
Temaet er at der altid slipper en bombemaskine eller et missil igennem. Fx har USA i 1954 en plan for bombning af Soviet, så der kun er en rygende radioaktiv samling af ruiner tilbage efter 2 timer. I 1960 var USA's arsenal på 18638 bomber og sprænghoveder og 20500 megatons. Problemet var simpelthen at koordinere et angreb. Planen var at bombe både Kina og Soviet, nu man var i gang. Også selv hvis Kina slet ikke var involveret i krigen. Desuden talte man kun sprængkraften med i beregninger af ødelæggelser, hvilket var absurd, for brande forstærker effekten. Man lavede lister over mål, men det var som at slå et søm i med et meteor. Udenom målet ville alt andet også blive ødelagt. Fx var der nok 400 bomber reserveret til Moskva.
Under Cuba-krisen kunne Soviet skyde ca 270 bomber afsted mod USA, mens USA havde tusindvis.
Sovjet forsøger at følge med, men højrefløjen i USA maler et skræmmebillede op om at det er Sovjet, der er foran. Cheney, Rumsfeld og Perle. SS-20, Carter og Reagan. Pershing-2 og krydsermissiler. Helt tilbage i 1966 er der overvejelser over Sovjets økonomiske svagheder. Andrei Sakharov advarer i 1970 Brezhnev om fx forskellen i brug af computere. Han understreger også at det er et problem med styreformen. Problemet kan ikke løses fra toppen.
USA videreudvikler sine atomvåben, fx W85 dial-a-yield med fra 0.3 til 45 kiloton sprængkraft. Oven i kom en misforståelse fra Carter til Reagan administrationen, som ad vanvare gav et vanvittigt højt militærbudget. Reagans ide var også at bruge pengene på militæret for at tvinge størrelsen på resten af budgettet ned.
Russisk militær har det fint med at blive kaldt "Evil Empire" for de får lov at bruge mange penge på øvelser.
Reagan giver militæret lov til at provokere russerne og indirekte bliver det skyld i at russerne skyder KE007 ned. Russerne er heller ikke begejstrede for KE007 var i russisk luftrum meget længe uden at luftforsvaret lagde mærke til det. USA invaderer Grenada. 2-11 november 1983 kører NATO øvelsen Able Archer.
Russerne er med god grund nervøse over den.
Den 20. november 1983 ser Reagan filmen "The Day After", hvor Lawrence, Kansas bliver ramt af et russisk missil og udslettet. Faktisk er filmen underspillet, for i virkeligheden ville byen være helt væk. Reagan havde med nød og næppe overlevet et attentat i foråret 1981 og mente at Gud havde sparet ham, så han kunne gøre noget ved a-våbenproblemet. Reagan har en ide om at Armageddon er en krig på a-våben og vil bygge et skjold.
I november 1990 slutter den kolde krig reelt med underskriften af Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty. Reagan og Gorbatjov mødes. Gorbatjovs første indtryk er at han har mødt en hulemand. Reagan tror på SDI og på at det bare er et fredeligt skjold.
28 januar 1986 eksploderer rumfærgen Challenger og 26 april eksploderer Tjernobyl-værket. Gorbatjov kan fint se at Tjernobyl er en lille nem kæmpekatastrofe sammenlignet med bare nogle få a-våbensprængning. Reagan og Gorbatjov mødes i Island for at sætte skub i nedrustningen for de kan se at der ellers intet sker. Reykjavik strander på SDI, som Reagan ikke vil aflive, men alligevel er det starten på noget stort.
Både Rusland og USA skærer ned på kernevåben og konventionelle våben uden at vente på den anden part. Et august-1991 kup venter på Gorbatjov.
I den sidste ende er det Boris Yeltsin, der sidder med den lille kuffert med koderne. Både Sovjet og USA har brugt milliarder på våben, de aldrig kan bruge.
Glimrende bog, men med langt større vægt på politik end på teknik.
Show More
Sorcerer's Apprentices (II)", "Decapitation", "Rehearsing Armageddon", "The Warheads Will Always Get Through", "Common Security", "Going Around in Circles", "Naysayers Hard at Work", "Looking Over the Horizon", "The Sovereign Right to Choose", "The Little Suitcase", "Notes", "Bibliography", "Acknowledgments", "Permissions Acknowledgments", "Index".Bogen starter med en rædselsvækkende gennemgang af Tjernobyl-ulykken og beretter om helikopterbesætninger, der flyver ind over den nøgne reaktorkerne og dumper sandsække. Låget - kaldet pyatachok, eller en russisk femøre - på 1000 tons er blæst halvt af - og der er fri adgang til den brændende kerne. Brrr. Tjernobyl er en følge af at al sovjetisk infrastruktur var underlagt militæret, så for at kunne tappe plutonium ud af brændselsstavene lettest muligt var der huller i indkapslingen.
Derefter får vi en beskrivelse af Gorbatjev og historien om rustningskapløb og senere nedrustning.
Åbning af arkiverne viste at der var 62 russiske kernevåben på og i nærheden af Cuba. Kennedy gjorde klogt i ikke at optrappe konflikten til krig.
Poitikerne lavede en kategorifejl: "what philosophy calls a category mistake, an assumption that nuclear explosives are military weapons in any meaningful sense of the term, and that [therefore] a sufficient quantity of such weapons can make us secure."
Så jo flere og jo større våben, jo større sikkerhed?
Temaet er at der altid slipper en bombemaskine eller et missil igennem. Fx har USA i 1954 en plan for bombning af Soviet, så der kun er en rygende radioaktiv samling af ruiner tilbage efter 2 timer. I 1960 var USA's arsenal på 18638 bomber og sprænghoveder og 20500 megatons. Problemet var simpelthen at koordinere et angreb. Planen var at bombe både Kina og Soviet, nu man var i gang. Også selv hvis Kina slet ikke var involveret i krigen. Desuden talte man kun sprængkraften med i beregninger af ødelæggelser, hvilket var absurd, for brande forstærker effekten. Man lavede lister over mål, men det var som at slå et søm i med et meteor. Udenom målet ville alt andet også blive ødelagt. Fx var der nok 400 bomber reserveret til Moskva.
Under Cuba-krisen kunne Soviet skyde ca 270 bomber afsted mod USA, mens USA havde tusindvis.
Sovjet forsøger at følge med, men højrefløjen i USA maler et skræmmebillede op om at det er Sovjet, der er foran. Cheney, Rumsfeld og Perle. SS-20, Carter og Reagan. Pershing-2 og krydsermissiler. Helt tilbage i 1966 er der overvejelser over Sovjets økonomiske svagheder. Andrei Sakharov advarer i 1970 Brezhnev om fx forskellen i brug af computere. Han understreger også at det er et problem med styreformen. Problemet kan ikke løses fra toppen.
USA videreudvikler sine atomvåben, fx W85 dial-a-yield med fra 0.3 til 45 kiloton sprængkraft. Oven i kom en misforståelse fra Carter til Reagan administrationen, som ad vanvare gav et vanvittigt højt militærbudget. Reagans ide var også at bruge pengene på militæret for at tvinge størrelsen på resten af budgettet ned.
Russisk militær har det fint med at blive kaldt "Evil Empire" for de får lov at bruge mange penge på øvelser.
Reagan giver militæret lov til at provokere russerne og indirekte bliver det skyld i at russerne skyder KE007 ned. Russerne er heller ikke begejstrede for KE007 var i russisk luftrum meget længe uden at luftforsvaret lagde mærke til det. USA invaderer Grenada. 2-11 november 1983 kører NATO øvelsen Able Archer.
Russerne er med god grund nervøse over den.
Den 20. november 1983 ser Reagan filmen "The Day After", hvor Lawrence, Kansas bliver ramt af et russisk missil og udslettet. Faktisk er filmen underspillet, for i virkeligheden ville byen være helt væk. Reagan havde med nød og næppe overlevet et attentat i foråret 1981 og mente at Gud havde sparet ham, så han kunne gøre noget ved a-våbenproblemet. Reagan har en ide om at Armageddon er en krig på a-våben og vil bygge et skjold.
I november 1990 slutter den kolde krig reelt med underskriften af Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty. Reagan og Gorbatjov mødes. Gorbatjovs første indtryk er at han har mødt en hulemand. Reagan tror på SDI og på at det bare er et fredeligt skjold.
28 januar 1986 eksploderer rumfærgen Challenger og 26 april eksploderer Tjernobyl-værket. Gorbatjov kan fint se at Tjernobyl er en lille nem kæmpekatastrofe sammenlignet med bare nogle få a-våbensprængning. Reagan og Gorbatjov mødes i Island for at sætte skub i nedrustningen for de kan se at der ellers intet sker. Reykjavik strander på SDI, som Reagan ikke vil aflive, men alligevel er det starten på noget stort.
Både Rusland og USA skærer ned på kernevåben og konventionelle våben uden at vente på den anden part. Et august-1991 kup venter på Gorbatjov.
I den sidste ende er det Boris Yeltsin, der sidder med den lille kuffert med koderne. Både Sovjet og USA har brugt milliarder på våben, de aldrig kan bruge.
Glimrende bog, men med langt større vægt på politik end på teknik.
Show Less
Publication
New York : Alfred A. Knopf, 2007.
Description
The story of the postwar superpower arms race, climaxing during the Reagan-Gorbachev decade. Drawing on a wealth of new documentation, Rhodes reveals how the Reagan administration's unprecedented arms buildup in the early 1980s led Soviet leader Andropov to conclude that Reagan must be preparing for a nuclear war. In 1983, when NATO staged a large series of field exercises, the Soviets came very close to launching a defensive first strike. Then Reagan launched the arms-reduction campaign of his second presidential term and set the stage for his 1986 summit with Gorbachev in Reykjavik. Rhodes also reveals the early influence of neoconservatives, demonstrating how the manipulation of government and public opinion with fake intelligence and threat inflation, which the administration of George W. Bush has used to justify current policies, were developed and applied in the Reagan era and even before.--From publisher description.… (more)
User reviews
LibraryThing member nbmars
Beginning with a gripping blow-by-blow account of the Chernobyl accident, Rhodes explores the nuclear arms race from 1986 through the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 in this important and thought-provoking book. He demonstrates that throughout the entire Cold War period, the U.S. had
What accounts from this divergence of fact and policy? One astute observation by Rhodes is that military leaders made “what philosophy calls a category mistake, an assumption that nuclear explosives are military weapons in any meaningful sense of the term, and that [therefore] a sufficient quantity of such weapons can make us secure.”
Political concerns also have played a large role in nuclear arms accumulation. Rhodes points out that the Regan administration sponsored “the largest peacetime buildup in American history.” Rhodes suggests that some of the motivation was “to starve the beast of government domestic spending, part of the conservative Republican agenda.” In addition, advisors to Reagan, Ford, and Bush such as Richard Perle, Don Rumsfeld, Dick Cheney, and Paul Wolfowitz blatantly twisted intelligence to conform to a bias that was anti-Soviet and pro-military-industrial complex. Particularly in the case of Reagan, advisors had more freedom for manuipulation given a president who could not speak coherently without cue cards.
One riveting section of the book describes a very close call to nuclear war between the U.S. and the Soviet Union that took place in November 1983. “That,” Rhodes charges, “was the return on the neoconservatives’ long, cynical, and radically partisan investment in threat inflation and arms-race escalation.”
A continuing thread in the book is the intelligence, courage, and perseverance of Mikhail Gorbachev. Not only did he have to overcome the ossification of the Soviet system to effect perestroika, but the resistance of U.S. hardliners as well.
How wonderful and appropriate that Rhodes ends his book with a quote from Robert Oppenheimer, whose opposition to a nuclear arms build-up cost him his career. Oppenheimer observed presciently in 1953, “We may anticipate a state of affairs in which two Great Powers will each be in a position to put an end to the civilization and life of the other, though not without risking its own. We may be likened to two scorpions in a bottle, each capable of killing the other, but only at the risk of his own life.” As Rhodes charges, the U.S. chose “to distend ourselves into the largest scorpion in the bottle.” And now we continue, he laments, “to claim an old and derelict sovereignty that the weapons themselves deny.” In fact, a recent article in Slate (“A Real Nuclear Option for the Nominees,” by Ron Rosenbaum, posted May 9, 2008) describes more recent “near misses” between U.S. and Russian nuclear-capable bombers. Read this book, and vote the military cabal out of office!
(JAF)
Show More
superior numbers of strategic nuclear bombs and warheads. The U.S. political debates that conjured the threat and fear of Soviet first-strike capabilities were “as divorced from reality as the debates of medieval scholars about the characteristics of seraphim and cherubim.”What accounts from this divergence of fact and policy? One astute observation by Rhodes is that military leaders made “what philosophy calls a category mistake, an assumption that nuclear explosives are military weapons in any meaningful sense of the term, and that [therefore] a sufficient quantity of such weapons can make us secure.”
Political concerns also have played a large role in nuclear arms accumulation. Rhodes points out that the Regan administration sponsored “the largest peacetime buildup in American history.” Rhodes suggests that some of the motivation was “to starve the beast of government domestic spending, part of the conservative Republican agenda.” In addition, advisors to Reagan, Ford, and Bush such as Richard Perle, Don Rumsfeld, Dick Cheney, and Paul Wolfowitz blatantly twisted intelligence to conform to a bias that was anti-Soviet and pro-military-industrial complex. Particularly in the case of Reagan, advisors had more freedom for manuipulation given a president who could not speak coherently without cue cards.
One riveting section of the book describes a very close call to nuclear war between the U.S. and the Soviet Union that took place in November 1983. “That,” Rhodes charges, “was the return on the neoconservatives’ long, cynical, and radically partisan investment in threat inflation and arms-race escalation.”
A continuing thread in the book is the intelligence, courage, and perseverance of Mikhail Gorbachev. Not only did he have to overcome the ossification of the Soviet system to effect perestroika, but the resistance of U.S. hardliners as well.
How wonderful and appropriate that Rhodes ends his book with a quote from Robert Oppenheimer, whose opposition to a nuclear arms build-up cost him his career. Oppenheimer observed presciently in 1953, “We may anticipate a state of affairs in which two Great Powers will each be in a position to put an end to the civilization and life of the other, though not without risking its own. We may be likened to two scorpions in a bottle, each capable of killing the other, but only at the risk of his own life.” As Rhodes charges, the U.S. chose “to distend ourselves into the largest scorpion in the bottle.” And now we continue, he laments, “to claim an old and derelict sovereignty that the weapons themselves deny.” In fact, a recent article in Slate (“A Real Nuclear Option for the Nominees,” by Ron Rosenbaum, posted May 9, 2008) describes more recent “near misses” between U.S. and Russian nuclear-capable bombers. Read this book, and vote the military cabal out of office!
(JAF)
Show Less
LibraryThing member kmcripn
This was an incredible work! What really struck me was how much more culpable the US is in the area of creating obstacles to peace. Another factor that surprised me was how Perle, Wolfowitz, and Cheney have always worked for world domination and not just their more visible role.
LibraryThing member drneutron
There's been a lot of books out about the history of the Cold War and the nuclear arms race written from many points of view. Many are written out of a particular agenda or with an eye to protecting (or improving) the reputations of actual participants. Arsenals of Folly is a pretty even-handed
Rhodes begins with a detailed description of the Chernobyl incident, which first shows just how devastating even a small nuclear exchange could be and then is used to highlight Gorbachev's (and others') motivations for nuclear disarmament. This approach really works well, and captures the reader right away. From this discussion, he moves to the early days after World War II and specifically Mikhail Gorbachev's biography to show where Gorbachev's desire for change came from. The last third or so of the book details nuclear arms limitations talks in the late Reagan years, followed by the dissolution of the Soviet Union in the G. H. W. Bush presidency.
Through all this discussion, it becomes pretty clear that there were parties on both sides of the conflict that, for various reasons, didn't want arms reduction and were willing to do some pretty immoral things to keep it from happening. Gorbachev really shines in Rhodes' work as the one with the real vision to change the world, and in many ways, the US did itself and the world a disservice by not trusting him when the time came. The one weakness in Rhodes' research is that he doesn't give enough consideration to the uncertainty of our knowledge of the situation. It's pretty easy to see, now that the whole story's out on the table, what the right path was. It's a whole different problem trying to figure that out in the middle of events. This bias shows in Rhodes' choice not to include non-nuclear areas of conflict in the discussion. Decision-makers at the time on both sides had to consider all events, not just a limited set related to nuclear arms, when developing policy. In spite my concern, Arsenals of Folly is well worth reading, and we can learn an awful lot from Rhodes work.
Show More
history from the early days of the Cold War to the breakup of the Soviet Union. Richard Rhodes has gone back to the original records and interviews with participants to set out the history from both sides of the conflict using an approach that lets us readers get into the heads of both US and Soviet leaders.Rhodes begins with a detailed description of the Chernobyl incident, which first shows just how devastating even a small nuclear exchange could be and then is used to highlight Gorbachev's (and others') motivations for nuclear disarmament. This approach really works well, and captures the reader right away. From this discussion, he moves to the early days after World War II and specifically Mikhail Gorbachev's biography to show where Gorbachev's desire for change came from. The last third or so of the book details nuclear arms limitations talks in the late Reagan years, followed by the dissolution of the Soviet Union in the G. H. W. Bush presidency.
Through all this discussion, it becomes pretty clear that there were parties on both sides of the conflict that, for various reasons, didn't want arms reduction and were willing to do some pretty immoral things to keep it from happening. Gorbachev really shines in Rhodes' work as the one with the real vision to change the world, and in many ways, the US did itself and the world a disservice by not trusting him when the time came. The one weakness in Rhodes' research is that he doesn't give enough consideration to the uncertainty of our knowledge of the situation. It's pretty easy to see, now that the whole story's out on the table, what the right path was. It's a whole different problem trying to figure that out in the middle of events. This bias shows in Rhodes' choice not to include non-nuclear areas of conflict in the discussion. Decision-makers at the time on both sides had to consider all events, not just a limited set related to nuclear arms, when developing policy. In spite my concern, Arsenals of Folly is well worth reading, and we can learn an awful lot from Rhodes work.
Show Less
LibraryThing member mrkurtz
Richard Rhodes completes his trilogy with this history of the nuclear arms race, after writing The Making of the Atomic Bomb and Dark Sun: The Making of the Hydrogen Bomb. This third nonfiction work is not quite the engrossing drama of the first two. The first chapter is a great essay of the
Show More
nuclear power plant eruption at Chernobel, Ukraine in 1986. The accident was caused by operator errors, running a test while the unit was producing full power, the lack of a containment vessel encasing the nuclear fission generator and the wholesale mismanagement of the power plant once the accident occurred. At this point the tale slows down considerably with a biography of Gorbachev and additional background of the Russian leaders and American Presidents that were at the center of the strategies for escalating the multitude of nuclear weapons by each power. Show Less
LibraryThing member nmele
This is one of the best histories I have read in a very long time. Rhodes uses nuclear weapons policy as the lens through which he views the Cold War. His discussion of Gorbachev is quite interesting and well done, but his detailed account of how Gorbachev and Reagan negotiated the INF and START
Show More
reductions is simply amazing in its detail and clarity. This is a must read book, especially for those too young to remember what it was like to live with the threat of nuclear annihilation. Show Less
LibraryThing member JonathanCrites
I really enjoyed this history of the Arms Race (albeit focusing on the end of it, particularly on Gorbachev) and would definitely recommend it. The author makes the reader consider what it all was worth - to put the world on the brink of destruction for so long at such a great cost.
Subjects
Awards
The Economist Best Books (2007.10)
Publishers Weekly's Best Books of the Year (Nonfiction — 2007)
The New York Times Notable Books of the Year (Nonfiction — 2007)
San Francisco Chronicle Best Book of the Year (History — 2007)
Language
Original language
English
Original publication date
2007-10
Physical description
386 p.; 25 cm
ISBN
9780375414138
Local notes
Omslag: Ikke angivet
Omslaget viser soldater, der dukker sig i forventning om en atomprøvesprængning i atmosfæren
Indskannet omslag - N650U - 150 dpi
The Making of the Nuclear Age, bind 3
Side -3: Reality is that which, when you don't believe in it, doesn't go away. - Peter Viereck
Side 1: What happened in this country was that a rigid system was created, and then life was herded into it. - Mikhail Gorbachev
Side 79: The Atomic Energy Commission's eight sites and 55000 employees in 1950 expanded to twenty sites and 142000 employees by 1953, and the expansion continued. By the mid-1950's, the nuclear production complex consumed 6.7 percent of total U.S. electrical power and exceeded in capital investment the combined capitalization of Bethlehel Steel, U.S. Steel, Alcoa, DuPont, Goodyear and General Motors.
Side 80: The war of the future would be one in which man could extinguish millions of lives at one blow, demolish the great cities of the world, wipe out the cultural achievements of the past - and destroy the very structure of a civilization that has been slowly and painfully built up through hundreds of generations. Such a war is not a possible policy for rational men.
Side 98: Have you applied your procedures to Hiroshima. Yes, 3 DGZs of 80 KT each.
Side 101: You can't have this kind of war. There just aren't enough bulldozers to scrape the bodies off the streets.
Side 167: Reagan was surprised and shocked that the Soviets had taken his years of militant rhetoric and his massive arms buildup seriously.
Side 298: It is one of history's great ironies that at the very moment when the United States had a monopoly of nuclear weapons, possessed most of the world's gold, produced half the world's goods on its own territory, and laid down the rules for allies and adversaries alike, it was afraid.
Side 306: The assumption that sustained war economy brings economic and allied well-being encounters a cruel contrast in the shape of what is forgone in the United States in health care, housing, education and minimum nutrition.
Side 308: We may be likened to two scorpions in a bottle, each capable of killing the other, but only at the risk of his own life.
Omslaget viser soldater, der dukker sig i forventning om en atomprøvesprængning i atmosfæren
Indskannet omslag - N650U - 150 dpi
The Making of the Nuclear Age, bind 3
Side -3: Reality is that which, when you don't believe in it, doesn't go away. - Peter Viereck
Side 1: What happened in this country was that a rigid system was created, and then life was herded into it. - Mikhail Gorbachev
Side 79: The Atomic Energy Commission's eight sites and 55000 employees in 1950 expanded to twenty sites and 142000 employees by 1953, and the expansion continued. By the mid-1950's, the nuclear production complex consumed 6.7 percent of total U.S. electrical power and exceeded in capital investment the combined capitalization of Bethlehel Steel, U.S. Steel, Alcoa, DuPont, Goodyear and General Motors.
Side 80: The war of the future would be one in which man could extinguish millions of lives at one blow, demolish the great cities of the world, wipe out the cultural achievements of the past - and destroy the very structure of a civilization that has been slowly and painfully built up through hundreds of generations. Such a war is not a possible policy for rational men.
Side 98: Have you applied your procedures to Hiroshima. Yes, 3 DGZs of 80 KT each.
Side 101: You can't have this kind of war. There just aren't enough bulldozers to scrape the bodies off the streets.
Side 167: Reagan was surprised and shocked that the Soviets had taken his years of militant rhetoric and his massive arms buildup seriously.
Side 298: It is one of history's great ironies that at the very moment when the United States had a monopoly of nuclear weapons, possessed most of the world's gold, produced half the world's goods on its own territory, and laid down the rules for allies and adversaries alike, it was afraid.
Side 306: The assumption that sustained war economy brings economic and allied well-being encounters a cruel contrast in the shape of what is forgone in the United States in health care, housing, education and minimum nutrition.
Side 308: We may be likened to two scorpions in a bottle, each capable of killing the other, but only at the risk of his own life.
Similar in this library
Pages
386
DDC/MDS
| 355.02/1709045 |