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USA og Sovjet, 1980-2010
Indeholder "Map", "Prologue", "Introduction", "Part one", "1: At the precipice", "2: War games", "3: War scare", "4: The germ nightmare", "5: The anthrax factory", "6: The dead hand", "7: Morning again in america", "Part two", "8: We can't go on living like this", "9: Year
Under Bresnev har Sovjet faktisk bygget en fabrik til at lave antrax, dvs miltbrandsporer i tonsvis. Og de har andre virulente ting, der er gjort klar til våbenbrug, fx kopper og tuleremia.
Bakterien Francisella tularensis forårsager sygdom i dyr, specielt harer, og smitter ganske nemt. 10 bakterier indåndet kan være nok til at smitte.
Prologen fortæller om et miltbrand-udslip i Sverdlovsk - sovjets tiendestørste by med 1,2 million indbyggere og en vital del af deres militærindustrielle kompleks. Udslippet skete i starten af april 1979 og kostede mellem 60 og 100 døde.
I 1983 var der falske alarmer fra Sovjets missilvarslingssystemer og regeringen var paranoid, men det vidste militæret godt, så de falske alarmer blev ikke sendt videre.
De to historier om miltbrand og falsk missilalarm er bare optakten. De første par kapitler handler mest om Ronald Reagan og hans besynderlige blanding af personlig charme, urokkelig overbevisning om amerikansk overlegenhed og rædsel over at opdage hvad følgerne af en atomkrig vil være. En lignende isnen har før ramt Eisenhower, Kennedy og senere præsidenter.
I 1983 var Sovjet angste for at vesten forberedte en first-strike krig mod dem. Det var ikke helt forkert set at Reagan var ude efter dem, men det var rent økonomisk og politisk. I deres angst kom de til at skyde en sydkoreansk jumbojet ned.
Både USA og Sovjet er bekymrede over muligheden for et hurtigt angreb på deres ledere. USA satser på at have noget af kommandokæden i sikkerhed og laver øvelser. Russerne laver et system, så gengældelse er nogenlunde sikret, Den døde Hånd, som bogen har taget titel efter.
Biologisk krigsførelse blev forberedt i det skjulte af russerne selv om de havde underskrevet en traktat om at lade være. Traktaten indeholdt ikke noget om gensidig inspektion, så russerne kunne næsten uden hindringer ignorere den. Det lykkedes dem at lave nogle rimeligt skræmmende stammer af dødelige sygdomme.
2. Del kigger på Sovjet efter Bresnev, Andropov og Tjernenko perioden med dysfunktionelle aldrende og syge ledere. Gorbatjov kommer til og går i den grad mod strømmen. Men i starten bliver han misforstået i Vesten og navnlig høgene i USA's regeringsapparat maler skræmmebilleder frem af Sovjets militær. Samtidig er Gorbatjov ved at få overblik over hvor galt det står til og det står rigtig galt til. Faktisk er det svært for ham at se hvor meget Sovjets militær egentlig koster, men et godt gæt er ca 20% af BNP. Imens er Reagan kommet til og han sætter gang i SDI, et stjernekrigsprojekt, som Sovjet ikke tror på vil virke, men som de samtidigt er bange for. Prisen for at matche truslen fra SDI med noget tilsvarende er også meget høj.
Både Sovjet og USA spionerer mod hinanden, men i 1983 er det mest russerne, der har taget teten. Det gør USA og England helt ude af stand til at få oplysninger om hvad sovjettoppen egentligt tænker og tror.
Det er pudsigt at læse at både Reagan og Gorbatjov er enige om at atomvåben er noget farligt skidt, men alligevel hober de dynger op af dem. Et stykke inde i Gorbatjovs regeringstid dukker Chernobyl op og vidner om at systemet er ved at rådne indefra.
Han griber muligheden for at få ryddet op, men har en pudsig ledelsesstil med ikke selv at tage beslutninger. På den måde tillader han fx NGO forskere fra USA at sætte udstyr op til seismiske målinger kun et par hundrede kilometer fra Semipaltinskområdet. I Reykjavik mødes han med Reagan og det er tankevækkende at kende deres tanker og notater og se hvor meget de misforstår hinanden.
Mathias Rust tager en flyver til den røde plads og det bruger Gorbatjov også klogt. Men samtidig er hans magtbase ved at smuldre. Han lader Berlin-muren falde fordi han kan huske Prag-foråret i 1968. De baltiske stater er også på vej væk. Reagan afløses af Bush, der er mere skeptisk og lader et års tid gå uden at der sker noget. En russisk bakteriolog, Pasechnik, hopper af og fortæller alt om det biologiske våbenforskningsprogram, Biopreparat, til englænderne, der lader det gå videre. Man tror på Pasechnik, men det passer dårligt ind i forhandlingerne med russerne at drille dem med det, så man venter lidt og indgår aftaler om gensidig inspektion. Selv om russerne har ryddet op, kan de ikke skjule de kæmpeinstallationer, der i størrelse overgår alt hvad Vesten har haft brug for til vaccineprogrammer.
3. del handler om Sovjets sammenbrud og farerne ved at have atombomber, atombombespecialister og specialister i kemiske og biologiske våben til at stå uden job. Det er ret skræmmende at læse at 90% beriget uran bare har ligget og flydt uden at der var bare en lageropsigt!
Super bog om stormagtsspillet 1980-2010.
Indeholder "Map", "Prologue", "Introduction", "Part one", "1: At the precipice", "2: War games", "3: War scare", "4: The germ nightmare", "5: The anthrax factory", "6: The dead hand", "7: Morning again in america", "Part two", "8: We can't go on living like this", "9: Year
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of the spy", "10: Of swords and shields", "11: The road to Reykjavik", "12: Farewell to arms", "13: Germs, gas and secrets", "14: The lost year", "15: The greatest breakthrough", "16: The year of living dangerously", "Part three", "17: A great unraveling", "18: The scientists", "19: Revelations", "20: Yeltsin's promise", "21: Project Sapphire", "22: Face to face with evil", "Epilogue", "Acknowledgements", "Abbreviations in notes", "Endnotes", "Index", "Text and illustration permissions".Under Bresnev har Sovjet faktisk bygget en fabrik til at lave antrax, dvs miltbrandsporer i tonsvis. Og de har andre virulente ting, der er gjort klar til våbenbrug, fx kopper og tuleremia.
Bakterien Francisella tularensis forårsager sygdom i dyr, specielt harer, og smitter ganske nemt. 10 bakterier indåndet kan være nok til at smitte.
Prologen fortæller om et miltbrand-udslip i Sverdlovsk - sovjets tiendestørste by med 1,2 million indbyggere og en vital del af deres militærindustrielle kompleks. Udslippet skete i starten af april 1979 og kostede mellem 60 og 100 døde.
I 1983 var der falske alarmer fra Sovjets missilvarslingssystemer og regeringen var paranoid, men det vidste militæret godt, så de falske alarmer blev ikke sendt videre.
De to historier om miltbrand og falsk missilalarm er bare optakten. De første par kapitler handler mest om Ronald Reagan og hans besynderlige blanding af personlig charme, urokkelig overbevisning om amerikansk overlegenhed og rædsel over at opdage hvad følgerne af en atomkrig vil være. En lignende isnen har før ramt Eisenhower, Kennedy og senere præsidenter.
I 1983 var Sovjet angste for at vesten forberedte en first-strike krig mod dem. Det var ikke helt forkert set at Reagan var ude efter dem, men det var rent økonomisk og politisk. I deres angst kom de til at skyde en sydkoreansk jumbojet ned.
Både USA og Sovjet er bekymrede over muligheden for et hurtigt angreb på deres ledere. USA satser på at have noget af kommandokæden i sikkerhed og laver øvelser. Russerne laver et system, så gengældelse er nogenlunde sikret, Den døde Hånd, som bogen har taget titel efter.
Biologisk krigsførelse blev forberedt i det skjulte af russerne selv om de havde underskrevet en traktat om at lade være. Traktaten indeholdt ikke noget om gensidig inspektion, så russerne kunne næsten uden hindringer ignorere den. Det lykkedes dem at lave nogle rimeligt skræmmende stammer af dødelige sygdomme.
2. Del kigger på Sovjet efter Bresnev, Andropov og Tjernenko perioden med dysfunktionelle aldrende og syge ledere. Gorbatjov kommer til og går i den grad mod strømmen. Men i starten bliver han misforstået i Vesten og navnlig høgene i USA's regeringsapparat maler skræmmebilleder frem af Sovjets militær. Samtidig er Gorbatjov ved at få overblik over hvor galt det står til og det står rigtig galt til. Faktisk er det svært for ham at se hvor meget Sovjets militær egentlig koster, men et godt gæt er ca 20% af BNP. Imens er Reagan kommet til og han sætter gang i SDI, et stjernekrigsprojekt, som Sovjet ikke tror på vil virke, men som de samtidigt er bange for. Prisen for at matche truslen fra SDI med noget tilsvarende er også meget høj.
Både Sovjet og USA spionerer mod hinanden, men i 1983 er det mest russerne, der har taget teten. Det gør USA og England helt ude af stand til at få oplysninger om hvad sovjettoppen egentligt tænker og tror.
Det er pudsigt at læse at både Reagan og Gorbatjov er enige om at atomvåben er noget farligt skidt, men alligevel hober de dynger op af dem. Et stykke inde i Gorbatjovs regeringstid dukker Chernobyl op og vidner om at systemet er ved at rådne indefra.
Han griber muligheden for at få ryddet op, men har en pudsig ledelsesstil med ikke selv at tage beslutninger. På den måde tillader han fx NGO forskere fra USA at sætte udstyr op til seismiske målinger kun et par hundrede kilometer fra Semipaltinskområdet. I Reykjavik mødes han med Reagan og det er tankevækkende at kende deres tanker og notater og se hvor meget de misforstår hinanden.
Mathias Rust tager en flyver til den røde plads og det bruger Gorbatjov også klogt. Men samtidig er hans magtbase ved at smuldre. Han lader Berlin-muren falde fordi han kan huske Prag-foråret i 1968. De baltiske stater er også på vej væk. Reagan afløses af Bush, der er mere skeptisk og lader et års tid gå uden at der sker noget. En russisk bakteriolog, Pasechnik, hopper af og fortæller alt om det biologiske våbenforskningsprogram, Biopreparat, til englænderne, der lader det gå videre. Man tror på Pasechnik, men det passer dårligt ind i forhandlingerne med russerne at drille dem med det, så man venter lidt og indgår aftaler om gensidig inspektion. Selv om russerne har ryddet op, kan de ikke skjule de kæmpeinstallationer, der i størrelse overgår alt hvad Vesten har haft brug for til vaccineprogrammer.
3. del handler om Sovjets sammenbrud og farerne ved at have atombomber, atombombespecialister og specialister i kemiske og biologiske våben til at stå uden job. Det er ret skræmmende at læse at 90% beriget uran bare har ligget og flydt uden at der var bare en lageropsigt!
Super bog om stormagtsspillet 1980-2010.
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Publication
London : Icon Books, 2011.
Description
During the Cold War, superpowers amassed nuclear arsenals containing the explosive power of one million Hiroshimas. The Soviet Union secretly plotted to create the "Dead Hand," a system designed to launch an automatic retaliatory nuclear strike on the United States, and developed a fearsome biological warfare machine. President Ronald Reagan, hoping to awe the Soviets into submission, pushed hard for the creation of space-based missile defenses. This, the first full account of how the arms race finally ended, provides an unprecedented look at the inner motives and secret decisions of each side. Drawing on top-secret documents from deep inside the Kremlin, memoirs, and interviews in both Russia and the United States, David Hoffman introduces the scientists, soldiers, diplomats, and spies who saw the world sliding toward disaster and tells the gripping story of how Reagan, Gorbachev, and many others struggled to bring the madness to an end.--From publisher description.… (more)
Media reviews
A readable, many-tentacled account of the decades-long military standoff between the United States and the Soviet Union... What’s particularly valuable about Mr. Hoffman’s book, is the skill with which he narrows his focus (and his indefatigable reporting) down to a few essential areas.
User reviews
LibraryThing member nandadevi
This book confirms my prejudice that a Pulitzer Prize is a very reliable indicator of excellence in non-fiction. This book showcases journalism at its best; eminently readable, well researched and ground breaking. I can´t say that this book answers all of the questions about the Cold War, but it
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has answered a lot of questions I would never have thought of asking. For those that remember the Cold War and the sense of the possibility of imminent extinction of life on the planet (an event that would be over in a couple of hours) this book brings back vivid memories. For those born later, they could do worse than remember that old saying about studying history in the hope of never repeating it. This would be one of the prime books for that sort of study. Highly recommended. Show Less
LibraryThing member Narboink
"The Dead Hand" covers enormous swaths of narrative terrain with an exceedingly narrow focus. After briefly introducing Soviet forays into biological and chemical warfare in the late 1970s, Hoffman commences with a retelling of the political and diplomatic bullet points between the U.S. and the
Rather than present an exhaustive study of the complex science or realpolitik pressures at play, Hoffman tends to give credence to personality by singling out quirky moments and conversational tipping points (i.e., the notes President Reagan scrawled in the margins of dense white papers seem to matter more than the content of the papers themselves). There's nothing inherently disingenuous about this kind of history, but it avoids the distinction of being comprehensive.
Apparently there is a significant amount of primary - even groundbreaking - research that has made its way into this book. This may be enough to recommend it to readers with an existing library on the Cold War who nonetheless have an appetite for historical minutia. For those with merely a passing familiarity with the nuclear arms race, this might present more questions than answers (which might recommend it as well). To keep the story moving, Hoffman often breezes over motivations, geopolitics, and technical specifics; a tactic which tends to focus the reader's credulity on the author himself. Fortunately, such credulity is ultimately well placed. There is authority here, even if it not always on display.
Finally, it reads very much like newspaper writing: often dry, with ham-fisted (and unnecessary) attempts to humanize characters, bland repetition for fear of being unclear, and a generalized simplification of convoluted realities.
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Soviet Union in the 1980s. The central concern of this story is the struggle of both superpowers to reduce or eliminate their respective stockpiles of nuclear weapons, with a subplot devoted to the aforementioned biological and chemical weapons programs within the Soviet Union.Rather than present an exhaustive study of the complex science or realpolitik pressures at play, Hoffman tends to give credence to personality by singling out quirky moments and conversational tipping points (i.e., the notes President Reagan scrawled in the margins of dense white papers seem to matter more than the content of the papers themselves). There's nothing inherently disingenuous about this kind of history, but it avoids the distinction of being comprehensive.
Apparently there is a significant amount of primary - even groundbreaking - research that has made its way into this book. This may be enough to recommend it to readers with an existing library on the Cold War who nonetheless have an appetite for historical minutia. For those with merely a passing familiarity with the nuclear arms race, this might present more questions than answers (which might recommend it as well). To keep the story moving, Hoffman often breezes over motivations, geopolitics, and technical specifics; a tactic which tends to focus the reader's credulity on the author himself. Fortunately, such credulity is ultimately well placed. There is authority here, even if it not always on display.
Finally, it reads very much like newspaper writing: often dry, with ham-fisted (and unnecessary) attempts to humanize characters, bland repetition for fear of being unclear, and a generalized simplification of convoluted realities.
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LibraryThing member Schmerguls
This Pulitzer-prize-winning book tells the exciting story of the interaction between Reagan and Gorbachev which, finally, after Reagan was out of office, led to the end of the Cnad War, due to Gorbachev's insistance rather than that of the U.S. The book also details the biologicaj war research
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which Russia carried on, even long after the Cold War ended, and how all the nuclear material still extant is a danger today. Very sobering book, but the account of the events leading to the end of the Cold War is rewarding reading. Show Less
LibraryThing member Othemts
This book is a history of the Cold War from ca. 1979 to collapse of the Soviet empire which draws on interviews, memoirs, and previously secret sources to present both the American and Soviet sides of the story. It's interesting to read about many of the top stories of my childhood from a
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historical perspective - Afghanistan, the Korean Air shoot down, Iran-Contra, Grenada, Reykjavik Summit, the Evil Empire and "We begin bombing Russia in five minutes," Cherynobyl, Glasnost and Perestroika, Mathias Rust flying into Red Square and the Soviet Coup of 1991 are all recounted. There are many surprises such as Ronald Reagan's deep desire to eliminate nuclear weapons from the world which seemed contrary to his defense rhetoric of the time but also the rationale behind Reagan clinging to the Strategic Defense Initiative (even though it was never a reality and it proved a stumbling block in disarmament treaties). Things on the Soviet side are even scarier as a incident in 1983 when a false alarm almost lead to the launch of a full-scale nuclear missile attack. Hoffman also details the Soviets extensive and illegal biological weapons development. The last part of the book Hoffman discusses the danger of the remaining nuclear and biological weapons left over after the collapse of the Soviet Union. While Hoffman's point is that the danger of these weapons didn't go away after 1991, this portion of the book just isn't as compelling as the earlier parts of the book and it feels kind of tacked on. This is a fascinating look at recent history that I found both eye-opening and educational. Show Less
LibraryThing member DSeanW
Increased my opinion of Gorbachev... not so much of Regan. Overall the book needed a stronger structural underpinning, was a bit jumpy and repeated itself a little.
LibraryThing member nmele
We don't hear much about weapons of mass destruction these days, but this history of the Cold War arms race and its aftermath is a warning bell that much needs to be done, not only to abolish nuclear weapons, but also chemical and biological weapons and stocks of enriched uranium and plutonium.
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Hoffman lays out in plain language the extent of unsecured weapons, weapons-grade materials and scientists and technicians who are able to make more of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons. Show Less
LibraryThing member csayban
In a word…frightening! The Dead Hand goes far beyond simply documenting how weapons of mass destruction (nuclear, chemical and biological) shaped policy between the superpowers. It describes just how perilously close we came at several points to all out Armageddon, far worse than the Cuban
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Missile Crisis. Hoffman provides a wealth of information from sources on all sides of the Cold War. Even more chilling is how even today we are haunted by the legacy of destructive arsenals even though the two primary combatants no longer have a beef with each other. The efforts of two superpowers to protect each other are now the deadly tools that rough states and terrorists would love to grab a hold of…and just one would alter our world forever. The Dead Hand is a must read for anyone who lived through the anxiety of the Cold War or wants to know what threatens our way of life today. Well written…and frankly unnerving. Show Less
LibraryThing member Stbalbach
Fascinating look at Soviet WMD programs, people and institutions, as well as Cold War events, espionage and politics in the 1980s. Coming of age in the 1980s, I'd heard of many of these things in the news, but herein we have retrospection and new information. Who needs unreliable and speculative
Hoffman does a particularly good job with the Soviet chemical and biological weapons programs, how they came about, developed and later uncovered. The pathogens created were diabolical enough to kill every human in the world with no anecdote. The Soviet chemical weapons are now loose in Syria, thanks to one rouge individual. As one pundit said, the Soviet weapons problem will be with us for many generations. I was also impressed by the depiction of Reagan who is usually seen as a warmonger but seemingly was just the opposite, he wanted to eliminate all nuclear weapons; however it also revealed the myth that Reagan "won" the Cold War, the Soviets would have failed anyway. 1985 seems to be the beginning of the end when the Old Breed WWII vets lost control and a new generation headed by Gorbachev took over. The book ends on a chilling note that the Cold War had a balance of power, neither side wanted to die, thus WMD's were kept in check. However the present era of terrorism, in which the belligerents want to die, and asynchronous warfare, in which a single person can cause untold damage, changes everything.
There are many great stories in this book, if it drags in a few place that is OK because all told its well worth it. This review is based on the audiobook, it translates well to narrative form.
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news if you can wait a few years for the book to tell what really happened. At times it felt like science fiction because it's so difficult to comprehend a Holocaust that could kill billions of people, but that is what we are asked to imagine as the purpose of these weapons, which are quite real.Hoffman does a particularly good job with the Soviet chemical and biological weapons programs, how they came about, developed and later uncovered. The pathogens created were diabolical enough to kill every human in the world with no anecdote. The Soviet chemical weapons are now loose in Syria, thanks to one rouge individual. As one pundit said, the Soviet weapons problem will be with us for many generations. I was also impressed by the depiction of Reagan who is usually seen as a warmonger but seemingly was just the opposite, he wanted to eliminate all nuclear weapons; however it also revealed the myth that Reagan "won" the Cold War, the Soviets would have failed anyway. 1985 seems to be the beginning of the end when the Old Breed WWII vets lost control and a new generation headed by Gorbachev took over. The book ends on a chilling note that the Cold War had a balance of power, neither side wanted to die, thus WMD's were kept in check. However the present era of terrorism, in which the belligerents want to die, and asynchronous warfare, in which a single person can cause untold damage, changes everything.
There are many great stories in this book, if it drags in a few place that is OK because all told its well worth it. This review is based on the audiobook, it translates well to narrative form.
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LibraryThing member stevesmits
This amazing and, in many respects, chilling book is an account of the winding down of the nuclear arms race between the United States and the Soviet Union. It is amazing because of the interplay on nuclear arms control between the US leadership, principally Ronald Reagan, and the Soviet leaders
Against this intention, however, were his constant provocative anti-Soviet public statements that could be legitimately received as antagonistic, even threatening. The story is chilling because of circumstances in the early 1980’s where misperceptions and the response to those brought us to the brink of an actual nuclear exchange. Reagan’s openly hostile demeanor toward the Soviets brought their leaders (a succession of old guard hacks – Andropov and Chernenko) to believe that the United States was planning a first-strike nuclear attack on the Soviet Union. Their level of obsession reached a state of paranoia. They surmised that the US would first take out the leadership through an all-out attack with its nuclear arsenal. This led to devising a command and control protocol that would allow a launch command to be sent without the real-time authorization of the top leaders – a semi-automatic launch command to the missile officers at the silos, hence the “dead hand” that would in effect pull the nuclear trigger. One thing is clear: the Soviets felt genuinely, if erroneously, threatened about the West’s intentions. While they were not reckless about their own use of nuclear weapons, a series of missteps or technical breakdowns stemming from their fears could have resulted in a nuclear exchange. The book recounts incidents where, due to errors in early warning systems, the Soviets thought they were being attacked. The decision time to launch a counter attack is just minutes, the so-called “hair trigger” danger of nuclear strategy.
Reagan’s effort to eliminate nuclear weapons was thwarted by his obsession with the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI or the so-called Star Wars program). It is puzzling why he held so tightly to this new aspect that would inevitably upset the balance between the super powers. It seems clear that this was not just a bargaining chip he played against the Soviets. He apparently truly believed that this anti-ballistic missile “shield” would protect against nuclear attacks (although the science and technology were/are highly suspect) and could bring about the reduction or elimination of offensive weapons. The Soviets, whose economy could not bear another expensive weapons venture, logically viewed SDI as destabilizing the MAD (Mutually Assured Destruction) balance between the two countries. SDI would create greater threat to them since, after all, if the US could destroy the Soviet’s nuclear missiles then its own could be used without fear of retaliation.
Another chilling aspect of this story, told at great length and in remarkable detail, is the Soviet’s development of biological weapons. After an international treaty banning the production and possession of biological weapon agents was signed by most countries, the Soviet Union completely violated the treaty by continuing with a full-scale, highly secret program of manufacturing the most heinous weapons imaginable. The Soviets believed wrongly that the US was also ignoring the treaty and they continued on a massive scale to find and weaponize diseases that would create the most horrific consequences if used. The Soviet leaders were aware of this, but couldn’t exercise complete control as there was a powerful military-industrial combine that worked to perpetuate it. Indeed, the influence of the defense/warfare sector of the Russian economy (and surely our own) was a strongly contributing factor to the arms race in all dimensions. (One must remember that the Soviet economy had a huge defense industry, a much larger component of the country’s economy than in the US.)
The Soviet Union collapsed during Gorbachev’s rule. Gorbachev was not the radical reformer that he is often portrayed to be, but his moves to open up Soviet society unleashed forces that took matters far beyond what he intended. Gorbachev and Reagan develop a true rapport, but institutional impediments (including the military/industrial combines in both countries and the SDI) prevented making substantial progress on arms control. It was after the Soviet economy collapsed (and, yes, the constant pressure of keeping up with the Americans had something to do with this) that the unsustainability of the levels of nuclear weapons compelled change.
However, as the Soviet’s economy and authority structure collapsed the already poor controls over nuclear weapons and weapons materials have become clear and very worrisome. The book conveys the laxity of security over weapons and weapons materials and the ability of rogue actors to spread these elsewhere. Even if, thankfully, the chances of full-scale nuclear war have greatly lessened, the possibilities that weapons or weapons components could fall into maleficent hands has greatly increased. In the “MAD” era of the cold war (and one would not wish to return to this) the opposing powers had compelling institutional rationales for not attacking each other. Our new enemies have no such inhibiting pressure on them. There are international programs aimed at destroying stockpiles, or at least accounting for them under strict security, but the chances that these materials could fall under the control of terrorists seems very great. One remembers the fear and revulsion created by two homemade “pressure cooker” bombs in Boston; just think of what could happen if even a small amount of nuclear/radioactive elements were unleashed anywhere in the country. The efforts to gain (regain?) control over the security of the products of the Cold War deserve the highest attention possible.
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following Brezhnev. Reagan was sincerely repulsed by the philosophy and practices of communism and his tough talk was an honest expression of his views on the so-called “Evil Empire”. At the same time, and this isn’t so widely known, he was genuinely driven by the idea that the world could be rid of nuclear weapons. His disarmament overtures to the Soviets were bold, usually counter to the advice of his civilian and military advisors, and came remarkably close to succeeding. Against this intention, however, were his constant provocative anti-Soviet public statements that could be legitimately received as antagonistic, even threatening. The story is chilling because of circumstances in the early 1980’s where misperceptions and the response to those brought us to the brink of an actual nuclear exchange. Reagan’s openly hostile demeanor toward the Soviets brought their leaders (a succession of old guard hacks – Andropov and Chernenko) to believe that the United States was planning a first-strike nuclear attack on the Soviet Union. Their level of obsession reached a state of paranoia. They surmised that the US would first take out the leadership through an all-out attack with its nuclear arsenal. This led to devising a command and control protocol that would allow a launch command to be sent without the real-time authorization of the top leaders – a semi-automatic launch command to the missile officers at the silos, hence the “dead hand” that would in effect pull the nuclear trigger. One thing is clear: the Soviets felt genuinely, if erroneously, threatened about the West’s intentions. While they were not reckless about their own use of nuclear weapons, a series of missteps or technical breakdowns stemming from their fears could have resulted in a nuclear exchange. The book recounts incidents where, due to errors in early warning systems, the Soviets thought they were being attacked. The decision time to launch a counter attack is just minutes, the so-called “hair trigger” danger of nuclear strategy.
Reagan’s effort to eliminate nuclear weapons was thwarted by his obsession with the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI or the so-called Star Wars program). It is puzzling why he held so tightly to this new aspect that would inevitably upset the balance between the super powers. It seems clear that this was not just a bargaining chip he played against the Soviets. He apparently truly believed that this anti-ballistic missile “shield” would protect against nuclear attacks (although the science and technology were/are highly suspect) and could bring about the reduction or elimination of offensive weapons. The Soviets, whose economy could not bear another expensive weapons venture, logically viewed SDI as destabilizing the MAD (Mutually Assured Destruction) balance between the two countries. SDI would create greater threat to them since, after all, if the US could destroy the Soviet’s nuclear missiles then its own could be used without fear of retaliation.
Another chilling aspect of this story, told at great length and in remarkable detail, is the Soviet’s development of biological weapons. After an international treaty banning the production and possession of biological weapon agents was signed by most countries, the Soviet Union completely violated the treaty by continuing with a full-scale, highly secret program of manufacturing the most heinous weapons imaginable. The Soviets believed wrongly that the US was also ignoring the treaty and they continued on a massive scale to find and weaponize diseases that would create the most horrific consequences if used. The Soviet leaders were aware of this, but couldn’t exercise complete control as there was a powerful military-industrial combine that worked to perpetuate it. Indeed, the influence of the defense/warfare sector of the Russian economy (and surely our own) was a strongly contributing factor to the arms race in all dimensions. (One must remember that the Soviet economy had a huge defense industry, a much larger component of the country’s economy than in the US.)
The Soviet Union collapsed during Gorbachev’s rule. Gorbachev was not the radical reformer that he is often portrayed to be, but his moves to open up Soviet society unleashed forces that took matters far beyond what he intended. Gorbachev and Reagan develop a true rapport, but institutional impediments (including the military/industrial combines in both countries and the SDI) prevented making substantial progress on arms control. It was after the Soviet economy collapsed (and, yes, the constant pressure of keeping up with the Americans had something to do with this) that the unsustainability of the levels of nuclear weapons compelled change.
However, as the Soviet’s economy and authority structure collapsed the already poor controls over nuclear weapons and weapons materials have become clear and very worrisome. The book conveys the laxity of security over weapons and weapons materials and the ability of rogue actors to spread these elsewhere. Even if, thankfully, the chances of full-scale nuclear war have greatly lessened, the possibilities that weapons or weapons components could fall into maleficent hands has greatly increased. In the “MAD” era of the cold war (and one would not wish to return to this) the opposing powers had compelling institutional rationales for not attacking each other. Our new enemies have no such inhibiting pressure on them. There are international programs aimed at destroying stockpiles, or at least accounting for them under strict security, but the chances that these materials could fall under the control of terrorists seems very great. One remembers the fear and revulsion created by two homemade “pressure cooker” bombs in Boston; just think of what could happen if even a small amount of nuclear/radioactive elements were unleashed anywhere in the country. The efforts to gain (regain?) control over the security of the products of the Cold War deserve the highest attention possible.
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LibraryThing member dham340
Good history of Cold War from around 1980 to 2000.
Lots of little known info on nuclear command control and disarmament issues. The chem bio stuff is downright terrifying when you realize much of the stockpile either still exists or can easily be made by anyone with right materials.
Recommend
Lots of little known info on nuclear command control and disarmament issues. The chem bio stuff is downright terrifying when you realize much of the stockpile either still exists or can easily be made by anyone with right materials.
Recommend
LibraryThing member gregorybrown
A fantastic overview of the '80s and '90s of Cold War nuclear politics, with chilling information about the biological and chemical programs undergone by the USSR at the same time.
LibraryThing member okrick
I listened to this book on mp3.
I expected a relatively balanced history of the cold war. However, the author allocated roughly the same amount of time to the entire history of the cold war prior to President Reagan as he did for each year of the Reagan presidency. The author appears to be a huge
Also, in the introduction the author led me to believe that the work was more balanced between USSR and US points of view. I felt that it was more like 80% US versus 20% USSR points of view.
So if you want to read a history of the cold war from the US point of view during the Reagan years then I highly recommend this book. If you want to read an entire history of the cold war then I suggest looking elsewhere.
I expected a relatively balanced history of the cold war. However, the author allocated roughly the same amount of time to the entire history of the cold war prior to President Reagan as he did for each year of the Reagan presidency. The author appears to be a huge
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fan of the late President.Also, in the introduction the author led me to believe that the work was more balanced between USSR and US points of view. I felt that it was more like 80% US versus 20% USSR points of view.
So if you want to read a history of the cold war from the US point of view during the Reagan years then I highly recommend this book. If you want to read an entire history of the cold war then I suggest looking elsewhere.
Show Less
LibraryThing member reader1009
non fiction. Cold War and subsequent proliferation of WMDs.
Holy crap, this is some serious shit.
Holy crap, this is some serious shit.
Awards
Pulitzer Prize (Winner — General Non-Fiction — 2010)
Lionel Gelber Prize (Shortlist — 2010)
Language
Original language
English
Original publication date
2009
ISBN
9781848312999
Local notes
Omslag: Corbis images
Omslaget viser en fotomontage af Ronald Reagan og Mikhail Gorbatjov på Den røde Plads i Moskva
Indskannet omslag - N650U - 150 dpi
Side ix: "Science has brought us to a point at which we might look forward with confidence to the conquest of disease and even to a true understanding of the life that animates us. And now we have cracked the atom and released such energies as hitherto only the sun and the stars could generate. But we have used the atom's energies to kill, and now we are fashioning weapons out of our knowledge of disease." —Theodor Rosebury,
Peace or Pestilence: Biological Warfare and How to Avoid It, 1949
Side 344: I know who you are and I know what you do. And I know that none of what is written here is true.
Side 447: He opened the first two boxes and carefully packed the samples in them, and resealed them to be shipped back home. Then he opened the third box: it was the gloves, dosimeter, and protective gear he was supposed to have worn while packing the first two boxes. When the samples got back to the United States, an analysis confirmed the uranium was 90 percent enriched.
missingdimension
Omslaget viser en fotomontage af Ronald Reagan og Mikhail Gorbatjov på Den røde Plads i Moskva
Indskannet omslag - N650U - 150 dpi
Side ix: "Science has brought us to a point at which we might look forward with confidence to the conquest of disease and even to a true understanding of the life that animates us. And now we have cracked the atom and released such energies as hitherto only the sun and the stars could generate. But we have used the atom's energies to kill, and now we are fashioning weapons out of our knowledge of disease." —Theodor Rosebury,
Peace or Pestilence: Biological Warfare and How to Avoid It, 1949
Side 344: I know who you are and I know what you do. And I know that none of what is written here is true.
Side 447: He opened the first two boxes and carefully packed the samples in them, and resealed them to be shipped back home. Then he opened the third box: it was the gloves, dosimeter, and protective gear he was supposed to have worn while packing the first two boxes. When the samples got back to the United States, an analysis confirmed the uranium was 90 percent enriched.
missingdimension
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Pages
577
DDC/MDS
| 909.825 |